Northridge Park County Water Dist. v. McDonell

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Citation: 158 Cal.App.2d 123,322 P.2d 25
• Decision Date: 28 February 1958
• Parties: NORTHRIDGE PARK COUNTY WATER DISTRICT, a Public Corporation, Petitioner, v. Edward M. McDONELL, Secretary of the Northridge Park County Water District, Respondent. Civ. 9438.

Page 25

322 P.2d 25

158 Cal.App.2d 123

NORTHRIDGE PARK COUNTY WATER DISTRICT, a Public Corporation, Petitioner, v. Edward M. McDONELL, Secretary of the Northridge Park County Water District, Respondent.

Civ. 9438.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Feb. 28, 1958.

Kirkbride, Wilson, Harzfeld & Wallace, San Mateo, for petitioner.

Edward M. McDonell, Sacramento, for respondent.

VAN DYKE, Presiding Justice.

Northridge Park County Water District, a county water district, has filed in this court a petition seeking to invoke our original jurisdiction by submitting to this court a controversy without action pursuant to Sections 1138, 1139 and 1140 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition also purports to contain sufficient allegations to invoke our original jurisdiction in mandamus. We issued an alternative writ and the proceeding was placed upon our February calendar for argument. However, argument was waived and the matter submitted upon the briefs on file. The pertinent code sections provide as follows:

Section 1138: 'Parties to a question in difference, which might be the subject of a civil action, may, without action, agree upon a case containing the facts, upon which the controversy depends, and present a submission of the same to any Court which would have jurisdiction if an action had been brought; but it must appear, by affidavit, that the controversy is real and the proceedings in good faith, to determine the rights of the parties. The Court must thereupon hear and determine the case, and render judgment thereon, as if an action were depending.'

Section 1139: 'Judgment must be entered as in other cases, but without costs for any proceeding prior to the trial. The case, the submission, and a copy of the judgment constitute the judgment roll.'

Section 1140: 'The judgment may be enforced in the same manner as if it had been rendered in an action in the same court, and is in the same manner subject to appeal.'

We have concluded that this court has no original jurisdiction under the code sections which govern the submission of a controversy without action.

Our jurisdiction is prescribed by Article VI, Section 4b of the California Constitution. That section, after prescribing the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal, provides, in respect of original jurisdiction, that:

'* * * The said courts shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of their appellate jurisdiction.'

1 Witkin, California Procedure, page 182, states:

'The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and district courts of appeal is fixed in the Constitution. * * * The jurisdiction of the superior courts is also set forth in the Constitution * * *, though it is not 'fixed' therein in the same sense as is the jurisdiction of the higher courts. * * *

'The rule is well established that the constitutional provisions are not only a grant but a limitation, and that the Legislature has no power to enlarge the jurisdiction of these courts.'

We quote the following from the same author, volume 1, page 244, under the heading 'Original Jurisdiction':

'The original jurisdiction of the district court of appeal to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and other unspecified writs, is declared in the same language as that of the Supreme Court.'

We think it is clear from a consideration of the constitutional provisions referred to, along with the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure governing the submission of controversies without action, that this court has no original jurisdiction of such proceedings and cannot try and render judgment therein.

Turning now to the consideration of the pleading as a petition in mandamus, we note that in City and County of San Francisco v. Boyle, 195 Cal. 426, 233 P. 965, 966, the Supreme Court said:

'This application for a writ of mandate was presented to this court upon an agreed statement of facts. The petitioners purport to make the application under the provisions of sections 1138 to 1140, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relate to the submission of controversies which might be the subject of a civil action to courts which would have jurisdiction of such action, upon an agreed statement of facts. It is not necessary to determine whether these sections of the code have application to the submission of causes to this court, since the facts set forth in the application herein would suffice to support the issuance of a writ of mandate if, as a matter of law, such writ should issue.'

The same practice was followed by the Supreme Court in California Toll Bridge Authority v. Wentworth, 212 Cal. 298, 309, 298 P. 485, 489. Therein the court said:

'While the parties to the controversy sought to submit it to the court without action, under the provisions of sections 1138 to 1140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we have elected to treat it as an application for a writ of mandate, following our action in City and County of San Francisco v. Boyle, 195 Cal. 426, 233 P. 965.'

The agreed case as stated in the petition contains the following assertions: That petitioner is a duly organized county water district and that in the formation thereof the applicable statutory provisions were fully complied with; that there has been formed within petitioner district an improvement district in the formation of which all applicable statutory requirements have been complied with; that proceedings have been taken by the district whereunder there has been authorized the issuance of bonds to obtain funds wherewith to construct improvements within the improvement district necessary and convenient for the service of water to the lands within that district, the bonds to constitute a lien upon such lands; that these proceedings have progressed to the point where the issuance of bonds has been duly authorized but that at that point the respondent secretary of the water district has announced that, in his view, the bonds will be invalid and void for various reasons advanced by him, having to do with the legal existence of the water district itself, as well as the legality of the proceedings to form the improvement district therein, and the legality of proceedings taken for the authorization of the bonds. The agreed case meticulously traces all steps taken in the formation of the water district and of the improvement district and in the authorization for the issuance and sale of...