Norton v. Hoyt

• Citation: 278 F.Supp.2d 214
• Decision Date: 13 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-0156L.,01-0156L.
• Parties: Gail M. NORTON, Plaintiff, v. Russell L. HOYT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

278 F.Supp.2d 214

Gail M. NORTON, Plaintiff, v. Russell L. HOYT, Defendant.

No. 01-0156L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

August 13, 2003.

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J. Ronald Fishbein, East Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

Gerald C. DeMaria, Peter E. Garvey, Lisa A. Kelly, Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Providence, RI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The disputed claims arise out of an adulterous twenty-three year relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, during which time Defendant allegedly maintained that he would terminate his marriage, marry Plaintiff, and support her for the rest of her life. After close examination of the record and existing case law, this Court concludes that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

FACTS AND TRAVEL

The "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits," Fed. Civ. P. 56(c), reveal the following facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

On or about July 24, 1974, Plaintiff Gail M. Norton ("Norton" or "Plaintiff"), a Rhode Island resident, met Defendant Russell L. Hoyt ("Hoyt" or "Defendant"), a Connecticut resident, through mutual acquaintances. At that time Hoyt represented to Norton that he was divorced; in reality he was (and still is) married. Believing Hoyt was single, Norton initiated a relationship with him. Shortly thereafter, when it became apparent to Norton that he actually was married, Hoyt told Norton that he was getting a divorce. Moreover, on or about January 5, 1975, Hoyt told Norton that he had moved out of the marital residence, leading her to believe once again that he was getting a divorce. However, Hoyt was not in the process of getting a divorce when he made these statements to Norton. Because of those alleged continuing misrepresentations over many years, Norton continued to maintain a relationship with Hoyt, which lasted for twenty-three years in all.

When the pair began dating Norton was employed as an elementary school teacher in the Bristol, Rhode Island school system, a position she held for a number of years. Allegedly in reliance upon Hoyt's repeated promises to divorce his wife and marry her, Norton resigned that position in 1980. Norton asserts that at Hoyt's insistence and in reliance on his promises, she resigned in order to be available to travel with him around the world.¹

The couple maintained a lavish lifestyle. Hoyt was part of the Newport, Rhode Island yachting crowd. Several times a year, they traveled together to destinations such as the Bahamas, London, and Block Island. In addition to bearing all travel and entertainment expenses, Hoyt provided Norton with material benefits and financial support. Specifically, Hoyt would pay rent on an apartment that they shared in Vermont, buy and maintain her automobiles, and make payments toward the maintenance of a condominium they shared in Newport. Periodically, the couple would also discuss plans for their contemplated wedding. According to Norton, but for Hoyt's oft-repeated promises to divorce his wife, marry Norton, and support her for the rest of her life, she would have ended the relationship.

Alas, in life, all good things must come to an end and on or about March 11, 1998, Hoyt ended his relationship with Norton, explaining that he "needed space." Norton was understandably shaken by the news. Not long after, she reported experiencing nervousness and anxiety, frequently crying, feeling depressed and vulnerable, being unable to stay home alone, and having suicidal thoughts. Additionally, Norton reported "not being able to resume work and possibly not being able to commit to another relationship, perhaps ever." Head and stomach aches, vomiting and weight loss also allegedly ensued.

Norton sought medical attention to help her deal with the maladies allegedly occasioned by the split with Hoyt. She saw a registered nurse who was also a licensed social worker, and who recorded that the "presenting problem [was] her twenty-three year relationship in turmoil." According to the nurse/social worker Norton was, "very shocked, scattered [sic][shattered], and [experiencing] loss of concentration." In 1998 she also consulted psychiatrist Dr. Henry Altman, accompanied on several occasions by Hoyt. During one of those sessions Hoyt allegedly told Norton and Dr. Altman that he would continue to support Norton financially by giving her $70,000.00 to $80,000.00 per year. According to Norton, Hoyt did provide financial support for two years after the break-up in an amount in excess of $80,000.00.

Norton avers that at the time of the break-up Hoyt also promised her that he was going to put $100,000.00 in her bank account and set up a trust that would take care of her for life. Allegedly, Hoyt told Norton that, in order to protect her interests, and to fulfill these promises, he had written a letter to an attorney, David McOsker, evidencing his intentions. Several months after the split, Hoyt allegedly reaffirmed his promise to support Norton and assured her that he would not renege on it, stating, "I know my responsibilities." Subsequently, Norton contacted attorney McOsker and discovered that the letter never existed.

Nearly four months after the break-up, Norton, in a letter to attorney Matthew Callaghan, expressed a desire to reconcile with Hoyt. However, on March 3, 2001, realizing that reconciliation was not a viable option, Norton did the next best thing: she sued him. The five count Complaint she filed in Rhode Island Superior Court sitting in Newport County asserted claims of promissory estoppel (Count I), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II), the tort of outrage (Count III), fraud (Count IV), and breach of promise to marry (Count V), and sought $5,000,000.00 in compensatory damages and $7,000,000.00 in punitive damages. On April 3, 2001, Hoyt removed the action to this Court based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and thereafter successfully challenged Counts III, IV, and V by filing a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Remaining for disposition are the promissory estoppel claim contained in Count I and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress asserted in Count II. Both of these claims are the subject of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review: Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The fundamental question is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. "A `genuine issue' is one `supported by such evidence that a reasonable jury, drawing favorable inferences, could resolve it in favor of the nonmoving party.'" Hershey v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 317 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir.2003)(quoting Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999)). Likewise, a material fact is one which "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This burden may be met by demonstrating to the court that a lack of evidence exists to support the nonmoving party's case. Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002). Upon discharging that burden, the nonmoving party must show that the trier of fact could reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party with respect to each issue on which that party has the burden of proof at trial. Id. In the end, the court must view all evidence and related inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. "[W]hen the facts support plausible but conflicting inferences on a pivotal issue in the case, the judge may not choose between those inferences at the summary judgment stage." Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 454, 460 (1st Cir.1995). Similarly, "[s]ummary judgment is not appropriate merely because the facts offered by the moving party seem most plausible, or because the opponent is unlikely to prevail at trial." Gannon v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 777 F.Supp. 167, 169 (D.R.I.1991).

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit based on the parties' diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In diversity cases, federal courts must apply the substantive law of the forum state, including that state's choice of law rules. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The parties do not dispute that Rhode Island law governs this case. Accordingly, this Court will resolve the instant motion by applying Rhode Island law, and, when appropriate, "persuasive adjudications by courts of sister states, learned treatises, and public policy considerations identified in state decisional law." Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir.1996).

III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Complaint does not specify what conduct gave rise to Norton's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, at oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel asserted that the wrongful...