Northland Greyhound Lines v. Blinco

• Decision Date: 07 February 1956
• Citation: 74 N.W.2d 796,272 Wis. 29
• Parties: NORTHLAND GREYHOUND LINES, Inc., a foreign corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William A. BLINCO, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 796

74 N.W.2d 796

272 Wis. 29

NORTHLAND GREYHOUND LINES, Inc., a foreign corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William A. BLINCO, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 7, 1956.

Greyhound appeals.

Cavanagh, Mittelstaed, Sheldon, Heide & Hartley, Kenosha, for appellant.

Vaudreuil & Vaudreuil, Kenosha, La France, Thompson & Zahn, Alfred E. La France and William E. Dye, Racine, of counsel, for respondent.

GEHL, Justice.

We are required to determine whether the so-called judgment is appealable. If it is not, we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the controversy. Wilt v. Neenah Cold Storage Co., 1907, 130 Wis. 398, 110 N.W. 177; Kling v. Sommers, 1948, 252 Wis. 217, 31 N.W.2d 206. The fact that the question has not been raised is immaterial, for such failure does not confer jurisdiction. Richter v. Standard Mfg. Co., 1937, 224 Wis. 121, 271 N.W. 14, 914. The fact that the document signed by the judge is designated as an interlocutory judgment is not controlling. Lemon v. Aronson, 1917, 166 Wis. 146, 164 N.W. 820; O'Hare v. Fink, 1948, 254 Wis. 65, 35 N.W.2d 320.

To render the paper effective as a judgment it must be the final determination of the rights of the parties, sec. 270.53(1), Stats., a determination as to whether a duty or a liability presently exists, Greeney v. Greeney, 1916, 163 Wis. 377, 157 N.W. 1097. The purpose of the legislature in authorizing the entry of an interlocutory judgment, sec. 270.54, Stats., and an appeal therefrom, sec. 274.09, Stats., was not to permit the interruption of a trial for a final decision upon a question of law which might arise during the progress of the trial, but to authorize a judgment which would finally dispose of a portion of the controversy. Kickapoo Development Corp. v. Kickapoo Orchard Co., 1939, 231 Wis. 458, 285 N.W. 354.

To properly characterize it as an interlocutory judgment it must, as the statute provides, be a 'finding or decision substantially disposing of the merits.' Sec. 270.54, Stats. The document may not be said to be a substantial disposition of any element of the merits of the case. The expression of the court is no more than its decision upon a question of law which will arise during the trial. It is at most an intermediate conclusion of law from which no appeal may be taken. Tellett v. Albregtson, 1915, 160 Wis. 487, 152 N.W. 152; In re Will of Stanley, 1938, 228 Wis. 530, 280 N.W. 685; Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Papara, 1940, 235 Wis. 184, 292 N.W. 281. It is in no sense a judgment or order from which an appeal is authorized by statute. Without such authority we may not entertain the appeal. Kling v. Sommers, supra.

The correctness of our conclusion is made clear by reference to the fact that the right of appeal is confined to parties aggrieved in some appreciable manner by the action of the court, and that

"A party is aggrieved if he would have had the thing if the erroneous judgment had not been given. Or, as it is sometimes put, in a legal sense a party is aggrieved by a judgment or decree whenever it operates on his rights of property or bears directly upon his interest. A broader and more comprehensive definition is that an aggrieved party, within the meaning of a statute governing appeals, is one having an interest...