Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Scholl

• Decision Date: 11 July 1860
• Citation: 16 Md. 331
• Parties: THE NORTHERN CENTRAL COMPANY v. MARY ANN SCHOLL, Adm'x of ELIAS SCHOLL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

16 Md. 331

THE NORTHERN CENTRAL COMPANY v. MARY ANN SCHOLL, Adm'x of ELIAS SCHOLL.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 11, 1860

A ticket-agent of the Northern Central Railway Company, a Maryland corporation, sold a ticket, in Pennsylvania, to a negro, after notice that he was a runaway slave, entitling him to pass over a portion of its road in that State, whereby his escape from service was facilitated. HELD:

1st. That this was a tort for which the master of the slave, a citizen of Maryland, may recover the value of the slave, in a Maryland court, against the railway company.

2nd. It makes no difference that the act was committed without the limits of Maryland, and in the State of Pennsylvania, by whose laws slavery is not recognized.

3rd. Nor is the jurisdiction of such a tort vested, by the Act of Congress of 1850, ch. 60, exclusively in the District court of the United States for Pennsylvania; the 7th section of that Act allowing the recovery of damages in certain cases, does not touch the question of the value of the escaped slave.

4th. Nor is it essential to the plaintiff's recovery, that he should prove that the loss of the slave was attributable wholly to his being transported on the defendant's road, from one place to another, in Pennsylvania; if the defendant aided him in his escape, it matters not who assisted in it.

A personal tort, committed against a citizen of Marryland, in another State, may be redressed by action against the wrong-doer, in the courts of Maryland, whenever he comes within its limits.

In all actions for injuries, ex-delicto to the person, or to personal property, the venue is, in general, transitory and may be laid in any county, though committed out of the jurisdiction of the court or out of the State.

The right of property of the citizens of Maryland in their negro slaves, is recognized by the Constitution of the United States, which is the supreme law of the country.

Whilst it is competent to Pennsylvania, or any other State, to prohibit negro slavery within its borders, yet, it is beyond its power to authorize its inhabitants, or others, to assist in despoiling the citizens of Maryland of their property in slaves.

A State may, if it pleases, forbid its courts to grant redress for such a wrong, but it cannot oust the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of the injured party; whenever the wrong-doer comes within its limits, he is liable to be made answerable for his tortious acts.

Though slavery be not established by the laws of Pennsylvania, it is recognized, and its protection guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and a railway company in that State has no more right, knowingly, to assist in the escape of a runaway slave than a wagoner on the high road.

By an agreement between the defendant and another railroad company the defendant was to appoint an agent, whose duty it was to receive and collect freight, to sell all passengers tickets, and to receive the revenues accruing from the joint operations of the two companies. HELD:

That by this agreement there is no partition of the agency as to the sales of through tickets over both roads; the defendant is responsible for the manner in which this agent discharges his duty in the sale of such tickets.

APPEAL from the Superior Court for Baltimore City.

This action was brought on the 11th of July 1855, by the appellee's intestate, against the appellant, to recover the value of a slave for life, named Solomon Digges belonging to the plaintiff, and alleged to have been lost to him by being transported in the cars over the railway of the defendant.

Exception. The pleadings and evidence are sufficiently stated in the opinion of this court. After all the evidence had been offered on both sides, the plaintiff asked the following instruction to the jury:

That if the jury shall find, from the evidence in the cause, that the defendant by arrangement with the Hanover Branch Railroad Company, had the authority to appoint an agent for the sale of passenger tickets, from Hanover to Baltimore, York, Harrisburgh and Columbia, and that the defendant in pursuance of such arrangement, and by virtue of such authority, had, prior to May 1855, appointed the witness, Leib, such agent, and that Leib, during May 1855, acted as such agent, and sold tickets for the passage of persons holding them from Hanover to said point, or points, named in said tickets respectively, and that on the morning of the 28th of May 1855, Leib, as such agent, sold and delivered to the negro man, Solomon Digges, spoken of by the witnesses Epply and Barrick, a ticket to pass on the said Hanover Branch Railroad to the place called the Junction, and thence in the cars of the defendant to York, and that in virtue of said ticket, the said negro man did travel over the said railroad from Hanover to the Junction, and thence on the railroad of the defendant from the Junction to York; and shall further find, from the evidence, that said slave was a valuable slave, and that he became and was wholly lost to the intestate of the plaintiff, and is wholly lost to his estate and to the plaintiff; and shall further find that the said agent, before the cars started, was notified that the said negro man was a slave and had run away from his master in Frederick county, and that said agent, notwithstanding said notice did not forbid or prohibit the said negro man from keeping in the cars with said ticket, and did not take any steps, nor make any effort to prevent the said negro man from going on in said cars, or to get back said ticket, or to prevent the escape of said negro, then the conduct of said agent was wrongful and negligent, and the defendant is responsible to the plaintiff for such damages, if any, as the jury may find, from the evidence, the plaintiff's intestate sustained by reason of such conduct.

The defendant then asked the following instructions:

1st. That the defendant is a common carrier of passengers, and bound to carry in its cars all persons entitled to be so carried, upon tendering the defendant the fare prescribed by law, and complying with such reasonable regulations as the defendant may prescribe, and that it is responsible in damages for a refusal to carry any such persons on those terms.

2nd. That by the true construction of the contract between the defendant and the Hanover Branch Railroad Company, offered in evidence by the plaintiff, the agent mentioned in the third article thereof, though to be appointed by the defendant, was, as to sales of through tickets made by him, the agent of the Hanover company, so far as said tickets authorized a passage over the road and in the cars of said Hanover company, and under the division made by the fifth article of the fare received by him at Hanover for through passenger tickets, the portion thereof payable to the defendant was for the transportation of passengers by the defendant over its own road, and not for the transportation over the road of the said Hanover company; and if the jury shall find, from the evidence, that Mr. Leib was appointed by the defendant as agent, under the said third article and accepted said appointment, and while acting as such agent, sold to Solomon Digges, the slave of the plaintiff's intestate, (if they shall find him to have been the slave of the said intestate,) at Hanover, under said agreement, a through ticket from Hanover to York, and that by virtue thereof he was entitled to a passage in the cars of the said Hanover company, and propelled by its motive power upon the said Hanover company's said road, from Hanover to the junction of the said Hanover company's road, with the road of the defendant, and thence in the cars of the defendant, and propelled by its motive power and over its railway to York; and that the defendant and the said Hanover company are not one but different companies, and own and use, and did then own and use, separate roads, cars and motive power, then that the defendant is not liable for the sale of said through ticket so far as it respected the transportation of the said slave on the said Hanover company's road, or for the transportation of said slave upon the said last mentioned road.

3rd. If the jury shall find that the defendant was formed, and constituted a corporation in 1854, under the Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania of 1854, No. 531, (which has been offered in evidence by consent,) and the Act of Assembly of Maryland of 1854, ch. 250, upon the terms and conditions contained in the written agreement for that purpose offered in evidence by consent, and entered into by the Baltimore & Susquehanna Rail Road Company, and the other parties thereto, and that a full record and report thereof was certified by the president of said company, and transmitted to the Governors of Maryland and Pennsylvania; and if they shall further find, from the evidence, that Solomon Digges was the slave of the plaintiff's intestate, and that the said slave bought a passage ticket for transportation by the defendant on its cars upon its railway, as stated by the plaintiff's witnesses, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this action under the Act of 1838, ch. 375, provided, the jury shall find from the evidence that the said sale of the said ticket was made in Pennsylvania, and that the part of the defendant's railway upon which the said slave so procured a ticket for transportation, and was transported, was within the State of Pennsylvania.

4th. If the jury shall find from the evidence, that Solomon Digges was the slave of the plaintiff's intestate, and that the said slave bought a passage ticket for transportation, and was transported, in the defendant's cars upon its railway, and that the defendant, and the person selling said ticket on ...