Norton v. Derr

• Decision Date: 08 July 2022
• Docket Number: Civ. 22-00128 JMS-RT
• Parties: DANIEL EMERSON NORTON, Petitioner, v. ESTELA DERR, WARDEN,[1] Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

DANIEL EMERSON NORTON, Petitioner, v. ESTELA DERR, WARDEN,^[1] Respondent.

Civ. No. 22-00128 JMS-RT

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

July 8, 2022

ORDER DISMISSING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF NO 1

J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is pro se Petitioner Daniel Emerson Norton's (“Norton”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), ECF No 1. As discussed below, the court DISMISSES the Petition with leave to amend certain claims.

II. BACKGROUND

Norton pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on April 15, 2019. See United States v. Norton, No. 17-cr-00050-MHW-1 (S.D. Ohio), ECF Nos. 90, 92. On November 26, 2019, he was sentenced by that court to a term of imprisonment of 96 months. Id., ECF No. 107. He began serving that sentence in January 2020 at the Federal Correctional Institution in Morgantown, West Virginia (“FCI Morgantown”). See id., ECF No. 123. His projected release date is October 26, 2026. See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited July 8, 2022).

Norton was subsequently transferred to the Federal Detention Center in Honolulu, Hawaii (“FDC Honolulu”); he arrived at FDC Honolulu on January 18, 2022. See ECF No. 9-1 at PageID # 56.^[2] On or about January 25, 2022, Norton received his “Individualized Needs Plan - Initial Classification” (“Needs Plan”) from a case manager at FDC Honolulu. See ECF No. 1 at PageID # 6; ECF No. 1-1 (Norton's Needs Plan dated January 25, 2022).

Norton filed his Petition on March 23, 2022,^[3] asserting that his Needs Plan “contains many errors” and that FDC Honolulu and its staff have “refused to update the [Needs Plan].” ECF No. 1 at PageID # 6. Specifically, Norton alleges that his Needs Plan contains the following five errors: (1) it omits two psychology classes and one psychology certification that Norton has completed; (2) it contains an inaccurate assignment of healthcare level; (3) it incorrectly states that he is ineligible for the Residential Drug Abuse Program; (4) it states an incorrect restitution obligation; and (5) its calculation of accumulated time credits is inaccurate. Id. at PagelD ## 6-7. For relief, Norton requests that the court direct FDC Honolulu, through Respondent Warden Estela Derr (“Warden Derr”), to correct those errors.

Before filing his Petition, Norton allegedly made “multiple attempts at resolving [the errors in his Needs Plan].” Id. at PageID # 7. Those attempts included filing a BP-8 informal-resolution request with his unit team, emailing his case manager, and emailing his case manager's supervisor, all of which were allegedly ignored. See id. Norton also filed a BP-9 formal complaint with FDC Honolulu's warden, but that complaint was “rejected” (not “denied”) because Norton did not submit a BP-8 underlying his BP-9. See ECF No. 1-7 (BP-9 rejection); see also ECF No. 1 at PageID # 7. The BP-9 rejection was not final, as it permitted Norton to correct his procedural errors, i.e., by presenting a previously denied BP-8 informal-resolution when resubmitting his BP-9. See ECF No. 1-7; ECF No. 9 at PageID # 41 (explaining that “[Norton's] BP-9 was rejected and returned to him with an explanation that he needs to properly follow BOP administrative remedy procedures,” and that Norton “could have filed a BP-8 with Unit Manager Kris Robl at that point who could have, in turn, addressed any alleged errors”); id. at PageID # 42 (noting the “important distinction between a ‘rejected' BP-9 . . . and a ‘denied' BP-9”).

Related to those efforts, Norton asserts that FDC Honolulu and its staff have “refus[ed] to allow inmates to pursue administrative remedies [up to a BP-11 appeal to the Federal Bureau of Prisons' General Counsel],” including by allegedly withholding BP-8 forms from inmates or not returning filed BP-8 forms to inmates and then denying BP-9 complaints on the basis of the lack of an underlying BP-8. See ECF No. 5 at PagelD ## 27-28; see also id. at PagelD # 27 (alleging that Unit Manager Kris Robl told inmates that “there are too many BP-8's [sic] coming from this unit” and that the inmates would “not [be] getting one” in the future); ECF No. 12 at PageID # 130 (“Mr. Robl informed inmates that he would no longer process BP-9's [sic] and hand out BP-8 forms.... This brings the entire process to a halt.”). Norton specifically alleges that “he never received a returned BP-8 from the Unit Team and, therefore[,] could not proceed with further remedies.” ECF No. 12 at PageID # 129.

After Norton filed his Petition, the court directed Warden Derr to file a response to the Petition, and the court permitted Norton file an optional reply. See ECF No. 6. Warden Derr filed her Response on May 24, 2022. ECF No. 9.

Norton filed his Reply on June 2, 2022. ECF No. 12. The court decides this matter without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Habeas corpus relief is available to a federal inmate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if the inmate can show that he or she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). Challenges to the execution of a sentence must be brought under § 2241 and in the “custodial court.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). More specifically, a challenge to the “manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution” must be brought under § 2241. Id. (emphasis added). Challenges to the “conditions of confinement” cannot, however, be brought in a habeas corpus petition. Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016). The distinction between challenges to the “conditions of a sentence's execution” and challenges to the “conditions of confinement” is that the former “challenges the fact or duration of the . . . sentence,” while the latter “challenges any other aspect of prison life.” See id. at 934; see also Jordan-McFeely v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2021 WL 3610321, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3602131 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021).

When adjudicating a § 2241 petition, the district court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the petition before proceeding to any other issue. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865. A district court can lack jurisdiction over a § 2241 petition due to, for example, not being the “custodial court,” i.e., the court sitting in the federal district in which the petitioner is being held. See id. A district court can also lack jurisdiction over a § 2241 petition when the petition challenges determinations committed to the discretion of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Rodriguez v. Copenhaver, 823 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2016). And a district court can lack jurisdiction over § 2241 petitioners who do not have constitutional standing due to their failure to allege an injury-in-fact, their claims being moot, or their claims being unripe. See, e.g., Coal. of Clergy, Laws., & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002); Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Sept. 25, 2002); Jefferson v. Thompson, 2022 WL 1215441, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2022) (findings and recommendation); Zhang v. Mukasey, 2009 WL 812145, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009).

Because Norton is proceeding pro se, the court liberally construes the allegations in his Petition. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed' . . . [and] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))); see also Ross v. Williams, 950 F.3d 1160, 1173 n.19 (9th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that courts must construe habeas petitions liberally and draw reasonable inferences in the petitioner's favor). Even when viewed liberally, however, a “cursory and vague claim” is insufficient to warrant habeas relief. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”)); see Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts^[4] (providing in part that a habeas petition must “specify all the grounds for relief” and “state the facts supporting each ground”).

As a prudential matter, an inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a § 2241 petition in federal court. See Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). But exhaustion of a § 2241 petition is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and can be waived “if pursuing those [administrative] remedies would be futile.” Id. (quoting Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993)). The existence of a law plainly mandating a particular result-such as language in an official BOP policy that is directly contrary to a petitioner's claims-can make a § 2241 petitioner's exhaustion efforts futile. See id. “Factors that weigh in favor of requiring exhaustion include whether ‘(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.'” Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended (Jan. 31, 2005) (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)).

IV. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, this court...