Northumberland County Com'rs v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 03 July 1829
• Citation: 2 Rawle 73
• Parties: The Commissioners of Northumberland County v. CHAPMAN.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

2 Rawle 73

The Commissioners of Northumberland County v. CHAPMAN.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 3, 1829

IN ERROR.

The office of President Judge of a judicial district, is liable to taxation for county rates and levies under the act of the 11th of April, 1799.

AN amicable action on the case was entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland county, in which the following case was stated:--

" It is hereby submitted to the associate judges, now holding a Court of Common Pleas, to decide whether the defendant is liable to be taxed for his office of President Judge of the Eighth Judicial District of Pennsylvania, by the laws for raising county rates and levies; and if so, judgment to be entered for the plaintiffs for three dollars, the amount assessed for the year 1825. If not, then judgment to be entered for the defendant. Either party to have the right of removal by writ of error."

The associate judges gave judgment as follows:--

" May 2d, 1828.--We the associate judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland county, upon the above statement are of opinion, that no state officer is liable to be taxed for his office by the county commissioners: and a President Judge, whose salary cannot by the constitution be diminished during his continuance in office, cannot be taxed. If the legislature had the power to pass an act of that kind, the constitution would be a nullity. We therefore give judgment for the defendant."

On this judgment a writ of error was taken out.

Donnell was counsel for the plaintiffs in error. The cause was submitted to this court on written arguments on each side.

Arguments for the plaintiffs in error.

The 4th section of the act of the 11th of April, 1799, ( Purd. Dig. 136,) respecting county rates and levies is very explicit in its enumeration of the objects and subjects of taxation; and, among the rest, it expressly includes " all offices and posts of profit." Offices and posts of profit, are, unquestionably, subjects of taxation.

That the situation which the defendant occupies, as president judge of the eighth judicial district of Pennsylvania, is an office, is clearly manifested by the very section of the constitution under which he claims his exemption from taxation. The second section of the fifth article of the constitution, provides that the judges of the " several Courts of Common Pleas shall hold their offices during good behaviour " that the compensation for their services " shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, " nor shall they hold " any other office of profit" during their continuance therein.

But it is said that the constitution expressly prohibits any diminution of the compensation of a judge, during his continuance in office; and that the imposition of a tax upon this office, diminishes the compensation, and is, therefore, illegal and not payable. Such a construction of the constitution would give more force to that section of the instrument, than would seem, from its letter and spirit, to be warrantable. The tax does not diminish the compensation. The demand of the judge upon the commonwealth for his services is not, in the least degree, abated. The " adequate compensation which has been fixed by law," remains untouched by the tax; and the undiminished amount thereof is, at stated periods, payable to his orders. The protection afforded by the second section of the fifth article of the constitution was intended to shield the incumbent from legislative interference, and to prevent the commonwealth from reducing the consideration upon which the officer accepted the service. The compensation was fixed at the time of his appointment, and no act of the legislature, under the present constitution, can withdraw any part of it from him. The burdens of the public must be sustained by the public generally; and the defendant is liable to contribute to the ordinary expenditures of government as any other citizen, unless he is exonerated by law. The law of the 11th of April, 1799, exempts the profession of a minister of the gospel and the occupation of a schoolmaster from taxation, but every other description of office, post of profit, trade and occupation is expressly made the subject of taxation.

Arguments for the defendant in error.

The act of assembly of the 11th of April, 1799, for raising county rates and levies, empowers the commissioners of the county to assess a tax on all offices and posts of profit. This is expressed in general terms, but admits of many exceptions. The same act requires an assessment of taxes upon all lands held by patent warrant, location, or improvement yet that admits of exceptions; namely, of lands granted to soldiers, which are exempt from taxation. By the terms of the act of assembly, unimproved land, not occupied, but held by the state, cannot be taxed: neither can improved land, purchased by the state from individuals holding by patent, be taxed. The commissioners of the county of Dauphin have no right to tax the state for the state house and other public buildings for the use of the state; nor for the land upon which they are erected; the authority of the state being paramount to the authority of the county; nor can the property of a county be taxed for city or borough purposes; the rights of the county being superior to a corporation within the county. 4 Serg. & Rawle, 354. In the different counties in the state, there are many United States' officers--members of congress, judges, marshalls, and postmasters: have the county commissioners, for the counties in which they reside, a right, under the aforesaid act, to tax them for their respective offices; and, in that way, by the authority of a state law reduce the compensation, which, by act of congress, is allowed them? It would seem not; this would be interfering with the national government, and violating the act of congress which is paramount to the act of assembly, by reducing the compensation allowed by act of co...