North Carolina v. Peggs
Decision Date | 23 April 2012 |
Docket Number | 1:11CR331 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES RONALD PEGGS |
This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review of a document filed by James Ronald Peggs (Docket Entry 1), labeled as a "Notice of Removal" (id. at 1), which purports to seek removal to this Court of state criminal case number 11CR039902, pending against Peggs in the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, in Guilford County, North Carolina (see id. at 1-2). (See Docket Entry dated Feb. 10, 2012.) For the reasons that follow, the Court should issue a summary remand and should order Peggs to show cause why the Court should not impose sanctions against him.
According to an attachment to Pegg's instant Notice of Removal, "[o]n or about July 14, 2011 A.D. [Peggs] was unlawfully stopped and detained by two Officers of the Greensboro Police Department and given a 'traffic citation' and required by force to appear in a Statutory Administrative Court." (Docket Entry 1-1 at 3.) Said attachment asserts that, because various governmentagencies and officials (whom Peggs calls "Third Party Defendants")1 do not "have a damaged party as is required by law . . . [t]his is Fraud, Conspiracy, Collusion, Racketeering, Abuse of Power, Denial of Due Process, Dishonor in Commerce, Abuse of Process, Extortion, Coercion, Obstruction of Justice, Assault, etc." (Id.)
Further paragraphs of the attachment complain about:
1) the failure of law enforcement officers to "fully identif[y] themselves as required by the questionaire [Peggs] gave them" (id.);
2) the warrantless seizure of Peggs's driver's license (id.);
3) the "threat" by a law enforcement officer that Peggs would face arrest if he "traveled by private conveyance without a compelled alleged contract (license)" (id. at 4);
4) the refusal by a state district court judge at Peggs's first court appearance for his traffic citation "to accept any declaration other than whether [Peggs] was using an 'attorney, i.e. an officer of the court' or not" (id.);
5) the failure of the state prosecutor to provide "[a]n indictment or presentment as required by the N.C. Constitution for any citation referred to as a 'crime' . . . [and] [a]n 'Assessment for Charges' as required by Federal Law" (id. at 4-5); and 6) the "[f]ailure to 'notify' [Peggs] of the alleged suspension of [his] 'license'" (id. at 5).
As "Support for Removal" of the state criminal case arising from his traffic citation, the instant Notice of Removal alleges:
(Docket Entry 1 at 1-2 (emphasis in original).)
When a defendant in a state criminal case files a notice of removal in a United States District Court, that court 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4) (2011).2 In this case, in light of the allegations in the instant Notice of Removal and its attachments (set forth in the Background section above), "it clearly appears on the face of the notice and [the] exhibits thereto that removal should not be permitted," id., and therefore, the Court "shall make an order for summary remand," id.
In this regard, the Court first should note that "'federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,' constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Owen Equip. andErection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978)). Moreover, federal law severely limits the circumstances under which a litigant may remove a case from state court to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1453 (2011); see also Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (). Further, "[t]he burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is placed upon the party seeking removal." Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151.
Peggs has not carried that burden in this case. Of the federal removal statutes, only three, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443, provide for removal of state criminal cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1453 (2011); accord, e.g., Iowa v. Johnson, 976 F. Supp. 812, 816 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (). Peggs has not satisfied the conditions of those three statutes because the instant Notice of Removal and its attachments lack allegations that Peggs acted as or assisted a federal official, acted as a military member, or faces denial of racial equality. See City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 815 (1966) ; Crawford v. State of Md., No. 92-2190, 4 F.3d 984 (table), 1993 WL 375649, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1993) (unpublished) ; Florida v. Simanonok, 850 F.2d 1429, 1430 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988) ; North Carolina v. Carr, 386 F.2d 129, 131 (4th Cir. 1967) ( ).
"[I]t clearly appears on the face of the [instant] [N]otice [of Removal] and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not be permitted [and thus] the [C]ourt shall make an order forsummary remand." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4) (2011). Indeed, the insufficiency of the instant Notice of Removal rises to such a level that it qualifies as frivolous. See generally Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) ( ).
Peggs's conduct in this regard warrants consideration of sanctions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2011) ( ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) ( ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) ( ). Moreover, in this case, the nonmonetary sanctions the Court should consider should...
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