North v. St. Mary's County

Decision Date01 September 1993
Docket NumberNo. 982,982
Citation638 A.2d 1175,99 Md.App. 502
PartiesJohn C. NORTH, II, et al. v. ST. MARY'S COUNTY et al. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

George E.H. Gay, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. and Thomas A. Deming, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), Annapolis, for appellants.

Joseph R. Densford, Leonardtown, argued for appellee, St. Mary's County.

John T. Enoch, argued (John Amato, IV and Goodman, Meagher & Enoch, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee, John T. Enoch.

Argued before BLOOM, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

Appellant, John C. North, II, Chairman of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission (Chairman), appeals from a decision of the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County affirming a decision of the St. Mary's County Board of Appeals, granting a variance from the provisions of the St. Mary's County Critical Area Program which prohibits the use requested, except as a variance, in the critical area buffer zone. Mr John T. Enoch and the Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary's County are the appellees.

Appellant poses two questions:

1. Was there substantial evidence before the Board to support its decision to grant the variance?

2. Is the Board's decision supported by lawfully sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law?

In addressing this case, it is important to recognize what it is and what it is not. Though appellant extensively refers to the public policy behind Maryland's Chesapeake Bay Critical Area legislation, this is not a case involving any interpretation or review of that legislation. The time for review and challenges to that legislation were: (1) when it was adopted, (2) subsequently when St. Mary's County adopted its program pursuant to the requirements of the state legislation, or (3) by a direct constitutional challenge to the state and county legislation when the case was heard below. No such challenge was made below in the case at bar. This case is, thus, a simple zoning variance case.

Facts

Mr. Enoch, appellee, owns a 4.3 acre parcel of land adjacent to Cuckold Creek in St. Mary's County. The parcel is within the County's critical area, i.e., within 1,000 feet beyond the landward boundaries of wetlands and the heads of tides. It is partially within the County's critical area buffer.

Part of the parcel is already developed with a ranch home and outbuildings. The structure at issue here is a proposed gazebo to be built within twenty-five feet 1 from the mean high water mark of the creek. Mr. Enoch's purpose in building the gazebo, it is alleged, is to have a place to contemplate, read and enjoy the view.

The existing ranch house backs up to the waters of the creek. Attached to the rear of the house is a network of exterior decking extending twenty to thirty feet out over the steep shore, which extends twenty feet or more to the waters of the creek. The water view from the deck is unobstructed. A walkway leads from the decks down the creek bank to a pier that extends out into the creek.

The gazebo is not a permitted use under the County's program. Mr. Enoch, therefore, applied for a variance from the provisions of the code to enable him to construct the gazebo. The County's Department of Planning and Zoning informed the Board of Appeals that Mr. Enoch did not meet the requirements entitling him to a variance because there were no special circumstances existing which established that Mr. Enoch had an unwarranted hardship.

Mr. Enoch admitted at the hearing before the Board of Appeals that:

I think that if we're not permitted to use this point for a scenic view, that it would be a deprivation of the rights of the property owner, maybe not a great deprivation....

....

... The whole purpose ... is ... to be able to walk out ... and observe that view.... I have a little bench ..., a couple chairs and a table where I sit out there [the point] and read.... [T]his gazebo ... would permit a better access to this. [Emphasis added.]

Standing

Before addressing the questions raised by appellant, it is necessary to resolve an issue raised by appellee Enoch. He asserts that:

The Commission has no standing to assert non-environmental features of the St. Mary's County program, such as "unwarranted hardship."

He argues:

Enoch respectfully asserts that the standing conferred upon the Chairman under § 8-1812 of the Natural Resources Article must be interpreted as limited to the State's interest in overseeing the resource protection program for the Bay and its tributaries; i.e. the State only has standing on variance approval issues to the extent they are based on adverse impact to water quality, wildlife or natural habitat of the adjacent shoreline. The Commission has no more standing to argue "unwarranted hardship," in the face of an undisputed finding that this gazebo will have no adverse environmental impact, than it would to argue that the variance must be denied because Enoch did not pay the County's application fee.

....

In this case the Commission concedes that if the Planting Agreement is implemented at the time of the gazebo construction, the granting of the variance will not adversely affect water quality or adversely impact fish, wildlife, or plant habitat.... Wholly apart from environmental concerns, the State now sees itself as the dictator of what is a luxury and what is a hardship with respect to the use of Enoch's property. Gazebos, says the Commission, are luxuries that the State can deny property owners even in the absence of adverse environmental consequences. Enoch disagrees. The Court should dismiss the appeal as it contains no justifiable issue that the Commission, or its Chairman, can lawfully assert.

We found it unnecessary to address a similar issue in The Wharf at Handy's Point, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 92 Md.App. 659, 610 A.2d 314 (1992), where we based our decision on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It is now necessary for this issue of standing to be resolved.

As we perceive the pertinent statutory provisions, the only limit on the Chairman's right, or standing, to appeal the issuance of variances is that provision found in Md.Nat.Res.Code Ann. § 8-1812(a) (1990 Repl.Vol.) where it provides that the Chairman must withdraw [the appeal] "if, within 35 days ... at least 13 members [of the Commission] indicate disapproval...." There is no evidence that the Chairman's authority was so withdrawn.

The statutes addressing his right to appeal state:

After the Commission has approved ... a program, the chairman ... has standing and the right and authority to ... appeal ... concerning a project approval in the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area.

Id.

The chairman may appeal an action or decision even if the chairman was not a party to or is not specifically aggrieved by the action or decision.

Id. at section 8-1812(c) (emphasis added).

Additionally, COMAR 27.01.11C, the State regulations authorizing local programs to contain variance provisions, states:

Appeals ... shall be taken in accordance with all applicable laws and procedures of each local jurisdiction for variances.... [T]he Chairman may appeal an action or decision even if the Chairman was not a party to or is not specifically aggrieved by the action or decision. [Emphasis added].

It is clear to us that the Chairman's (thus, the Commission's) right to appeal a decision of the Board is unrestricted. We, therefore, reject Enoch's claim that the Commission has no standing to assert non-environmental features of the St. Mary's County's ordinance enacted pursuant to the dictates of the Natural Resources Article.

We are concerned that the Commission initially offered no evidence, nor did anyone, of any environmental damage that might occur if this gazebo were to be built. 2 As we perceive the general thrust of the state and local legislation, the Commission was included as an unlimited litigant in order to permit it to fully guard the environmental interests it was created to protect. The local ordinance, and the state legislation, authorize the Chairman to be a full litigant. We are thus constrained to permit the Chairman to litigate all issues. As we noted in Green v. Bair, 77 Md.App. 144, 152, 549 A.2d 762 (1988), cert. denied, 315 Md. 307, 554 A.2d 393 (1989), quoting the trial court:

It is not for the court to decide the wisdom, vel non, of the zoning code, as adopted by the Mayor and common council [of St. Mary's County], but rather to enforce it as it is written.

1.

Was there substantial evidence before the Board to support its decision to grant a variance?

The Law

We said in Enviro-Gro Technologies v. Bockelmann, 88 Md.App. 323, 335, 594 A.2d 1190, cert. denied, 325 Md. 94, 599 A.2d 447 (1991):

We, in discussing the law relative to rezoning, have stated that the courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the legislative agency, if the issue is rendered fairly debatable. The basic reason for the "fairly debatable" rule is that zoning matters are, first of all, legislative functions and, absent arbitrary and capricious actions, are presumptively correct if based upon substantial evidence; even if substantial evidence to the contrary exists. [Emphasis added, citations omitted.]

See also Luxmanor Citizen's Assoc., Inc. v. Burkart, 266 Md. 631, 647, 296 A.2d 403 (1972); Chesapeake Ranch Club, Inc. v. Fulcher, 48 Md.App. 223, 227-28, 426 A.2d 428 (1981). We also stated in Neuman v. Mayor & City Council, 23 Md.App. 13, 14, 325 A.2d 146 (1974), that "where the action of the Board is not supported by substantial evidence the board's decision cannot be said to be 'fairly debatable.' Under those circumstances the board's finding falls into the category of being arbitrary, capricious and a denial of due process of law." See also Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. People's Counsel, 96 Md.App 219, 224, 624 A.2d 1281 (1993); County Comm'rs v. Zent, 86 Md.App....

To continue reading

Request your trial
26 cases
  • Cromwell v. Ward, 617
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1994
    ...appears to be no distinction between the two terms...."). 7 We also attempted to indicate the problem in North v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md.App. 502, 510, 638 A.2d 1175 (1994), in footnote Baltimore City's zoning code makes no distinction between special exceptions and variances. Its code tr......
  • Lewis v. Dept. of Natural Resources
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • July 31, 2003
    ...to withdrawal if thirteen members of the Commission oppose the intervention within thirty-five days. See North v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md.App. 502, 508, 638 A.2d 1175, 1178 (noting that section 8-1812 confers `unrestricted' standing upon the Commission to appeal any administrative or judic......
  • Chesley v. Annapolis
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 27, 2007
    ... ...       The Chesleys petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The City Attorney, acting as counsel for the Board, gave notice of the Board's intent to ... v. North, 355 Md. 259, 281, 734 A.2d 227 (1999) ...         There are different types of ... ...
  • Steel v. Cape Corp.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1995
    ...of school facilities. Moreover, the Critical Area Commission had no objections to the rezoning. We noted, in North v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md. App. 502, 507, 638 A.2d 1175, cert. denied, 336 Md. 224, 647 A.2d 444 (1994), that the Critical Area Commission's involvement in local zoning matte......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT