Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co.
Decision Date | 24 January 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 44904,44904 |
Citation | 225 N.W.2d 831,303 Minn. 16 |
Parties | NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Respondent, v. GLOBE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. An insurer must indemnify the insured for payment made by the insured to a hijacker where the policy was a blanket crime policy, as opposed to one insuring for specific risks only.
2. In the event of ambiguity in a policy, the policy language will be strictly construed against the insurer.
Robins, Davis & Lyons, Harding A. Orren, John C. Hart, and M. Arnold Lyons, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Dorsey, Marquart, Windhorst, West & Halladay, William J. Hempel, and Lane Ayres, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Considered and decided by the court en banc.
Plaintiff brought an action in the District Court of Hennepin County, seeking recovery under an insurance policy issued it by defendant for losses sustained as the result of criminal acts of an unknown person perpetrated in the states of Washington and Oregon during an airline flight. From the judgment of the district court determining that plaintiff was entitled to recovery, defendant appeals. We affirm.
On September 29, 1965, defendant (insurer) and plaintiff (insured) executed an insurance agreement entitled 'blanket Crime Policy' and providing indemnity for covered losses not to exceed $250,000, with a $20,000 deductible clause. This policy was in effect at the time of the alleged loss.
On November 24, 1971, plaintiff, in the normal course of its air carrier business, was operating Flight 305, originating at Minneapolis, Minnesota, terminating at Seattle, Washington, with intermediate stops, including Portland, Oregon.
A male passenger, ticketed under the name of D. B. Cooper, boarded Flight 305 at Portland, Oregon, carrying a briefcase. Cooper took a seat in the tourist section at the rear of the passenger cabin. At or near the time of takeoff, at approximately 3 p.m., he proceeded to 'hijack' Flight 305 by threatening to detonate what appeared to be a bomb concealed in his briefcase unless the following demands were met:
(1) $200,000 in cash, to be delivered to the plane at Seattle.
(2) Four parachutes, to be delivered with the money.
(3) No police interference.
(4) Refueling of the plane at Seattle.
The above demands were communicated to the pilot, Captain William A. Scott, who, in turn, radioed plaintiff's headquarters at Minneapolis-St. Paul, and advised the company officials of Cooper's demands. As a result of discussions with other crew members, Captain Scott decided to cooperate with the hijacker.
Plaintiff's Seattle ground personnel were notified of the hijacking and, further, received home office authorization to procure the money and parachutes demanded by Cooper. In order to obtain the $200,000 in cash, arrangements were made with Seattle First National Bank, through its airport branch. The money was taken from the vault of the bank's downtown facility, and transported to the airport by bank personnel and the Seattle police. The release of cash funds after normal banking hours resulted in a debit to plaintiff's account which was repaid by a transfer credit on the next banking day.
Mr. William C. Grinnell, an officer of Seattle First National Bank, arrived at the Seattle airport at approximately 5 p.m. with the money. He first proceeded to the airport branch of the bank to pick up the branch manager, who then accompanied Mr. Grinnell to plaintiff's air freight terminal, a 'premises' of plaintiff insured within the meaning of the subject insurance policy. An authorized official of plaintiff gave a receipt for the $200,000 while it was Inside the terminal. Mr. Grinnell transferred possession of the $200,000 to Captain Elwood M. Lee, a Northwest official designated to transport the money to the hijacked airplane, which had landed at the Seattle airport and was parked at the end of a runway. Captain Lee proceeded to the airplane in an automobile and delivered the money to Stewardess Tina Larson, who carried the money into the airplane and surrendered direct physical custody of it to the hijacker. Upon receipt thereof, Cooper allowed the passengers to leave the airplane. Stewardess Larson also delivered the parachutes and other items to Cooper, who was still in the rear cabin of the aircraft. At that time, he allowed two other stewardesses to leave the airplane. Cooper, Stewardess Larson, and the cockpit crew of three men remained on board.
Pursuant to Cooper's instructions, the airplane took off for the stated destination of Mexico. However, intermediate fuel stops were negotiated with Cooper, the first of which was to be Reno, Nevada. The hijacker instructed the crew as to altitude, speed, and other details of the flight. After takeoff, Cooper ordered the remaining crew members to stay in the forward area of the aircraft and to keep the curtains to the tourist section closed. Shortly after takeoff, approximately 7:30 p.m., Cooper lowered the rear stairs of the airplane. Approximately halfway between Seattle and Portland, the instruments of the aircraft indicated that Cooper had jumped from these stairs. Upon landing in Reno, Nevada, the crew discovered that Cooper, the bomb, the money, and two parachutes were not on board. Neither Cooper nor the money has ever been located.
The 'Blanket Crime Policy' underlying this appeal provides coverage as set forth in five insuring agreements, which may be described in general terms as follows:
(1) Employee dishonesty coverage.
(2) Loss inside the premises coverage.
(3) Loss outside the premises coverage.
(4) Money orders and counterfeit paper currency coverage.
(5) Depositor's forgery coverage.
Plaintiff seeks recovery under the following insuring agreements, which state in relevant part:CC 'LOSS INSIDE THE PREMISES COVERAGE
'LOSS OUTSIDE THE PREMISES COVERAGE
'Loss of other property by Robbery or attempt thereat outside the Premises while being conveyed by a Messenger or any armored motor vehicle company, or by theft while within the living quarters in the home of any Messenger.' (Italics supplied.)
Section 3 of the conditions and limitations of the policy provides the following definitions of terms relevant to the issues presented in this appeal:
The trial court determined that there was a wrongful abstraction of money from within plaintiff's premises or from within plaintiff's bank premises, and also outside the premises while the money was being conveyed by a meassenger as defined in the policy. From judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $180,000 plus interest and costs and disbursements, defendant appeals.
To recover, defendant correctly states that plaintiff must establish:
(1) That it suffered a loss of money.
(2) That the loss resulted from the actual wrongful abstraction thereof.
(3) That the wrongful abstraction is a risk covered in the policy.
Defendant attacks the first element on grounds that the trial court's finding that plaintiff 'suffered a loss of $200,000 in money by means of wrongful abstraction thereof within the meaning of the contract of insurance' is too general. This assertion must fail because:
a) The court found that plaintiff obtained $200,000 in cash and delivered it to a stewardess who, in turn, delivered said money to the hijacker.
b) A fair reading of the findings establishes that the hijacker jumped from the airplane with the money.
c) The court found that none of the $200,000 has been recovered.
In the light of the foregoing, we cannot agree that the taking of the $200,000 is not a 'loss of money' as defined in the policy.
Defendant maintains that the insuring agreement was intended to cover only specific money that plaintiff might have on its premises at any particular time from ticket sales and other receipts, and could not include borrowed money and that, therefore, the money taken really did not belong to Northwest Airlines. However, we see little reason for a distinction between money which plaintiff has on hand itself, which it borrowed, or which it could readily borrow.
The second requisite element, wrongful abstraction, is not defined in the policy and the parties agree that said term is...
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