Northwestern Brewers Supply Co. v. Vorhees

• Decision Date: 09 June 1947
• Docket Number: 40249
• Citation: 203 S.W.2d 422,356 Mo. 699
• Parties: Northwestern Brewers Supply Company, a Corporation, Appellant, v. Montgomery Vorhees
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

203 S.W.2d 422

356 Mo. 699

Northwestern Brewers Supply Company, a Corporation, Appellant, v. Montgomery Vorhees

No. 40249

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 9, 1947

Rehearing Denied July 14, 1947.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. James E McLaughlin and Hon. Joseph J. Ward, Judges.

Affirmed.

Harry T. Limerick, Jr., David K. Breed, and Roy R Stauff for appellant.

(1) Defendant, by admitting in its answer that a judgment is not paid, loses any right to a defense under R.S. 1939, Sec. 1038; this because a party is bound by admissions in his pleadings or by his counsel. Chiles v. School Dist. of Buckner, 103 Mo.App. 240, 77 S.W. 82; Fleming v. Joseph F. McMahon Contr. Co., 45 S.W.2d 952; Utterback v. N.Y. Life, 191 S.W.2d 421; Eaton v. Curtis, 4 S.W.2d 819; Evans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 129 S.W.2d 53; Republic Steel Corp. v. Atlas Housewrecking Co., 113 S.W.2d 155; Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 26 L.Ed. 539. (2) "Full Faith and Credit" means full faith and credit in every state, for the full term of the duration of the judgment under the lex fori where the judgment was entered, i.e., Wisconsin. U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 1; Berkeley v. Tootle, 163 Mo. 548, 63 S.W. 681; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 48 S.Ct. 142, 53 A.L.R. 1141; U.S. Code, Title 28, Sec. 687, 26 U.S.C.A., Sec 687; Wisconsin Statutes 1945 (18th Ed.), Secs. 272.04, 270.66; Civil Code of Mo., Sec. 54-b, Mo. Stat. Ann., pocket supp., Sec. 847.54 (b). (3) Even though an action is unlawful under the law of the forum, proof of a duly authenticated foreign judgment makes a prima facie case for the plaintiff. Walter L. Lacey Co. v. Natl. Finance Corp., 79 S.W.2d 1078; Geo. Edw. Day Sons v. Robb, 139 S.W.2d 533, certiorari quashed, State ex rel. Robb v. Shain, 149 S.W.2d 812; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L.Ed. 475; Roche v. McDonald, supra; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 231, 28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208; Ohio Bureau of Credit v. Steinberg, 29 Ala.App. 515, 199 So. 246; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 59 S.Ct. 557. (4) If jurisdiction exists, a judgment of one state is good for all purposes in all other states and under all circumstances. Williams v. North Carolina, 63 S.Ct. 207, 317 U.S. 287, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273, 64 S.Ct. 1286, granting certiorari after a retrial below, and (Final Opinion), 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, Rehearing denied, 65 S.Ct. 1560, see particularly l.c. 63 S.Ct. 210, also 65 S.Ct. 1095.

Irvin H. Gamble for respondent.

(1) The 10-year statute of limitations of Missouri can be pleaded and is the proper defense against a Wisconsin judgment that is more than 10 years old; the full faith and credit clause applies only to the merits of the case, not to limitations or remedies. Sec. 1038, R.S. 1939; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 S.Ct. 312; Bacon v. Howard, 61 U.S. 811; Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U.S. 675; Cook's Estate v. Brown, 140 S.W.2d 44. (2) Section 1038 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, is a definite statute and all judgments become dormant and are outlawed 10 years after rendition, unless kept alive by payments of record, made in accordance with the provisions of the statute itself or by revival of the judgment. Sec. 1038, R.S. 1939; Hedges v. McKittrick, 153 S.W.2d 790; Mayes v. Mayes, 342 Mo. 401, 116 S.W.2d 1; Kansas City v. Field, 270 Mo. 500, 194 S.W. 39; Chiles v. School Dist. of Buckner, 103 Mo.App. 240.

OPINION

Douglas, P.J.

In January, 1946 plaintiff filed this suit on a Wisconsin judgment rendered on October 31, 1932. Defendant pleaded the Missouri Statute barring suits on judgments after ten years. Plaintiff, in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleged that the statute of limitations in Wisconsin, where the judgment was obtained, ran for a period of twenty years, and therefore under the Constitution of the United States the Wisconsin judgment was entitled to full faith and credit for such term, and the Missouri ten-year statute could not be applied. Defendant also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the ten-year statute. Plaintiff's motion was overruled, defendant's motion was sustained, and the court entered judgment dismissing the petition. Plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff's position is that full faith and credit means full faith and credit for the full term of the duration of the judgment under the law of the place where the judgment was obtained, and that the statute of Missouri, where suit was brought on the judgment, prescribing a shorter term violated the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, and was therefore unconstitutional. We are unable to agree with plaintiff's position and find that a similar contention has been overruled in a number of cases. Anno. 52 A.L.R. 566. See also 11 Am. Jur. Conflict of Laws, sec. 192, 34 C.J. Judgments, sec. 1577.

The plea based on a statute limiting an action on a foreign judgment is one to the remedy, and it is the general rule that the law of the forum will govern rather than that of the place where the judgment was rendered.

It was settled in M'Elmoyle v. Cohen (1839), 38 U.S. 312, that this rule did not violate the full faith and credit clause. The court interpreted full faith and credit to mean that "if a judgment is conclusive in the state where it is pronounced, it is equally conclusive, everywhere, in the states of the Union. If re-examinable there, it is open to the same inquiries in every other state. . . . Such being the faith, credit, and effect, to be given to a judgment of one state in another, by the Constitution and the act of Congress, the point under consideration will be determined by settling what is the nature of a plea of the statute of limitations. Is it a plea that settles the right of a party on a contract or judgment, or one that bars the remedy? Whatever diversity of opinion there may be among jurists upon this point, we think it is well settled to be a plea to the remedy; and consequently that the lex fori must prevail. . . ."

The court continued: "Prescription is a thing of policy, growing out of the experience of its necessity; and the time after which suits or actions shall be barred, has been, from a remote antiquity, fixed by every nation, in virtue of that sovereignty by which it exercises its legislation for all persons and property within its jurisdiction. This being the foundation of the right to pass statutes of prescription or limitation, may not our states, under our system, exercise this right in virtue of their sovereignty? or is it to be conceded to them in every other particular, than that of barring the remedy upon judgments of other states by the lapse of time? The states use this right upon judgments rendered in their own Courts; and the common law raises the presumption of the payment of a judgment after the lapse of twenty years. May they not then limit the time for remedies upon the judgments of other states, and alter the common law by statute, fixing a less or larger time for such presumption, and altogether barring suits upon such judgments, if they shall not be brought within the time stated in the statute? . . . But the point might have been shortly dismissed with this sage declaration, that there is no direct constitutional inhibition upon the states, nor any clause in the Constitution from which it can be even plausibly inferred, that the states may not legislate upon the remedy in suits upon the judgments of other states, exclusive of all interference with their merits. It being settled that the statute of limitations may bar recoveries upon foreign judgments; that the effect intended to be given under our Constitution to judgments, is, that they are conclusive only as regards the merits; the common law principle then applies to suits upon them, that they must be brought within the period prescribed by the local law, the lex fori, or the suit will be barred."

In Bacon v. Howard, 61 U.S. 22, the above decision was approved. We find: "But rules of prescription remain, as before, in the full power of every state. There is no clause in the Constitution which restrains this right in each state to legislate upon the remedy in suits on judgments of other states, exclusive of all interference with their merits. The case of M'Elmoyle v. Cohen (13 Peters, 312) leaves nothing further to be said on the subject."

This court has followed the M'Elmoyle case as to the meaning and effect of the full faith and credit clause. Cook's Estate v. Brown, 346 Mo. 281, 140 S.W.2d 42. The case of Berkley v. Tootle, 163 Mo. 584, 63 S.W. 681 is not in point as it considered a statute of Kansas, where the judgment was rendered, which affected the very life of the judgment rather than the remedy. The statute of limitations of this State was not involved.

Cases cited by plaintiff do not sustain its position. Roche v McDonald, 275...