Northington v. Int'l All. of Theatrical Stage Emps, Local 17

• Decision Date: 12 November 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION 3:20-CV-00390-GNS-LLK
• Parties: BRUCE NORTHINGTON; and JOHN PERRY PLAINTIFFS v. INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 17 DEFENDANT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

BRUCE NORTHINGTON; and JOHN PERRY PLAINTIFFS
v.
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 17 DEFENDANT

CIVIL ACTION No. 3:20-CV-00390-GNS-LLK

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

November 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GREG N. STIVERS, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

This case is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (DN 5). The matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

This matter arises from a state court action in Jefferson County Circuit Court, where Plaintiffs Bruce Northington and John Perry (“Plaintiffs”) originally filed their Complaint on March 13, 2020. (Compl., DN 1-2). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs note that they are African American and are members of other locals of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (“IATSE”) union, but not members of Defendant International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Local 17 (“Defendant”). (Compl. ¶ 3). Plaintiffs allege they initially performed work for Defendant in 1993 and 1996. (Compl. ¶ 3). Thereafter, Plaintiffs applied to become members of Defendant and were “repeatedly rejected for membership in Local 17 by a five member panel made up of white Local 17 members . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5).

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The crux of this dispute stems from the rejection of Plaintiffs’ membership applications by Defendant, while white applicants with “significantly less experience, training, and certifications” were allegedly accepted by Defendant for membership. (Compl. ¶ 6). Moreover, “[t]he overwhelming majority of members of [Defendant] are white (around 140 members), with only a miniscule No. being African-American (around four members).” (Compl. ¶ 7). As a result, Plaintiffs allege they were deprived the benefits of membership including “higher paying job placements based upon seniority and certifications, job protections under various Collective Bargaining Agreements, promotions, contributions to IATSE pension and retirement plans, payment of prevailing wages on union projects based upon seniority, health insurance, work training, and other employment benefits.” (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiffs claim they have “complained about the discriminatory treatment by agents and/or employees of Defendant . . . to individuals in leadership positions with Defendant . . . and other Locals . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 8). Plaintiffs state that Defendant has “failed to take any corrective action to remedy the discriminatory treatment against . . . Plaintiffs and/or similarly situated applicants for membership . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 8).

The Complaint seeks relief under two counts: (i) race discrimination by a labor organization in violation of KRS 344.060; and (ii) discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”), particularly KRS 344.280. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-16, 17-21). The alleged violations are grounded solely in Kentucky law. Defendant filed a notice of removal, arguing it is a labor organization, as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), which “owes a ‘duty of fair representation’ to all members in a bargaining unit to refrain from engaging in conduct that is ‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith’”, as required by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151-69. (Notice Removal 2-3, DN 1). As such, Defendant contends the

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“essence” of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims should be construed as having presented a question of federal law for the purpose of this Court’s jurisdiction. (Notice Removal 3-4). Soon after this matter was removed, Plaintiffs filed the present motion seeking remand back to Jefferson Circuit Court. (Pls.’ Mot. Remand, DN 5).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Removal is proper in “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A case “may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” Id. After the filing of a notice of removal, a plaintiff may move to remand the case “on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction” within thirty days. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Further, “[t]he removal petition is to be strictly construed, with all doubts resolved against removal.” Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Province of Ont. v. Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

PLAINTIFFs seek remand based on the contention that their claims are not preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97.^[1] (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 3-19, DN 5-1). “Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act has complete preemptive force.” (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 4 (quoting Lattin v. Kurdziel, No. 97-1384,

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1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10769, at *8-9 (6th Cir. May 26, 1998))). Section 301 of the LMRA provides as follows:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties

29 U.S.C. § 185(a).^[2] “In effecting complete preemption, § 301 is nearly unique among federal laws-neither §§ 157 or 158 of the National Labor Relations Act are completely preemptive.” (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 4 (quoting Lattin, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10769, at *8-9)). Tying Lattin to the present case, Plaintiffs assert that federal jurisdiction is lacking because no collective bargaining agreement is implicated by their claims, as required by the LMRA. (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 4-5).

Defendant points out that Section 301 of the LMRA creates a mechanism for employees to bring suits for violations of a collective bargaining agreement, and when “resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent on an analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted and federal labor law applies.” (Def.’s Resp. Pls.’ Mot. Remand 2-3, DN 6 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985))). “If the claim is one based solely on terms of the collective bargaining agreement, which includes union constitutions, the preemption of Section 301 is ‘complete,’ so that ‘any claim purportedly based on [a] pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law,’

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and may be removed to federal court.” (Def.’s Resp. Pls.’ Mot. Remand 3 (alteration in original) (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987))).

In DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth Circuit developed a two-step inquiry that “courts must determine whether resolving the state-law claim would require interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.” Mattis v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004). If interpretation is required, then the claim is preempted. See Id. “Second, courts must ascertain whether the rights claimed by the plaintiff were created by the collective bargaining agreement, or instead by state law.” Id. (citing DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 216). If the rights were created by the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted. See Id...