North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 24 October 1898 |
| Citation | 176 Ill. 635,52 N.E. 21 |
| Parties | NORTH CHICAGO ST. R. CO. v. ANDERSON. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from appellate court, First district.
Action by Rosalie J. Anderson against the North Chicago Street-Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the appellate court (70 Ill. App. 336), and defendant again appeals. Affirmed.
John A. Rose (Francis A. Riddle, of counsel), for appellant.
Richard Prendergast and Carleton N. Gary, for appellee.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the appellate court for the First district affirming a judgment rendered in the superior court of Cook county on the verdict of a jury in favor of the appellee, against the appellant company, in the sum of $10,000. The action was in case, and the ground of recovery was alleged negligence on the part of the appellant company in conducting the movements of one of its trains of street cars on North Clark street, in the city of Chicago, whereby appellee sustained personal injuries.
At the close of all the evidence in the case, the court denied the motion of the appellant company to exclude the testimony, and to instruct the jury to return a verdict finding it not guilty. We have read the briefs of counsel for the respective parties, and heard and considered their arguments orally presented to the court, and have consulted the proofs as preserved in the record, and are clearly of the opinion the trial judge properly declined to direct a finding and verdict in favor of the appellant company, as a matter of law. The evidence tended to establish negligence, as charged, upon the part of the company, and that the appellee exercised ordinary care for her own safety on the occasion in question. An issue of fact thereupon arose, which it was the province of the jury to determine. The jury, the trial judge, and the appellate court having determined that the appellee's case was supported by a preponderance of the evidence; and this court, upon a re-examination of the evidence, having determined that the evidence demanded the submission of the case to a jury, it would seem sufficient we should simply announce such to be our conclusion, without reciting the testimony upon which that conclusion is based.
The alleged improper conduct of counsel for appellee during the hearing in the trial court, and also the language and deportment of counsel during the course of his argument to the jury, are much criticised by counsel for appellant. We have considered these complaints so far as the alleged grounds thereof are disclosed by the record. We find that counsel for both parties were betrayed into the use of intemperate remarks. Counsel who represent the appellant in this court urge that the objectionable observations of their associate counsel in the trial court were indulged in because of the previous irritating conduct of counsel for the appellee, which overcame the patience of said associate counsel, and provoked a heated retort. The rights of parties demand, and the law awards, the largest and most liberal freedom of speech in the trial of causes consistent with justice and fairness and the orderly and decorous administration of the judicial functions of the court. The range of discussion is often necessarily wide, and it is difficult for the court at all times to restrain the zeal of counsel and confine the argument within strictly legitimate bounds. This delicate duty the trial judge who presided upon the hearing of this cause did not in the least seek to avoid, but vigorously and firmly exerted the powers vested in him by law to secure a fair and impartial trial of the cause, and to preserve proper order and decorum in his court. We are here concerned only with regard to the question whether injustice resulted to either of the litigants. The opportunity of the trial court for determining whether the irregularities of counsel for appellee had intervened to prevent the due and proper administration of justice in the cause was much superior to ours; and, upon the motion for new trial, he decided neither party had been thereby prejudiced. Acting upon the lights before us, we are inclined to accept that as the correct view.
The first instruction given on behalf of the appellee is not subject to the criticism preferred against it. The principle it announces is that the preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily to be determined by the greater number of witnesses testifying as to any specified subject of inquiry. The determination as to where the weight or preponderance of the evidence lies...
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People v. Miller
...his feeling of hostility to either of the parties or of undue friendliness to one or the other." (North Chicago Street R.R. Co. v. Anderson (1898), 176 Ill. 635, 639, 52 N.E. 21, 22.) "It is the function of the trier of fact, and not the court of review, to determine the credibility of witn......
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Connelly v. Greenfield Sav. Bank
... ... v. Waldron, 99 N.Y.S. 561; ... Miller v. Boyer, 79 Hun 131, 29 N.Y.S. 479; ... North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Anderson, 176 Ill. 635, ... 52 N.E. 21 ... The ... ...
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