Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pyle

• Decision Date: 08 December 1910
• Citation: 112 P. 678,19 Idaho 3
• Parties: THE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO., Appellant, v. E. E. PYLE et ux., Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

112 P. 678

19 Idaho 3

THE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO., Appellant, v. E. E. PYLE et ux., Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 8, 1910

RAILROAD LAND GRANT-LOCATION OF ROAD-TITLE TO LAND-HOMESTEAD ENTRY-CONTEST IN UNITED STATES LAND OFFICE-ADVERSE POSSESSION-PAYMENT OF TAXES-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-SUSPENSION OF.

(Syllabus by the court.)

1. Under the provisions of sec. 4043, Rev. Codes, title to land by adverse possession cannot be established under the provisions of the Revised Statutes unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for a period of five years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all taxes, state, county and municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon said land according to law.

2. Held, that the evidence is sufficient to show that the respondents paid all taxes that had been assessed against the land in dispute according to law, from 1902 to 1907.

3. Under an act of Congress approved July 2, 1864, entitled "An act granting land to aid in the construction of the railroad and telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget's Sound on the Pacific Coast, by the northern route," and the acts and joint resolutions of Congress supplemental thereto and amendatory thereof, there was granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Co. certain lands along its right of way upon the conditions mentioned in said act. The line of said railroad company was definitely fixed opposite the land in controversy and a plat thereof filed in the office of the commissioner of the general land office on December 12, 1882. Thereafter the said railroad company complied with the terms and conditions of said acts, and said railroad and telegraph line were constructed and accepted by the President of the United States. Held, that said land was within the limits of said grant and became a part thereof, and under a mortgage foreclosure sale said land was sold and conveyed, with other land, to the appellant herein, the Northern Pacific Railway Co.; that said grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Co. was in praesenti, and that the legal title to said land passed to said railroad company upon its filing its map of definite location and thereafter complying with the terms and conditions of said grant.

4. The delay of the government in issuing a patent to said railroad company for said land did not prevent the company from maintaining an action in ejectment to remove any person from said land and maintain its right to the possession thereof.

5. The pendency of a homestead contest in the land department of the United States does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations.

6. Held, that the Northern Pacific Railroad Co. was entitled to the possession of the land in dispute from December 2, 1882 up to the time that said lot was conveyed to the appellant corporation in 1896, and that said appellant corporation could have maintained an action in ejectment to remove any trespasser from said lot at any time prior to the running of said statute in favor of an adverse claim.

7. In an action in ejectment to recover land in this state, the defendant may admit title in the United States either with or without claim on his part of the right to procure title from the United States, and it is sufficient if he has such possession as is required by our statute and claims title adversely to the plaintiff and all others except the United States.

APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District, for Shoshone County. Hon. W. W. Woods, Judge.

Action to have title quieted to certain land and to recover compensation for a railway right of way. Judgment for defendants. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs in favor of the respondents.

Featherstone & Fox, for Appellant (E. J. Cannon and Cullen & Dudley, of Counsel).

The running of the statute of limitations was suspended during the pendency of the contest between the respondents and appellant in the land department of the United States. (St. P. M. & M. Ry. Co. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, 94 Am. St. 693, 91 N.W. 294; Braun v. Sauerwein, 10 Wall. 218, 19 L.Ed. 895; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall 347, 19 L.Ed. 62; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72 20 L.Ed. 485; Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S. 473, 25 L.Ed. 800; Cosmos Exp. Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co., 112 F. 4, 7, 50 C. C. A. 79 et seq., and cases cited, 190 U.S. 301, 308, 23 S.Ct. 692 et seq.; Craig v. Leitersdorfer, 123 U.S. 189, 210, 8 S.Ct. 85, 31 L.Ed. 114 et seq.; Martinson v. Marzolf, 14 N.D. 301, 103 N.W. 937; Matthews v. O'Brien, 84 Minn. 505, 88 N.W. 12; McHenry v. Nygaard, 72 Minn. 2, 74 N.W. 1106; Zimmerman v. McCurdy, 15 N.D. 79, 106 N.W. 125, 12 Ann. Cas. 29; Le Fevre v. Amonson, 11 Idaho 45, 81 P. 71.)

Since the jurisdiction to determine what lands passed under the grant was vested in the interior department, equally with the jurisdiction to determine the better right to public lands as between contesting claimants, the rule of law prohibiting courts from taking jurisdiction of any cause which would infringe upon the land department's jurisdiction is as applicable to the contest between the appellant and a homestead claimant as it is to a contest between two homestead claimants. (Litchfield v. Register and Receiver, 9 Wall. 575, 19 L.Ed. 681; S. C. & St. P. R. Co. v. United States, 34 F. 835; Phoenix & E. R. Co. v. Arizona E. P. Co., 9 Ariz. 434, 84 P. 1097; Humbird v. Avery, 110 F. 465, 195 U.S. 480, 502, 25 S.Ct. 123, 49 L.Ed. 286; Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473, 19 S.Ct. 485, 43 L.Ed. 772; Northern Lumber Co. v. O'Brien, 124 F. 819; French v. Fyan, 93 U.S. 169, 23 L.Ed. 812; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U.S. 488, 7 S.Ct. 985, 30 L.Ed. 1039; Barden v. N. P. R. R. Co., 154 U.S. 288, 14 S.Ct. 1030, 38 L.Ed. 992.)

It is a necessary conclusion from the foregoing premises that the pendency of the contest between the appellant and the respondents before the officers of the interior department from 1902 to 1908 precluded the running of the statute of limitations in favor of the respondents and against the appellant. (St. P. M. & M. Co. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, 94 Am. St. 693, 91 N.W. 294; Delacey v. Commercial Trust Co., 51 Wash. 542, 130 Am. St. 1112, 99 P. 575; Blumer v. Iowa R. Land Co., 129 Iowa 32, 113 Am. St. 444, 105 N.W. 342, 206 U.S. 482, 27 S.Ct. 769, 51 L.Ed. 1148; Frink v. Hoke, 35 Ore. 17, 56 P. 1093.)

The possession pleaded by the respondents was not adverse within the meaning of the statute, nor sufficient to set the statute of limitations in motion in their favor. (Reynolds v. Willard, 80 Cal. 605, 22 P. 262; Tuffree v. Polhemus, 108 Cal. 670, 41 P. 806; Altschul v. O'Neill, 35 Ore. 202, 57 P. 95, and cases cited; Litchfield v. Sewell, 97 Iowa 247, 66 N.W. 104 et seq.; Doe v. Beck, 108 Ala. 71, 19 So. 802; Delacey v. Commercial Trust Co., 51 Wash. 542, 130 Am. St. 1112, 99 P. 574; Flewelten v. Randall, 32 Tex. Civ. 361, 74 S.W. 49; Port Townsend v. Lewis, 34 Wash. 413, 75 P. 982.)

C. W. Beale, Walter H. Hanson and James A. Wayne, for Respondents.

The grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company to said lot No. 10 was a grant in praesenti, and the legal title thereto passed to said company on December 12, 1882, the date of the filing of its map of definite location of its railroad. (New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 17, 18 S.Ct. 531, 42 L.Ed. 927; Iowa R. R. Co. v. Blumer, 206 U.S. 482, 491, 27 S.Ct. 769, 51 L.Ed. 1148; Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 107 P. 498.)

The Northern Pacific Railroad Company was entitled to the possession up to the time that this lot was conveyed to the appellant in 1896, and might have maintained an action of ejectment from the date of the filing of its map of definite location up to the time of the transfer in 1896 to appellant; and adverse possession could commence at the date of filing map of definite location of railroad. (Toltec Ranch Co. v. Babcock, 24 Utah 183, 66 P. 879.)

The statute of limitation would not be suspended or tolled during the time of pendency of any contest before the interior department, and the officers of the department are without jurisdiction to hear or determine any controversy as to title of land from date of definite location of railroad, and subsequent to that time controversies concerning the land should be submitted to the courts for determination. (Mo. Valley Land Co. v. Weise, 208 U.S. 234, 28 S.Ct. 294, 52 L.Ed. 466; Sage v. Rudnick, 91 Minn. 325, 98 N.W. 89, 100 N.W. 106; So. P. R. Co. v. Whitaker, 109 Cal. 268, 41 P. 1083; Northern P. R. Co. v. Kranich, 52 F. 911; 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1st ed., 58; Edwards v. University, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. (N. C.) 325, 30 Am. Dec. 170.)

A claim of right which is subservient to the government and hostile to all others does not rob the adverse claimant of his right under the statute of limitations. (Blumer v. Iowa Land Co., 129 Iowa 32, 113 Am. St. 444, 105 N.W. 342; Toltec Ranch Co. v. Babcock, supra; Northern P. R. Co. v. Kranich, supra; Allen v. McKay, 120 Cal. 332, 52 P. 828.)

SULLIVAN, C. J. Ailshie, J., concurs.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, C. J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court adjudicating that the respondents, who are defendants, E. E. Pyle and Aletha J. Pyle, husband and wife, are the owners in fee of lot 10 in sec. 5, Tp. 45 N., Range 3 E., of Boise Meridian, and adjudging that the appellant, the Northern Pacific Railway Co., has no right, title or interest in or right of possession to said lot, and that the respondents are entitled to the payment of the sum of $ 9,200, awarded by the commissioners to be paid by the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. for a railway right of way over said lot.

On the 9th of March, 1908, the plaintiff in the original action, the Chicago, Milwaukee & St....