Northern Pac Ry Co v. Department of Public Works of Washington, 371

Decision Date13 April 1925
Docket NumberNo. 371,371
PartiesNORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF WASHINGTON et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. C. W. Bunn, of St. Paul, Minn., F. M. Dudley, of Seattle, Wash., and John H. Carroll, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. Raymond W. Clifford, of Olympia, Wash., Scott Z. Henderson, of Tacoma, Wash., and John H. Dunbar, of Olympia, Wash., for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The intrastate transportation of sawlogs in carload lots constitutes a large part of all of the intrastate freight traffic in Washington on each of the four transcontinental railroad systems by which much of that service is performed.1 Prior to federal control the rates had, with few exceptions, been initiated from time to time by individual tariffs of the several carriers. In 1918 the Director General of Railroads made a horizontal increase of 25 per cent. In 1920, after the decision in Ex parte 74, Increased Rates, 1920, 58 I. C. C. 220, a further increase of 25 per cent. was authorized by the Public Service Commission of the state. Complaint was made that some of the rates as so raised were excessive and discriminatory, and that the rate structure lacked uniformity.

On December 28, 1920, the Public Service Commission instituted a proceeding before itself for the purpose of investigating the log rates and making such order thereon as the facts found should warrant. Hearings were duly had in which shippers and the four transcontinental carriers participated. Much evidence was introduced. The carriers insisted that the existing rates were unremunerative. They also filed, during the hearings, a joint tariff embodying the higher rates which they deemed reasonable. A suspension order issued, and the two proceedings were consolidated. On February 1, 1922, the Department of Public Works (by which the functions of the commission had come to be exercised) made a report in which it found that the existing rates were highly remunerative. Thereupon it entered an order which, among other things, abrogated all the intrastate log tariffs then in force, canceled the suspended joint tariff filed by the carriers, and established a uniform distance tariff applicable to these railroads, to remain in effect during an experimental period of 12 months, or until further order of the department. The tariff so prescribed reduced greatly the rates theretofore prevailing. It was estimated that the revenues of the several carriers from this traffic would be lessened from 15 to 37 per cent. and that additional losses in revenue would result from changes prescribed concerning minimum loadings.

This suit was brought by the carriers against the department, in the superior court of Thurston county, to set aside the order on the ground, among others, that it deprived them of property in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The findings of fact upon which the order proceeded were attacked as arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence. The prescribed rates were assailed as confiscatory. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 30 S. Ct. 423, 54 L. Ed. 624. Upon the giving of bonds the court superseded and suspended the order, except in so far as it canceled the joint tariff of higher rates filed by the carriers.2 After full hearing the court entered a final decree denying the relief sought. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state, three judges dissenting. 125 Wash. 584, 217 P. 507. The case is here under section 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended (Comp. St. § 1214). A motion to dismiss on the ground that the judgment is not reviewable on writ of error was postponed to the hearing on merits. The motion is denied. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 679, 683, 43 S. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176. As to the merits, many errors are assigned. It will be sufficient to consider one.3

The log traffic is limited substantially to the section of the state lying west of the Cascade Mountains. The average length of its haul on each of these roads is not more than 32 miles. The three principal carriers presented evidence tending to show that their existing rates were so low as not to yield any return upon the property employed in the business, and that the rates did not defray fully the operating costs of the traffic and its proportion of the taxes payable. This evidence was in character persuasive. It was fairly specific, direct, and comprehensive. If the facts warranted, the shippers and the public officials might, of course, have shown by evidence of similar character that the carriers' evidence was inherently untrustworthy, or it might have been overcome by more persuasive evidence to the contrary. Little attempt was made to show that any testimony introduced by the carriers was inherently untrustworthy. Little conflict with the evidence of the carriers was developed by the evidence as to specific facts introduced for the shippers and the public. Apparently necessary inferences from specific facts established by the carriers were not explained away. The department's findings concerning operating costs rested largely upon deductions from data found in published reports of the carriers and in their exhibits filed in this case. Instead of attempting to show by evidence, reasonably specific and direct, what the actual operating cost of this traffic was to the several carriers, the department created a composite figure representing the weighted...

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