Norton v. Everhart
| Citation | 895 S.W.2d 317 |
| Parties | Richard Lynn NORTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Don EVERHART, Warden, State of Tennessee, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Decision Date | 30 January 1995 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
John C. Burgin, Jr., Kramer, Rayson, Leake, Rodgers & Morgan, Knoxville, for plaintiff-appellee.
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. & Reporter, and Joel W. Perry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for defendants-appellants.
The State of Tennessee appeals from the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's dismissal of Richard Norton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which alleged that the Board of Paroles had illegally revoked his parole. This case presents the following procedural issues for our determination: (1) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals was correct in holding that the trial court had the inherent authority and duty to convert petitioner's request for relief from its incorrect form, that of habeas corpus, to the correct form of certiorari and thereafter transfer the case to the Davidson County courts, which have the exclusive jurisdiction to review actions of the Board of Paroles; and (2) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals was correct in holding that the doctrine of "equitable tolling" served to allow petitioner to refile his otherwise untimely request for relief in Davidson County.
On May 18, 1989, Richard Norton was convicted of aggravated and simple assault; he was sentenced to serve ten years in the Department of Corrections. On January 31, 1991, Norton was paroled with special conditions, one of which being that he abstain from the excessive use of intoxicants. On March 7, 1991, Beatrice Norton, Norton's ex-wife, complained to the Greene County Sheriff's Department that Norton was extremely drunk and would not vacate her residence. Officer Ronnie Dixon investigated the call and woke Norton from a dead sleep to inform him that his ex-wife wanted him to leave the residence. Officer Dixon believed that Norton was indeed drunk at that time; and this belief was apparently brought to the attention of the Board of Paroles.
As a result of this occurrence, The Board of Paroles issued a parole violation warrant on March 27, 1991. At the revocation hearing on June 6, 1991, Norton argued that he was not drunk at the time the Sheriff found him, but that he had worked late the previous evening and had therefore been sleeping heavily at the time the officer awakened him. Ms. Norton also testified at the hearing that Norton had not been drunk at the time; she explained that she had called the sheriff because she suspected that Norton was having an affair with another woman and was angry at him. After the completion of the testimony, the hearing officer recommended to the Board of Paroles that Norton's parole be revoked. The Board subsequently voted to revoke the parole based on the hearing officer's recommendation. Norton was informed of the Board's decision by letter postmarked July 8, 1991. Norton then requested review of the Board's decision; but that request was denied by the Board in a letter dated August 5, 1991.
On August 28, 1991, Norton filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Morgan County Criminal Court. In the petition Norton basically repeated the arguments he had advanced at the revocation hearing; and he specifically requested a "fast and speedy hearing" on the petition. On November 12, 1991, after hearing nothing concerning his petition, Norton filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Morgan County Circuit Court, requesting that Court to hold the Morgan County Criminal Court in contempt for failing to act on the habeas corpus petition.
On January 14, 1992, the Morgan County Criminal Court dismissed Norton's petition. In its order the Court first stated that Norton did not allege that his conviction was void or that his term of imprisonment had expired--the only circumstances in which habeas corpus relief is available. The Court further stated that because Norton was merely alleging that his parole had been illegally revoked, his sole remedy would be to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court then concluded that, because all actions for review of the actions of the Board of Paroles must be filed in Davidson County, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, the Court dismissed the petition; and Norton appealed from its decision to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. Initially, the Court agreed with the trial court that a writ of certiorari is the proper pleading by which to challenge a parole revocation, and that the courts of Davidson County have the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Board of Paroles. However, the Court also noted that determining the proper procedure for challenging a parole revocation was by no means a simple task; rather, it stated that the necessary analysis of the applicable statutes and case law, some of which is conflicting, was "daunting even to someone with a legal education." In light of these procedural obstacles, the relaxed standards applicable to pro se pleadings, and the settled rule that a pleading is to be given effect with regard to its content, the Court held that the Morgan County Criminal Court should have converted the habeas corpus petition into a certiorari petition and transferred it to a proper court in Davidson County.
The Court alternatively held that even if the trial court had no authority to transfer the matter, the doctrine of "equitable tolling" would permit Norton to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in Davidson County despite the fact that the sixty day statutory period of limitations applicable to writs of certiorari had expired.
The State of Tennessee applied for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11, Tenn.R.App.P. We granted the application to address these important procedural issues.
We first address the propriety of the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding regarding the trial court's inherent authority and duty to convert the petition to its proper form and to transfer it to the proper court. Initially, we note that there is no problem with the first part of the Court's holding--that the trial court should have treated the petition as one for a writ of certiorari. It is well settled that a trial court is not bound by the title of the pleading, but has the discretion to treat the pleading according to the relief sought. Fallin v. Knox County Board of Commissioners, 656 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tenn.1983); State v. Minimum Salary Dep't. of A.M.E. Church, 477 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tenn.1972).
The part of the Court's holding regarding the inherent authority of the trial court to transfer is, however, extremely problematic. The general rule governing transfer is that a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction over a case has no authority to transfer it, unless that authority is specifically conferred by statute, rule, or constitutional provision. See C.J.S. Courts § 195 (1990); Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3827 (1973). This rule is for all practical purposes universally adhered to, 1 and although it was not cited by any of the parties, this Court has explicitly adopted this position in Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341 (1950).
In Coleman a couple obtained a divorce in the Shelby County Circuit Court. When Mrs. Coleman later filed an action concerning child support in the Shelby County Chancery Court, Mr. Coleman filed a cross-bill, requesting that he be granted custody of the child. The chancellor refused to rule on the cross-bill, noting that a statute conferred exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters to the court in which the divorce was originally granted--in this instance the Shelby County Circuit Court. The chancellor did, however, order the case transferred to that court.
On appeal this Court reversed the chancellor's decision, reasoning as follows:
We have been unable to find any statute which authorizes the chancellor to transfer this cross-bill to the Circuit Court for further proceedings there with reference to the custody of this child. Nor have we been able to find any opinions of this Court so holding ...
There are several situations in this state in which one court without jurisdiction of a given cause is authorized without consent of the parties to transfer that cause to a court having jurisdiction. But that authority is in each instance given by statute ...
The fact that statutes were considered necessary to authorize transfers by a court without jurisdiction to a court with jurisdiction implies lack of authority to order such transfer in the absence of statutory authority, and the courts seem to have so regarded it. By way of illustration, Code, § 9110 provides that where a suit is dismissed for want of jurisdiction costs should be adjudged against the party attempting to institute such suit. The reason for the enactment of that statute was because the courts were of the opinion that in the absence of jurisdiction of a given cause there was no authority to adjudge costs. [citation omitted]. Another illustration is in the practice of the Supreme Court in cases which should have been appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. Until the enactment of a statute authorizing the transfer of the cause to the Court of Appeals this Court simply dismissed the cause for want of jurisdiction. [citation omitted].
We are of the opinion that since there is no statute authorizing the Chancery Court to transfer this cause to the Circuit Court, it was without authority of its own motion to order the transfer or to do more with reference to the cross-bill than to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction and adjudge the costs against the cross-complainant.
Coleman, 229 S.W.2d at 343-44.
This Court has continued to apply the rule set...
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