Northwest Reforestation Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Summit Forests, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 August 1996 |
| Citation | 143 Or.App. 138,922 P.2d 1240 |
| Parties | NORTHWEST REFORESTATION CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.; C & H Reforesters, Inc.; Grayback Forestry, Inc.; Hugo Reforestation, Inc.; Miller Timber Services, Inc.; Rincon Reforestation, Inc.; Second Growth, Inc.; Shiloh Forestry, Inc.; Skookum Reforestation, Inc.; Timber West, Inc.; and Strata Industries, Inc., Appellants, v. SUMMIT FORESTS, INC., Respondent. 16-93-09532; CA A86294. @ Court of Appeals of Oregon, In Banc. * |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.
Judith Giers, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were William F. Gary and Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C.
D. Michael Dale filed a brief amicus curiae for Oregon Legal Services Corporation.
Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Janie M. Burcart, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief amicus curiae for Bureau of Labor & Industries.
Plaintiffs seek an injunction and damages under ORS 658.475, which provides remedies against farm labor contractors who violate certain statutes and administrative rules. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, ORCP 47, and plaintiffs appeal. We reverse in part.
Defendant is a large reforestation contractor working on federal lands in Oregon. In each of the last several years, defendant or Summitt Enterprises, Inc., 1 its predecessor, received federal reforestation contracts. As a reforestation contractor, defendant is subject to ORS 658.475, which provides:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiffs are also reforestation contractors subject to ORS 658.475. In November 1993, they filed a complaint against defendant, which was eventually replaced with a third amended complaint that frames the issues for purposes of summary judgment. The third amended complaint provides, in part:
In August 1994, defendant moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant offered uncontroverted evidence that it has had Oregon workers' compensation insurance in effect since October 1993, and that that coverage had continued since that time. It also offered evidence that it was in compliance with ORS 658.417(3), 2 ORS 658.417(4) 3 and ORS 658.440(3)(e). 4 Plaintiffs offered evidence in contravention of defendant's motion. That evidence demonstrated that defendant was often late in filing required payroll reports in 1993 and 1994 and that, during that time, the Border Patrol made several raids on defendant's work sites. As a result of those raids, the Immigration Service took a number of defendant's workers and those of its subcontractors into custody as illegal aliens. In each instance, there is evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer that violations were continuing to occur in November 1993, the date plaintiffs filed their complaint, and thereafter. As a result, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant on those claims that seek injunctive relief based on violations of ORS 658.417(3) and ORS 658.440(3)(d). Jones v. General Motors, 139 Or.App. 244, 911 P.2d 1243, rev. allowed 323 Or. 483, 918 P.2d 847 (1996).
The remaining claim focuses on the allegation that defendant was entitled to injunctive relief and damages under ORS 658.475 because it failed to provide workers' compensation insurance for individuals who performed forestation or reforestation activities in the State of Oregon as required by ORS 658.417(4). As mentioned previously, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that, at the time that plaintiffs filed their complaint, defendant was in compliance with the requirements of ORS 658.417(4) and had been for over a month. Although plaintiffs concede that defendant was in compliance with the statute as of November 1993, and defendant continued to be in compliance at the time of the summary judgment hearing, they argue that the considerable evidence that defendant was violating ORS 658.417(4) before October 1993, entitles them to injunctive and damage remedies under ORS 658.475 and precludes summary judgment for defendant.
Plaintiffs' argument frames an issue of statutory interpretation: Does ORS 658.475 afford a remedy for past violations? In interpreting a statute, our goal is to discern the intent of the legislature. If the meaning of a statute is clear on its face, our inquiry goes no further. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). In order for a party to be entitled to the additional remedy of damages under ORS 658.475, the person against whom the remedy is sought must be "acting * * * in violation" of the act or the administrative rules promulgated pursuant to the statute. (Emphasis supplied.) The statute is clear on its face as to the time frame to which it applies. The requirement that the contractor be "acting in violation" of the enumerated statutes or rules is in the present tense. It does not authorize an injunction or damages against a person who has violated the statutes or rules in the past. There is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant did not have coverage or was threatening to drop the Oregon coverage it had procured at the time the complaint was filed or thereafter. 5 As a result, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant was acting in violation of ORS 658.417(4) by not having workers' compensation insurance for its employees in November 1993, and consequently, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
Nonetheless, the dissent asserts that under the language of the statute, plaintiff may bring a claim for damages for past violations of ORS 658.417(4), and it relies on an analysis that equates the statute to general equitable principles. The reliance on equitable principles is misplaced. ORS 658.475 is solely a creation of the legislature. There is nothing on the face of the statute that supports the dissent's analysis. Even if an argument can be made that the statute is unclear on its face, there is nothing in the legislative history that suggests that the legislature intended to adopt general equitable principles or create a private statutory cause of action for damages for past violations when it enacted the statute.
Finally, even if the statutory claim is treated as an equitable claim, the case law does not support the dissent's reasoning. At common law, the availability of an award of damages in a case in equity depended on whether plaintiff was entitled to relief at the time of the filing of the suit. In Oregon Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Riddle, 116 Or. 562, 569, 241 P. 1011 (1926), the court explained:
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