Northwestern L. & B. Co. v. Jonasen
Decision Date | 26 June 1899 |
Citation | 79 N.W. 840,11 S.D. 566 |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Parties | NORTHWESTERN LOAN & BANKING COMPANY, Plaintiff and appellant, v. ERIK JONASEN and Marsta Jonasen, Defendants and respondents. |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Moody County, SD
Reversed
J. H. Williamson and Aikens & Judge
Attorneys for appellant.
George Rice
Attorney for respondent.
Opinion filed June 26, 1899
(See 82 NW 94)
Title to land being questioned, this action of forcible entry and detainer was certified from a justice of the peace to the circuit court, where the defendants obtained judgment, and plaintiff appeals.
That the statutory notice to quit was given, and that the respondents remained in possession after the execution and delivery of a deed to appellant, based upon regular mortgage foreclosure proceedings under a power of sale, appears upon the face of the record, and the only matter of fact in dispute is whether respondent Marsta Jonasen ever joined in the execution of the mortgage given by her husband, Erik Jonasen, upon the homestead, to secure the payment of a portion of the purchase money. Though insisting that the evidence upon the point is wholly insufficient to sustain the verdict, it is urged by counsel for appellant that a mortgage executed by the fee owner of a homestead to secure the purchase price need not be signed by the husband or wife of such owner, and that the court erred in given the following instruction:
In this state
“a conveyance or incumbrance by the owner of such homestead shall be of no validity unless the husband and wife, if the owner is married, and both husband and wife are residents of the state, concur in and sign the same joint instrument.”
Comp. Laws, 2451. Although Section 2452 of the Comp. Laws subjects the homestead to the lien of a mechanic, and Section 2453 provides that it “may be sold for any debt created for the purchase thereof,” Chapter 86 of the Laws of 1890, by express terms absolutely exempts the homestead therein defined and limited from all process, levy, or sale. In Fallihee v. Wittmayer,(1897), it was decided that by this act mechanics and material men were deprived of the right to a lien against the homestead; and in the performance of the duty enjoined by Section 4 of Article 21 of the state constitution, requiring the enactment of a wholesome law defining, limiting, and exempting the homestead from forced sale, it seems very clear from the language employed that the legislature of 1890 intended to bestow upon every owner of a homestead absolute immunity from a sale thereof in satisfaction of debts, even though contracted for the purchase price. The mortgagor being the fee-simple owner of the premises impressed with the character of a homestead, and the mortgagees’ interest no more than a lien in the nature of a chattel, there can be no hypothecation unless the purported mortgage was concurred in and signed by both the husband and wife. Comp. Laws, § 2451, Chapters 76, 77, Laws 1891.
We come now to the main contention. Respondent Marsta Jonasen, being unable to write, it appears that her name was written upon the mortgage by another, and that she signed by making her mark in the presence of two attesting witnesses, and in the usual form acknowledged the execution of the instrument before a notary public. To the point presented by a denial that she ever executed the mortgage, C. B. Kennedy, president of appellant corporation, testified concerning the note and mortgage as follows:
“I saw Erik Jonasen and Marsta Jonasen sign that note and mortgage. Erik Jonasen signed the note and mortgage himself. Marsta Jonasen did not sign her own name to the note and mortgage. John L. Jones signed her name to the note and mortgage for her. I heard her make that request. I saw her make her mark on the note and mortgage. It was done by her taking hold of the pen with Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones had hold of the pen, too. That note and mortgage was delivered to plaintiff after its execution … .
J. L. Jones read over those papers. He would read a clause, and then Mr. Jonasen would talk in Norwegian to her, and explain it, and talk it over. I was in the room at the time, talking frequently myself with them. … ,f said a little while ago that Mrs. Jonasen asked Mr. Jones to write her name on that mortgage. She said, can’t write,’ or words to that effect. ‘You write it.’ She said that in broken English, but enough so I could understand it. She did not talk very much English. She talks a little English. She spoke in English there that day. That is about the extent of it though, that I have repeated. Erik Jonasen signed them first. She held the pen when she made her mark. She held on the end of it, and he held it in his hand. I think she kept hold of it while he made all the marks. There were three mortgages and three notes signed at that time.”
The following is the material part of the testimony of J. L. Jones:
Cross-examination:
To overcome the foregoing evidence, Erik Jonasen did no more than to swear that his wife never signed the papers, and her testimony relating to the matter is as follows:
Upon the theory that the certificate of the officer taking the acknowledgment cannot be impeached by the uncorroborated testimony of interested parties, it is urged that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the finding of the jury that Marsta Jonasen did not execute the mortgage, and that the motion to direct a verdict in favor of appellant ought to have been sustained. The view we shall take of the quoted instruction given to the jury, and to which our attention is called by an assignment of error, renders a direct determination of the exact point unnecessary. While an unrecorded mortgage is valid as between the parties and those having notice thereof, the statute requires that it must be acknowledged in order to be recorded, and when acknowledged. and recorded its admission in evidence is expressly authorized without any further proof. Comp. Laws, § 3269, 3297, 5307. Thus the statutory injunction emanating from a wise consideration of public policy, and based upon the presumption that a public officer has properly performed his official duty, makes the recitals of his certificate, written substantially in the form provided by Section 3288 of the Compiled Laws, “evidence without further proof” that the person named there in and in the instrument not only executed, but acknowledged, the execution of such instrument. Though Mrs. Jonasen, who could not write, denies that she asked any one to sign her name, or had the pen in her hand when her mark was made, it is undisputed that she went there with her husband for the purpose of transacting the business, and, according to the recitals of his certificate, was to the notary “well known to be the person who is described in and who executed the within and foregoing mortgage, and acknowledged the same to be her free act and deed, for the purposes...
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