NORTHBROOK INS. v. UNITED SERVICES AUTO.
Decision Date | 24 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-CV-641.,92-CV-641. |
Citation | 626 A.2d 915 |
Parties | NORTHBROOK INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Paul H. Ethridge, Rockville, MD, for appellant. Thomas Patrick Ryan, Rockville, MD, filed a brief.
David F. Grimaldi, Washington, DC, for appellee.
Before TERRY and SCHWELB, Associate Judges, and BELSON, Senior Judge.
This appeal requires us to resolve a controversy between two insurance companies regarding their respective responsibilities in connection with an automobile accident caused by the negligence of the operator of a rented vehicle. We affirm the trial court's holding, on cross-motions for summary judgment, that the rental company's insurer is solely responsible for compensating the driver of the other vehicle for his injuries (and the driver's wife for alleged loss of consortium), and that the company which insured the individual who rented the car (but who was not operating it at the time of the accident) has no liability.
Almost eight years ago, on July 26, 1985, Mlle. Maria Claudel, a resident of France, was operating a car which Major Carl McCarden, a resident of St. Croix, V.I., had rented in Falls Church, Virginia from Adjusters Auto Rental, Inc. (Adjusters), d/b/a Jiffy Auto Rental. As she approached a traffic light on Massachusetts Avenue in northwest Washington, D.C., Mlle. Claudel "had a blank" and her foot slipped off the brake. The vehicle, which was equipped with an automatic transmission, rear-ended a truck which was being operated by Mitchell Goodrum, a resident of Maryland.
Goodrum suffered serious injuries to his back, and he and his wife promptly filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, based on diversity of citizenship, against McCarden, Mlle. Claudel, and Adjusters. The Goodrums moved for partial summary judgment as to liability. On December 19, 1988, a federal district judge granted the motion, holding that the accident was caused by Mlle. Claudel's negligence and that she was operating the vehicle with the consent of Major McCarden and Adjusters. Goodrum v. McCarden, et al., C.A. No. 85-3396 SSH (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1988). The case was subsequently settled for $125,000.
Adjusters was insured by appellant Northbrook Insurance Company. So far as the record shows, Mlle. Claudel had no relevant insurance. McCarden had several policies with appellee United Services Automobile Association (USAA). Northbrook paid $25,000 towards the settlement; USAA paid $100,000. It was agreed between Adjusters, Northbrook and USAA that any applicable insurance coverage dispute between these parties would be decided in an action for a declaratory judgment.
On March 25, 1992, USAA filed the present action against Northbrook and Adjusters.1 The facts were largely undisputed. Northbrook and USAA each filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial judge granted USAA's motion and denied Northbrook's. This appeal followed.
Graff v. Malawer, 592 A.2d 1038, 1040 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). "The test for deciding a motion for summary judgment is essentially the same as that for a motion for a directed verdict." Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 199 (D.C.1991).
Read, supra, 493 A.2d at 1016 (citing Holland, supra, 456 A.2d at 814 n. 9). When there is no dispute as to any material fact, the issue on appeal is whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1366, (D.C.1977).
In the present case, the facts are almost entirely undisputed. The questions presented to us are thus questions of law, and we therefore review the trial judge's disposition of them de novo.
This appeal turns largely on the provisions of specific insurance policies issued by USAA and by Northbrook. We conclude, based on a careful examination of the policies, that those issued by USAA to Major McCarden do not cover the accident in question, but that two of Northbrook's policies do apply to it.
At the time of the collision, Major McCarden was insured by USAA under four policies. These policies provided liability coverage to McCarden with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence.2
Subparagraph 1 does not apply to the collision which precipitated this case. It does not reach Major McCarden because he did not own the rented vehicle, nor does Northbrook allege that he was maintaining or using it.3 Neither Adjusters nor Mlle. Claudel was a "family member," as required by subparagraph 1.
(Emphasis added).
The car which Mlle. Claudel was driving was not shown in the Declarations, nor was it a "temporary substitute" for any other vehicle which had become unavailable as a result of breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction. In fact, Major McCarden testified, and Northbrook does not deny, that he rented the car because all of his vehicles were in locations other than Washington, and because he needed one to drive during his visit here.
6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4293.5, at 209 n. 38.30 (1979) (emphasis added) (citing Fulton v. Woodford, 17 Ariz.App. 490, 498 P.2d 564, 569 (1972)). The USAA policies were phrased in the very terms used in APPLEMAN, and were inapplicable to the scenario in the present case, which was a conventional short-term rental by someone who had no vehicle of his own in the Washington, D.C. area.5
At the time of the accident, Adjusters was insured by three separate Northbrook policies, with limits of $25,000, $1,000,000 and $5,000,000, respectively. Northbrook acknowledges that the $25,000 policy covered the accident. USAA concedes that the $5,000,000 policy does not apply. The parties are in disagreement only as to whether the $1,000,000 policy afforded coverage to Adjusters.
On its face, the policy plainly applies to the accident in question. Goodrum's injury resulted from the use of the rental car. It is undisputed that Mlle. Claudel was using that car with Adjusters' permission. Finally, as we have explained in connection with the discussion of USAA's policy, the rental was not pursuant to a "Temporary Substitute Automobile Lease Agreement," as that phrase is used in the industry.7
Northbrook, however, relies on Endorsement No. 3 to its $1,000,000 policy. That Endorsement provides in pertinent part as follows:
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