Northern Inyo Hosp. v. Fair Emp. Practice Com.

Decision Date20 March 1974
Citation112 Cal.Rptr. 872,38 Cal.App.3d 14
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 13 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 312, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9305 NORTHERN INYO HOSPITAL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMISSION of the State of California, Defendant and Appellant; Louise KELLER, Real Party In Interest. Civ. 13200.
OPINION

TAMURA, Associate Justice.

The Fair Employment Practice Commission (hereafter FEPC or Commission) appeals from a judgment in mandate commanding it to vacate a cease and desist order issued against the Northern Inyo Hospital District (Hospital) for an alleged act of racial discrimination in employment practiced upon real party in interest (Mrs. Louise Keller).

Mrs. Keller, an American Indian, filed an unlawful employment practice complaint with the FEPC charging that the Hospital, after granting her sick leave, refused to rehire her solely because of her race. Following an investigation, a formal accusation 1 was served and filed charging the Hospital with discrimination against Mrs. Keller solely because of her race and ancestry in violation of Labor Code section 1420, subdivision (a). 2 The Commission heard the matter itself with a hearing officer of the office of administrative hearings presiding. (Gov.Code § 11512, subd. (b). 3) The Commission found that the Hospital had unlawfully discriminated against Mrs. Keller as charged in the accusation and issued a cease and desist order and an order directing the Hospital to pay Mrs. Keller $2,982.40 in lost wages as a result of the unlawful discrimination practiced against her. 4

Hospital filed a petition for administrative mandamus to review and vacate the FEPC decision on the ground, among others, that the Commission abused its discretion in that its findings 'were not supported by the weight of the evidence or substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.' At the commencement of the hearing on the petition, Hospital was granted leave to amend by adding an allegation that the FEPC decision 'affects fundamental vested rights of Petitioner, to establish employment practices and procedures and to impose conditions to employment at Petitioner's hospital facility.' The cause was thereafter argued and submitted on the petition, the Commission's answer, and the administrative record.

The evidence adduced at the FEPC hearing may be summarized as follows:

The Hospital at which Mrs. Keller was employed is located in Bishop, California, and is owned and operated by the Northern Inyo Local Hospital District, a public district. Mrs. Keller commenced working for Hospital in its kitchen and laundry in 1960 and eventually was appointed laundry supervisor. On August 17, 1970, upon learning that she needed minor surgery, she asked the Hospital administrator (Mr. McConnell) if she would be allowed to return to work if she should undergo surgery. She testified that Mr. McConnell replied that she could return to work. Mrs. Keller thereupon applied for a leave of absence without pay (her sick leave having previously been fully used) and underwent surgery. The day she was released from the hospital (Sept. 11, 1970), she received a letter from Mr. McConnell informing her that her leave of absence had been approved and that '(t)he policy of the Board is that return to work will be contingent on the availability of the work load at that time.'

On October 28, 1970, Mrs. Keller obtained a release from her physician to return to work. She went to the Hospital that day and told Mr. McConnell she was ready to return to work. McConnell told her to see Jim Stewart who had apparently taken Mrs. Keller's place as supervisor of the laundry. Mr. Stewart informed Mrs. Keller that no help was needed at that time. Mrs. Keller replied she would be available for work should there be an opening.

In early November 1970, Mrs. Keller wrote a letter to the board of directors and the advisory committee of the Hospital complaining that she had not been rehired. The letter concluded with the following statements: 'I have never mentioned this to anyone, but I feel in some way that discriminating (sic) is here somewhere. If I did not do my job, I think I should have been told.' Hospital's attorney, Mr. Smith, replied by letter dated November 13, stating the leave of absence made return to work contingent upon availability of work. He stated it was his understanding that no work was then available but that she would be called when there was an opening. Although he suggested that she could appear before the board of directors to discuss her employment, Mrs. Keller apparently did not do so. Mrs. Keller admitted talking to a Pat Ford of the California Legal Indian Service about the time she wrote her letter to the Hospital.

There was evidence that although three openings thereafter became available at the laundry Mrs. Keller was not called to fill any of these positions.

Mrs. Keller testified that she felt she was discriminated against on account of her Indian ancestry because Hospital had granted leaves of absence to several non-Indian female workers and had subsequently rehired them. The fact that certain named Caucasian employees had been on sick leave and subsequently returned to their jobs was corroborated by a consultant to the FEPC who investigated the case.

Mr. McConnell testified that the workers who had been rehired after sick leave were nurses whose skills were in short supply; initially Mrs. Keller was not rehired because the laundry was partially shut down for remodeling; Mrs. Keller's November 1970 letter, more particularly her statement that 'I feel in some way that discriminating (sic) is here somewhere', 'put a doubt in (his) mind'; he admitted there was a job available sometime in November of 1970 but testified that the letter and Mrs. Keller's subsequent complaint to the FEPC (January 16, 1971) persuaded him not to rehire her because he was afraid that to do so would be an admission that Hospital had discriminated against her. He denied that there had been any discrimination against Mrs. Keller because of her racial ancestry.

An FEPC employment pattern survey form filled out by Hospital and received in evidence at the FEPC hearing indicates that the Hospital employs 140 persons, of whom 24 are members of a minority group. Of the 24, 18 are minority group members who are neither Negro nor Oriental, and 6 are persons of Mexican, Central or South American ancestry. One of the 18 persons in the former category is designated a supervisor. 5 Twenty-four nonminority persons are designated supervisors.

Mr. McConnell testified that the population of the City of Bishop is more than 3,000, the population of its immediate vicinity is 9,000 and the population of the county is 16,000. Mrs. Keller testified that the Indian population of the Bishop Indian Reservation, the City of Bishop and the surrounding areas numbered 900 persons, 825 of whom lived on the reservation.

The Commission found that Mrs. Keller was granted a medical leave of absence on or about August 17, 1970, with the understanding that she would be entitled to the first available position for which she was qualified; on October 28, 1970, Mrs. Keller became available for reemployment and was again assured by the Hospital that she would be rehired when the first available position developed; since that time positions have developed for which Mrs. Keller was qualified but others were hired for those positions; the failure to reemploy Mrs. Keller was due solely to her race or ancestry.

The court below determined that the FEPC decision 'affects fundamental vested rights of (the Hospital) to establish practices and procedures and to impose conditions to employment at (its) hospital facility' and that the court was therefore authorized to exercise its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence. The court found it to be true that Mrs. Keller was granted a medical leave of absence; that she became available for reemployment on October 28, 1970; and that the Hospital failed to rehire her. However, the court found that the failure to rehire was not because of Mrs. Keller's race or ancestry and that the Hospital did not violate Labor Code section 1420, subdivision (a). Judgment was entered directing the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the FEPC to vacate its decision.

The FEPC contends (1) that the substantial evidence rather than the independent judgment rule should have been applied in reviewing its decision and (2) that there was substantial evidence in the light of the entire record to support the Commission's decision and that the judgment should therefore be reversed with directions to enter judgment for the Commission. From the analysis which follows, we have concluded that the foregoing contentions must be upheld.

I

The basic framework for the rules governing judicial review of any final order or decision rendered by a state or local administrative agency is provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal.3d 130, 137, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 238, 481 P.2d 242, 246.) Subdivision (c) of the section provides: '(c) . . . Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence; and in all other cases abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.'

The FEPC advances two arguments in...

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