Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, Civ. No. 2922-2925.
| Decision Date | 19 October 1951 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 2922-2925. |
| Citation | 101 F. Supp. 29 |
| Parties | NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
M. L. Countryman, Jr., and Conrad Olson, of St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiff.
C. U. Landrum and Mr. James J. Giblin, of St. Paul, Minn. (Mr. Armistead B. Rood, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for the United States.
The cases involve the construction of the provisions of Section 321(a) of the Transportation Act of 1940, 49 U.S.C.A. § 65(a), which entitles "military or naval property of the United States moving for military or naval and not for civil use" to land-grant rates. Plaintiff seeks to recover certain balances claimed to be due from the Government by reason of certain freight shipments of military or naval property of the United States arriving from overseas and shipped on government bills of lading marked "Military". Plaintiff in the first instance billed the United States at full commercial rates on all of the shipments. The Government paid the bills, but later deducted the sums sought to be recovered herein from subsequent bills tendered by plaintiff so as to pay land-grant rates only on the shipments involved herein.
The shipments were made in 1944 and 1945, and after coming from overseas, were shipped from Seattle and other western points over plaintiff's railway lines to certain salvage and redistribution centers of the Government. The property thus transported by plaintiff consisted of quartermaster or ordnance material, such as automobile parts, automobiles, tents and canvas, tobacco and cigarettes, scrap iron, clothing, canned goods, sawing machines, construction equipment, concrete mixing machines, wooden huts, and miscellaneous junk. They were all military or naval property of the United States. They were shipped by a military or naval officer of the United States to the salvage and redistribution centers, and after inspection, a certain portion of the goods were reconsigned, either with or without rehabilitation, for naval or military use. Goods and merchandise which were to be discarded after inspection were sold as army or navy surplus.
Plaintiff concedes that the portions of the shipments after inspection actually reconsigned for military or naval use are subject to land-grant rates. But plaintiff asserts and contends that the goods which were discarded for civilian use and disposition were therefore shipped for civil use, and hence are not entitled to land-grant rates. The Government's position is that, under these facts, the land-grant rates are applicable to all such materials thus shipped.
The inspection of this property and its reconditioning and rehabilitation for further military purposes, so far as that was practical and feasible, was determined and processed by the military and naval forces of the United States. The future use of this property, either for military use or civilian use as war surplus, was a military responsibility. The purpose of the shipment was to permit the fulfillment of that responsibility. The shipments were made and completed before any decision was made as to the ultimate use of the goods. For aught anyone knew at the time of the shipments, all of the material might be allocated for future military purposes. That the property, therefore, was in military use at or during the shipment, as that term is usually understood, seems clear. These goods never lost their military status during shipment.
Generally speaking, the salvaging, reconditioning and rehabilitation of military and naval stores is a function which is performed in furtherance of the war effort. And the military stores, which were not reconsigned for military use, were sold as war surplus and the funds obtained therefrom were available for future government use. Moreover, it is fair to assume that the dominant purpose of the shipment was to salvage as much of the property as possible for military purposes. The apparent object of the salvage center was to save and...
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