North River Energy Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 28 December 1981
• Docket Number: U,No. 1926,No. 80-7933,1926,80-7933
• Parties: 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2335, 92 Lab.Cas. P 13,192 NORTH RIVER ENERGY CORPORATION, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA; District 20, et al., Defendants, Localnited Mine Workers of America, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1184

664 F.2d 1184

109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2335, 92 Lab.Cas. P 13,192

NORTH RIVER ENERGY CORPORATION, a corporation Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA; District 20, et al., Defendants Local No. 1926, United Mine Workers of America Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee.

No. 80-7933.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 28, 1981.

William E. Mitch, Earl V. Brown, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellant cross-appellee.

Thomas Taliaferro, Forman, Burr & Murray, C. V. Stelzenmuller, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee cross-appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before TUTTLE, HENDERSON and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires the review of a trial court's application of common law agency principles in finding that a local union authorized and ratified only one of seven wildcat strikes at an Alabama mine in violation of an implied "no-strike" clause. Concluding that the district court's findings are not erroneous, we affirm.

FACTS

North River Energy Corp. (North River) operates an underground coal mine in Fayette County, Alabama. The approximately 450 miners working there are members of Local 1926 (Local), United Mine Workers of America (UMWA). The union and employer were parties to a collective bargaining agreement entitled the "National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1978," ¹ which contains an implied "no-strike" clause and a mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure.

The instant case arises out of an unauthorized or "wildcat" strike that erupted at North River's No. 1 mine in Fayette County on May 29, 1979. The genesis of the work stoppage was a "search notice" posted by the company which indicated that it reserved the right to inspect the miners' persons, lunch boxes, lockers and automobiles in an effort to combat losses of company-owned property. On the first day of the strike, the Local conducted a special meeting at which the members discussed the reason for the strike, that is, the company notice concerning inspection. At this meeting Local president Leon Howell directed the miners to return to work. An eyewitness in attendance testified that no vote was taken concerning the controversy. Further, the striking miners did not picket or engage in other overt signs of strike activity.

On May 30, Local president Howell informed mine superintendent Paul Holder that the men would return to work, but only when the company removed the disputed notice. A witness to this discussion testified that Howell neither couched this message as an ultimatum nor indicated that his statements reflected the position of the union membership. Later that day, Howell presented management with a written grievance regarding the search policy.

Towards the latter part of this strike, Howell sent a telegram to North River's management in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, objecting to the proposed searches as violative of the miners' statutory and constitutional rights. ² The message also stated that the search policy was not an arbitrable matter under the collective bargaining agreement. On June 9, 1979, the telegram was approved for payment by and read to the union membership.

North River filed a complaint for injunctive relief and damages under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), against the UMWA, UMWA District 20, and Local 1926, UMWA. Although the district court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the strike on June 5, 1979, none of the Local union officials and committeemen ³ returned to work for forty-eight hours. Work resumed after seven days or twenty-one shifts, and grievance procedures led to the modification and subsequent re-posting of the search notice. ⁴

Over the next year the company experienced six short wildcat strikes, lasting between three and ten shifts, as a result of which North River filed an amended complaint for damages. All production and maintenance employees and all Local union officers and committeemen, with the exception of mine safety personnel known as fire bosses and pumpers, participated in all seven strikes.

After a bench trial, the district court entered into the record orally dictated findings of fact and conclusions of law holding the Local liable for the original strike and assessing damages for company losses at $140,693. In concluding that the union membership actually authorized and ratified the original wildcat strike, the court specifically found that the Local authorized the work stoppage at the "special" meeting conducted on May 29. The court found that "whether formal or informal, some sense of meeting of the membership or of the officers was taken." The court also based its finding on the fact that, later that day, union officials told mine superintendent Holder "that the men would return to work, but only if and when the notices were taken down concerning the inspection." Finally, the court deemed the Howell telegram as tantamount to union approval and ratification of the strike because Howell's message claimed that the strike was outside the purview of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore not an arbitrable matter.

The trial court held, however, that there was not sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the Local "similarly authorized or ratified" the six subsequent strikes for which North River sought damages. In finding the Local not liable for these strikes, the court stated that:

The mere number of strikes does not constitute a sufficient basis ... for inferring Union approval and authorization, particularly where, as here, the strikes, for the most part, were one and two days in length ... and were resolved, so far as appears, without the necessity of court intervention to direct the membership back to work.

The court also found that neither the International nor District 20 authorized, ratified, or instigated any of the seven work stoppages.

The Local now appeals the trial court's finding of union responsibility for the original wildcat strike. The employer has cross-appealed, contesting the district court's failure to find the Local liable for the six short work stoppages.

The Local raises two points on appeal. First, it contends that the district court erred in premising its liability for expressly "authorizing" the first strike upon Howell's discussion with Holder and upon the telegram sent by Howell to North River. The Local posits that Howell's expressions of disagreement with management's position was merely a personal representation of opposition or, alternatively, an exercise of his functions as collective bargaining representative. To require Howell to refrain from expressly disagreeing with the employer during the pendency of an unauthorized strike, the Local argues, would effectively reduce and eliminate his automony as collective bargaining agent. Second, the Local argues that under the standards recently enunciated in Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 100 S.Ct. 410, 62 L.Ed.2d 394 (1979), the district court erred in imposing liability for the original strike upon the union because the Local did nothing to instigate, encourage, or prolong the unauthorized work stoppage, but rather attempted to suppress it.

North River argues that the district court's finding that the Local authorized and ratified the original strike was amply supported by evidence that the membership approved this strike at a union meeting and adopted the mailagram sent by the Local president advocating continuation of the strike. The employer disputes, however, the trial court's holding that there was not sufficient evidence of union responsibility for the six subsequent strikes. First, the company argues that the court erroneously held the employer to a higher standard of proof, contrary to the common law of agency, by requiring proof of actual authorization or ratification. Second, the employer contends that the Local is liable by virtue of the acts of all of its officers in participating in these latter strikes. Third, North River contends that the Local was responsible for the six subsequent strikes under the "mass action" theory. Finally, North River asserts that the court committed error in giving weight to the fact that the last six work stoppages were short-lived and that the employer did not seek an injunction against these strikes.

ISSUES

We must determine whether the district court erred in finding that the Local union authorized and ratified the original wildcat strike and in finding no sufficient evidence to warrant Local union responsibility for the six subsequent strikes.

THE LOCAL'S APPEAL

In assessing whether the district court erred in holding the Local liable for "authorizing" the first work stoppage, we note that findings of fact by a district court shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). A finding of fact is "clearly erroneous," although there is evidence to support it, when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 729 (5th Cir. 1981). Great weight must be given to the findings made and inferences drawn from the evidence by the trial court. Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 710 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1980). The clearly erroneous standard, however, does not apply to "ultimate fact" determinations. Rather, the reviewing court is free to make an independent determination of the ultimate fact, guided by the trial court's determination of subsidiary facts which are not themselves clearly erroneous. United States v. Wiring, Inc., 646 F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).

An independent review of the evidence before the trial court reveals that its finding of authorization, which is an "ultimate fact," Central Appalachian Coal Co. v. UMWA, 376 F.Supp. 914, 923 (S.D.W.Va.1974), is not improper. The...