Northrop v. Knowles

• Decision Date: 30 September 1885
• Citation: 52 Conn. 522,2 A. 395
• Parties: NORTHROP v. KNOWLES.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

2 A. 395

52 Conn. 522

NORTHROP

v. KNOWLES.

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT.

Filed September, 1885.

Appeal from Litchfield county, First judicial department.

Taylor & Taylor, for appellant.

L. D. Brewster and J. H. McMahon, for appellee.

LOOMIS, J. The record shows that, upon the trial of this case, the plaintiff claimed title to the land in question under the will of Friend G. Northrop, which was the subject of construction by this court in Turrill v. Northrop, 51 Conn. 33. The plaintiff's title depended on the question whether he was the legitimate son of Gad G. Northrop and his wife, whose maiden name was Cordelia Dennis. The plaintiff in chief offered direct proof of the marriage of Gad Northrop and Cordelia Dennis, including the testimony of Cordelia and what purported to he the certificate of the magistrate performing the marriage ceremony, and at no stage of the trial did he offer any evidence of reputation to prove the marriage. But the defendant on his part, to disprove the marriage, and to show that the plaintiff was illegitimate, offered the testimony of Harriet Curtis and others, that, after the alleged marriage, the said Gad and Cordelia were reputed in the neighborhood and locality where they resided to be unmarried, and that they were reputed to be not husband and wife, but to be living in a state of illicit intercourse.

The first question for review is whether this evidence of reputation was properly excluded by the court upon the plaintiff's objection. We have no doubt it was. The plaintiff's case on this point rested solely upon direct evidence of a formal ceremonial solemnization of marriage between his parents at a specified time and place; and it is too obvious to require discussion that such evidence could not in the least be affected by any amount of evidence that they were reputed to have been unmarried. The strongest objections ever made against hearsay evidence would apply to such a case as this; for, if the defendant's position is correct, a marriage solemnized according to all the forms of law might, in effect, be nullified by the mere speech of people.

The reasoning in behalf of the defendant is based upon the fallacy that because general reputation of parties as husband and wife, in connection with other circumstances, is admissible to prove marriage, therefore general reputation must also be admissible to prove there was no marriage; but there is a vast difference between reputation as primary proof of an existing fact or relation, and reputation as applied to prove a mere negative. Reputation, in connection with other things, is admissible to prove marriage, because, among other reasons, it attends and indicates the reality as a shadow does a substance; but a non-existing thing casts no shadow. But it may be suggested that in this case the evidence was offered to prove, not simply a negative, but an adulterous relation. This, again, overlooks another fundamental reason why reputation and cohabitation furnish presumptive evidence of marriage; which is, that the law presumes against vice and immorality, and in favor of marriage. The contention of the defendant would revolutionize this wholesome principle, and obliterate all distinction between vice and virtue, concubinage and marriage, as furnishing the basis for...