North Western Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Heimann

• Decision Date: 14 February 1884
• Docket Number: 10,377
• Citation: 93 Ind. 24
• Parties: North Western Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Heimann
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

93 Ind. 24

North Western Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Heimann

No. 10,377

Supreme Court of Indiana

February 14, 1884

From the Vanderburgh Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

T. A Hendricks, A. W. Hendricks, C. Baker, O. B. Hord, A. Baker and E. Daniels, for appellant.

J. M Shackleford, A. Gilchrist and C. H. Butterfield, for appellee.

OPINION

Zollars J.

As creditor of William H. Fowler, appellee was made the beneficiary in a policy of insurance, issued by appellant, upon the life of said Fowler. After the death of Fowler this action was brought upon that policy. Defence is made by the company upon alleged false answers in the application for the insurance. With the general verdict for appellee, the jury returned answers to interrogatories submitted by appellant.

With other reasons urged for a reversal of the judgment, are a refusal by the trial court to strike out and suppress one of these answers, and the overruling of appellant's motion for judgment, notwithstanding the general verdict.

One of the defences set up and urged below and here is a false statement in the application for the insurance, in relation to the amount of Fowler's indebtedness to appellee.

The application and policy show that appellee was made a beneficiary as the creditor of Fowler. Upon the question of that indebtedness the application contains the following:

"21st. It is also declared that the above named beneficiary has an interest in the life of the person whose life is proposed for insurance, to the full extent of the amount of insurance applied for."

It is further declared in the application that it is the basis of the contract of insurance, that the several answers by the applicant are fair and true, and that any untrue or fraudulent answers, or any suppression of facts in regard to the applicant's health, habits or circumstances, material to the risk, shall vitiate the policy. The policy issued upon the application is for $ 1,000. It contains a provision that if any of the statements or declarations in the application shall be found to be in any material respect untrue, the policy shall be null and void.

At the request of appellant, the court submitted to the jury a number of interrogatories, three of which, with the answers of the jury thereto, were as follows:

"15th. To what amount was said Heimann the creditor of said Fowler, at the time of making said application? Answer. $ 581.45.

"16th. Had said Heimann any other interest in the life of said Fowler? Ans. None.

"17th. If he had any interest other than as a creditor, what was that interest? Ans. A verbal obligation for the payment of $ 300, and interest, for goods obtained by Stone and Fowler from Heimann."

After the jury had been discharged, appellant, by counsel, moved to suppress and reject the last answer, because inconsistent with the two preceding, and because it is uncertain and meaningless.

If this answer is open to the objections urged against it, appellant's remedy was to ask the court to refer the interrogatory back to the jury for a more pertinent and specific answer. Not having done so, we think that the trial court was not in error in overruling the motion to reject the answer. Noble v. Enos, 19 Ind. 72; Noakes v. Morey, 30 Ind. 103; McElfresh v. Guard, 32 Ind. 408; Reeves v. Plough, 41 Ind. 204.

The court had no right to reject the answer, nor disregard it, in passing upon the motion of appellant for judgment upon the interrogatories, notwithstanding the general verdict for appellee.

The answers are not in irreconcilable conflict with each other, nor with the general verdict. The jury evidently understood the interrogatories to require answers, first, as to the amount that Fowler alone was indebted to appellee, and, second, as to the amount of any other indebtedness of whatever kind; and hence they answered that, alone, he was indebted in the sum of $ 581.45, and with Stone, in the amount of $ 300 and interest. How much the interest amounted to, the jury did not, nor were they required to answer. For aught that we can know, the interest may have been sufficient to swell the indebtedness up to and beyond the amount of the policy. And so far as shown by the answer, or anything in the record, Fowler was liable for the whole amount of the joint indebtedness with Stone. This might have been because they were partners, or because Stone was insolvent. So far as it affects the contract of insurance, it makes no difference whether the "verbal obligation" was within the statute of frauds or barred by the statute of limitations. The company is not in a position to raise either of these questions. Bliss L. Ins., section 28; Wills v. Ross, 77 Ind. 1 (40 Am. R. 279); Cool v. Peters, etc., Co., 87 Ind. 531.

The general verdict implies a finding by the jury that Fowler was indebted to appellee in the amount stated in the policy. The rule is well settled that judgment will be given on answers to interrogatories, only in cases where there is an irreconcilable conflict between them and the general verdict. Byram v. Galbraith, 75 Ind. 134, and cases cited; Higgins v. Kendall, 73 Ind. 522; Louthain v. Miller, 85 Ind. 161.

It is also settled that where the evidence is not in the record, as in this case, every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the general verdict. Salander v. Lockwood, 66 Ind. 285. As there is no such irreconcilable conflict between the answers to the interrogatories and the general verdict in the case before us, we must hold that the court below did not err in overruling appellant's motion for judgment.

It is contended on behalf of appellant that the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury four interrogatories. One of them sought an answer from the jury as to whether or not the policy was issued upon the faith of an application, partly printed and partly in writing, made by appellee and Fowler. We are unable to see what difference it could make whether the application was partially or wholly in writing. The copy of the policy filed with the complaint shows that the policy was issued upon the faith of the application. There seems to have been no controversy about that. The instructions are all based upon that theory. We know of no way, and counsel suggest none, in which an answer to the interrogatory could have affected the general verdict. When such is the case, the refusal to submit an interrogatory is not an available error for the reversal of the judgment. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Noel, 77 Ind. 110.

A part of the sixteenth question in the application is as follows: "Are you engaged in any way in the sale of alcoholic liquors?" The answer is: "No; have been, but am not now in any way connected with the sale of liquors."

The application and this answer, with the other answers, were made on the 17th day of April, 1877. One of the defences relied upon by appellant is that this answer was false. Of the interrogatories submitted by it upon this question, the court submitted five and rejected three. To the five thus submitted the jury responded that the answer by Fowler was true. This is the...