North River Co. v. Belcher

• Decision Date: 13 November 1930
• Citation: 155 Va. 588
• Parties: THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY v. MARION BELCHER.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 588

155 Va. 588

THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY v. MARION BELCHER.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

November 13, 1930.

Present, Prentis, C.J., and Campbell, Epes, Hudgins and Gregory, JJ.

1. FIRE INSURANCE — Title to Property Insured — Knowledge by Agent that Title was not in Insured — Neighborhood Knowledge — Irrelevant Evidence. — In the instant case, an action against an insurance company, the defense of the company was that neither it nor its agent knew that the owner of the legal title had only a life estate in the property, with remainder to the heirs of her body. In an attempt to show that plaintiff had knowledge or notice that his mother-in-law, who, plaintiff claimed, had given the property to his wife, had only a life estate in the tract of land, the husband of the mother-in-law was asked if it was not a fact that it was generally known by everybody in the neighborhood how the deed was made, to which he replied: "Yes." He was then asked if everybody in the neighborhood knew that the deed was made to your wife and then to her heirs, to which he replied: "I don't know." These questions and answers were stricken out as irrelevant and immaterial.

Held: That this action of the court was not error.

2. FIRE INSURANCE — Amendment of Notice of Motion for Judgment — Title to Property Insured — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action on a fire insurance policy, plaintiff alleged that the title to the land upon which the house was erected was not in plaintiff but the land was given to the plaintiff by his father-in-law and mother-in-law prior to the date of the issuance of the policy. After the insurance company had filed its demurrer and grounds of defense, plaintiff was permitted to amend his notice so as to allege that the land was given to the plaintiff and his wife by his father-in-law and mother-in-law, instead of to him alone.

Held: That the action of the court in permitting this amendment was in furtherance of justice, and in accordance with the spirit of the provisions of section 6104 of the Code of 1919.

3. FIRE INSURANCE — Unconditional and Sole Ownership — Building on Ground not Owned in Fee Simple by Insured — Knowledge of Agent as to Plaintiff's Title — Estoppel of Fire Insurance Company — Case at Bar. — In the instant case defendant fire insurance company claimed that the original notice of motion and the amended notice of motion showed that the interest of the insured in the building insured was not the unconditional and sole ownership and that the subject of insurance was a building on ground not owned in fee simple by the insured. Under the allegations of both the original notice and the notice as amended, the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the property insured; and both allege that the facts therein stated with reference to the insured's interest in the property insured and his title to the land upon which the insured building stood were made known to the agent of the defendant prior to the issuance of said policy.

Held: That if this was true, defendant was estopped from asserting that the facts alleged in the notice with reference to plaintiff's interest and title rendered the policy void from its inception.

4. FIRE INSURANCE — Unconditional and Sole Ownership — Building on Ground not Owned in Fee Simple by Insured — Knowledge of Agent as to Plaintiff's Title — Estoppel of Fire Insurance Company. — Where prior to the issuance of a policy containing a provision that the policy shall be void if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership, or if the subject of insurance be a building on ground not owned in fee simple, the insurer, or its agent, has knowledge, actual or imputed, of facts which under the express terms of the policy render it void or unenforceable from its inception, and then issues the policy, it is equivalent to an assertion by the insurer that such facts do not invalidate the policy, and, if the insured has acted in good faith, the insurer is thereby estopped, after loss, from claiming that such facts avoid its liability thereunder.

5. FIRE INSURANCE — Unconditional and Sole Ownership — Building on Ground not Owned in Fee Simple by Insured — Knowledge of Agent as to Plaintiff's Title — Estoppel of Fire Insurance Company — Acts 1928, page 763, 1928 Supp. Virginia Code, Section 4305a, Code of 1930, Section 4305a. — The act of 1928, prescribing the form and requiring the use of a standard fire insurance policy in the State of Virginia (Acts 1928, page 763, 1928 Supp. Virginia Code, section 4305a, Code of 1930, section 4305a) has not abrogated the principle of estoppel, where before the issuance of the policy the insurance company, or its agent, has knowledge of facts which under the express terms of the policy render it void or unenforceable from its inception.

6. FIRE INSURANCE — Acts 1928, page 763, 1928 Supp. Va. Code, Section 4305a, Code of 1930, Section 4305a — Purpose of the Act — Estoppel. — The purpose of the General Assembly in passing the act of 1928 (Acts 1928, page 763, 1928 Supp. Virginia Code, section 4305a, Code of 1930, section 4305a), prescribing a standard policy and requiring its use was to assure in all cases a fair and equitable contract of insurance between the parties, and not to cut off estoppels designed to prevent fraud or imposition, which had theretofore been enforced by the courts in cases in which the policy in question contained the same provisions as those which are contained in the standard policy prescribed by the act.

7. FIRE INSURANCE — Demurrer to the Evidence by Defendant Insurance Company — Jury to Find Amount which Plaintiff is Entitled to Recover and not the Value of the Property Destroyed. — Where in an action upon a fire insurance policy there has been a demurrer to the evidence by the defendant, the office of the jury is to find the amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if the court be of opinion that he is entitled to recover anything, and not the value of the property destroyed.

8. FIRE INSURANCE — Unconditional and Sole Ownership — Building on Ground not Owned in Fee Simple by Insured — Deficiencies in Title not Known to Insurance Company or Its Agent. — Case at Bar — In the instant case, an action upon a fire insurance policy, defendant company demurred to the evidence. The evidence showed that in addition to the deficiencies in interest and defects in the title of plaintiff of which defendant's agent was informed, there were other deficiencies and defects of which neither defendant nor its agent was informed, which constituted a breach of the conditions as to sole and unconditional ownership and the fee simple ownership of the land upon which the property was situated, and which had not been waived by the defendant.

Held: That the court erred in not sustaining the demurrer to the evidence.

9. FIRE INSURANCE — Standard Policy — Unconditional and Sole Ownership — Building on Ground not Owned in Fee Simple by Insured. — The provisions of a policy of insurance with reference to the interest and title of the insured are valid under the common law, and by virtue of the standard policy act of 1928 (Acts 1928, page 763, 1928 Supp. Virginia Code, section 4305a, Code of 1930, section 4305a) are now by statute not only permitted, but required to be included in every Virginia fire insurance policy; and the insured accepting a policy in which they are included is bound thereby, unless the insurer by a binding waiver or by virtue of an estoppel is precluded from relying thereon, or upon the specific breach thereof.

10. FIRE INSURANCE — Standard Policy — Unconditional and Sole Ownership — Building on Ground not Owned in Fee Simple by Insured — Waiver of Provisions by Delivery of Policy. — The delivery by an insurer of a policy containing provisions to the effect that the policy should be void if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership, or if the subject of the insurance be a building on ground not owned in fee simple, without having made inquiry as to the interest or title of the insured, does not constitute a waiver of these provisions or estop the insurer from relying thereon, where the insurer has no knowledge, actual or imputed, of the fact that the interest of the insured is other than the unconditional and sole ownership, or that the building stands upon ground not owned in fee simple by the insured.

11. FIRE INSURANCE — Unconditional and Sole Ownership — Building on Ground not Owned in Fee Simple by Insured — Knowledge of Insurer or Agent — Waiver of Conditions — Estoppel of Insurer. — Where the insurer has knowledge of certain facts which render the interest of the insured other than the unconditional and sole ownership, or his title not a fee simple title, and thereafter issues a policy containing said provisions, the insurer is thereby estopped, after loss, from relying upon such facts, or the breach resulting from such facts, as a defense to recovery under the policy. But the issuance of the policy does not constitute a waiver of the provisions nor estop the insurer from relying thereon, so as, in effect, to eliminate the provisions from the policy. The insurer is only estopped from asserting that the facts of which he had knowledge constituted a breach of the provisions. If there be other facts unknown to the insurer, the existence of which constitute a breach of the provisions, the insurer by issuing the policy neither waives his right to insist thereon as a defense, nor is estopped from relying thereon. This is true whether the knowledge of the insurer has been received from an application of insured or from inquiries made by the insurer of the insured as to his interest or title, or has been otherwise acquired.

12. FIRE INSURANCE — Unconditional and Sole Ownership — Building on Ground not Owned in Fee Simple by Insured — Knowledge of Insurer or Agent — Case at Bar. — In the instant case defendant's agent...