Northern Pacific Railway Company v. State of North Dakota Ex Rel McCue

• Decision Date: 14 March 1910
• Docket Number: No. 553,553
• Citation: 30 S.Ct. 423,216 U.S. 579,54 L.Ed. 624
• Parties: NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA EX REL. T. F. MCCUE, Attorney General
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

216 U.S. 579

30 S.Ct. 423

54 L.Ed. 624

NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA EX REL. T. F. MCCUE, Attorney General.

No. 553.

Argued February 24 and 25, 1910.

Decided March 14, 1910.

Mr. Charles W. Bunn for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Guy C. H. Corliss, Andrew Miller, and T. F. McCue for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a proceeding by the attorney general of North Dakota, charging the plaintiff in error with continuous violation of a law fixing rates for the carriage of coal within the state, and asking for an injunction. See N. D. Laws of 1907, chap. 51. The railroad answered that the act was void under art. 1, § 8, of the Constitution, the commerce clause, and also under the 14th Amendment, because the maximum rates fixed by it were inadequate and confiscatory. Evidence was taken and reported to the supreme court, and that court decided that the injunction should issue as prayed. (N. D.) 120 N. W. 869. The grounds of its decision were that the act referred only to transportation wholly within the state, and therefore was not bad under art. 1, § 8, thus removing that question; and that the evidence did not prove that the rates would entail a loss on the carriage of coal, so that it was not necessary to decide whether, in that event, it would be unconstitutional, if the railroad made a fair profit on its whole business within the state.

The court did, however, intimate its opinion that if the railroad was able to make a fair profit upon its whole business within the state, it might be required to carry a particular commodity at cost or possibly below; and it expressed its opinion so strongly that the counsel for the plaintiff in error treats that doctrine as the ground of decision, and the statement as to the insufficiency of the evidence as made only in the light of it, and upon rather technical grounds. He argues that the evidence was undisputed, that the facts testified to and the fair inferences from them must be taken as proved, and that on those facts and inferences the constitutional question is raised. The evidence consisted of tables of rates in other states, computation as to the cost of transportation, and expert opinions, all of which were thought to converge to the conclusion that the statutory rates were unreasonable and less than the cost of carriage. But laying technical objections on one side, and taking the facts as admitted, the argument for ...