Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel

Decision Date11 July 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-4389,86-4389
Citation851 F.2d 1152
Parties, 11 Fed.R.Serv.3d 38 NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald P. HODEL, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Western Energy Co.; Wesco Resources, Inc.; and Thermal Energy, Inc., Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Steven H. Chestnut and Marc D. Slonim, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellant.

F. Henry Habicht, II, Jacques B. Gelin, Michael W. Reed, Robert L. Klarquist and William R. Murray, Jr., Washington, D.C., Byron H. Dunbar, Billings, Mont., for defendants-appellees.

L.W. Peterson, Billings, Mont., for Wesco Resources, Inc., Stephen H. Foster, Billings, Mont., for Thermal Energy, Inc., James A. Poore, III and Gary L. Walton, Butte, Mont., for Western Energy, for defendants-intervenors-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana.

Before WALLACE, NORRIS and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge:

The Northern Cheyenne Tribe (the Tribe) appeals from an amended injunction against the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary). The amended injunction is defended by the Secretary and by Thermal Energy, Inc. (Thermal), Wesco Resources, Inc. (Wesco), and Western Energy Co. (Western Energy). Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1362. We hold that the injunction should be modified further and remand for this purpose.

BACKGROUND

In the aftermath of the Battle of Little Bighorn, the Northern Cheyenne moved to Montana. Virtually no white men inhabited the country. The land lay along no migration routes "and remained physically isolated until the 1950's." Then the first paved highway across the reservation was laid. E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Indians of the Great Plains (1978) 124-125. In this beautiful environment, the Northern Cheyenne "retained much of their identity" as the people of the Morning Star. Id. at 131. The discovery of extensive coal deposits in the region produced a crisis for the Tribe. Id. at 132-133.

In 1982 the Secretary decided to offer to lease 2.24 billion tons of federal coal in the Powder River region of Montana and Wyoming. The eight Montana tracts border the Tribe's reservation on the north, east and south. The Tribe occupies 445,000 acres. The population of the reservation is approximately 4,300, of whom 85% are Indian. The predominant use of the land is cattle grazing.

The Secretary's decision was based on a final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which, except for occasional peripheral references, did not mention any impact on the Tribe. On April 15, 1982 the Tribe brought this action to enjoin the Secretary from proceeding with the leases without complying with federal law in such a way as to avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse impacts of the leases on the Tribe.

On April 28, 1982 the Secretary proceeded with sale of the leases. The bidders were notified of the Tribe's suit and went ahead nonetheless. Thermal was the successful bidder for Tract M-54714; Wesco was the successful bidder for Tract M-54710; and Western Energy was the successful bidder on Tracts M-54711, M-54712, and M-54713.

On May 28, 1985 the district court granted the Tribe summary judgment and held that the decision to make the Montana leases violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 4321 et seq.; the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 30 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.; and the responsibilities of the United States as trustee of the Tribe. The court held all leases issued as a result of the sale void.

Within 10 days of the original injunction, the Secretary moved to amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. On October 7, 1985 the district court permitted Wesco, Thermal and Western Energy to intervene. In permitting intervention at this late date the court ruled the lessees must take the case as they found it "subject to the proceedings that have occurred prior to intervention. In other words, the Court will not relitigate the issue of the sufficiency of the EIS.... The only issue before the court, and hence the only issue in which intervention may be sought, is the appropriate remedy in this case."

On October 6, 1986 the district court amended its injunction to suspend but not void the leases to Thermal and Wesco. The suspension was to last until the Secretary prepared a supplemental EIS "addressing the cultural, social and economic impact of issuing coal leases near the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation." The lessees

                were relieved of their obligations under the leases.  Western Energy was permitted to go forward with mining on its leases of M-54711, M-54712, and M-54713, subject to the caveat that mining should immediately be halted if the Secretary found that it caused "significant socioeconomic impacts."    The Secretary was directed at the completion of the supplemental EIS to decide whether or not to rescind all of the leases and whether to impose additional measures of mitigation if the leases stayed in force.  The Tribe appeals from this amendment of the original injunction
                
ANALYSIS

1. The Tribe contends that the judgment of the district court was made after a trial on the record and that post-judgment motions could be made only under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), so that the court lacked the power to amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). The district court's determination that it had the power to amend its judgment pursuant to rule 59(e) is a conclusion of law. We review it de novo. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).

Rule 59(e) provides a means whereby a district court may alter or amend its judgment. A motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment is appropriately brought under rule 59(e). Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.1985). The district court expressly characterized its judgment as a summary judgment. The court did not resolve questions of fact, but decided as a matter of law that the proposed leases were in violation of federal requirements. The court had the power to amend the judgment under rule 59(e).

2. The Tribe contends that Western Energy's motion for modification of relief constituted an untimely motion to alter or amend judgment under rule 59(e) since Western Energy filed the motion later than 10 days after entry of judgment. We strictly construe rule 59(e)'s ten-day limitation. McConnell v. MEBA Medical and Benefits Plan, 778 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir.1985); and we review the district court's refusal to strike Western Energy's motion for modification of relief for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Backlund 778 F.2d at 1388 (review of denial of rule 59(e) motion for an abuse of discretion); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Board of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir.1986) (review of motion to strike defenses under rule 12(f) for an abuse of discretion).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize "a motion for modification of relief." To classify it properly, we examine the nature of and the reason for the motion. Western Energy submitted the motion and supporting brief in response to the district court's order of October 7, 1985, which stated: "It is FURTHER ORDERED that Western Energy Company shall file a brief responding to the federal defendants' motion to alter or amend the judgment within fifteen (15) days of the filing of this order." Western Energy's response, in short, was not a rule 59(e) motion. It was a response to a timely motion of the federal defendants. The response did not have to comply with rule 59(e)'s ten-day limitation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Western Energy's motion.

3. We review the district court's decision on injunctive relief for abuse of discretion, application of erroneous legal principles, or clearly erroneous findings of fact. Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir.1985). The Tribe argues that under the principles enunciated in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978), we should conclude that Congress has balanced the equities under the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act and thereby mandated that district courts issue an injunction upon finding that the government is in violation. The Tribe seeks to have this court extend the principles of Hill and conclude that Congress has not only mandated that an injunction issue whenever the Coal Leasing Act is violated, but also that Congress has mandated that the injunction void all activities, such as the leasing of federal land containing coal, undertaken in violation of the Act. The Secretary and the intervenors disagree and contend that Congress has not balanced the equities under the statute and that, therefore, the district retained its traditional equitable power to vindicate the objectives and requirements of the statute. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982).

Hill, Romero-Barcelo, and Village of Gambell provide significant guidance in deciding whether Congress has balanced the equities under the statute and mandated an injunction. In Hill, the Court stated that generally courts retain discretion to fashion appropriate relief unless Congress has clearly demonstrated explicitly or implicitly that it has balanced the equities and mandated an injunction. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291. In Romero-Barcelo, the plaintiff sued the Secretary of Defense and claimed that the Navy, while using an island off Puerto Rico's coast for weapons training, violated the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251. The plaintiff argued that, as in Hill, Congress had balanced the equities...

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