Norton v. United States

• Decision Date: 09 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14-633C,14-633C
• Parties: MICHAEL ANTHONY NORTON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

MICHAEL ANTHONY NORTON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 14-633C

United States Court of Federal Claims

March 9, 2015

Pro Se Plaintiff; In Forma Pauperis Application; Motion to Dismiss; Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Failure to State a Claim; Intellectual Property.

Michael Anthony Norton, Reston, VA, pro se.

Craig A. Newell, Jr., Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the defendant. With him were John Fargo, Director. Civil Division, Department of Justice, and Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice.

ORDER

HORN, J.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Pro se plaintiff,¹ Michael Anthony Norton, filed a complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, "set[ting] forth a demand for judgment against the United States in the sum of $398,306.00 USD" for violations of his alleged trademarks, registered copyrights and a patent application² by various private entities, Mr. Nortondemands judgment against the United States, because a private entity, World Capital Market, Inc., (WCM) allegedly stole his business identity and because the State of California lost his identity and denied him unemployment insurance benefits. Although Mr. Norton's complaint identifies the United States as the defendant, Mr. Norton does not specifically claim that the United States violated any of his copyrights, trademarks, patents, or any other rights to which he is legally entitled. Nonetheless, it appears that Mr. Norton blames the United States and its "[f]ragmented jurisdictional entities" for "allowing this to happen." despite that his allegations are for actions allegedly taken by private entities and the State of California.

Among his multiple allegations, Mr. Norton claims that two of his alleged copyrighted works, Feminica" and 'A Line in the Sand,"³ were adapted, without his authorization, 'from 2012-present in the form of a television show titled 'Veep' and registered with the U.S. Copyright Office in 2011 by Armando lannucci and HBO, Inc." Plaintiff states he registered these works with the United States Copyright Office in 2003 and 2002, respectively.

Plaintiff also claims that for an "App." he "filed an application for patent protection with the USPTO in January, 2006," and that "[i]n 2013, the Plaintiff discovered 3 claims of the App had been implemented in Ohio by TeamNEO, lnc[.], who hired Atlas Advertising. Inc. of Colorado to do such partial implementation [of the App] in 2010 after the Plaintiff's App was rejected by USPTO." Plaintiff alleges that 'TeamNEO, Inc. receives its funding from two prior entities which [Mr. Norton] previously approached while seeking to implement the App: JumpStart, Inc. and the Ohio Development Office."

Further, Mr. Norton claims that in 2008, a law firm, Polsinelli Law. filed "for protection of a Trademark (words and logo) titled Odysseus', which the Plaintiff had used as early as 2007 to promote the implementation of the App." Plaintiff claims his discovery of Polsinelli Law's trademark filing is pertinent "as both the App and the Polsinelli action fall within the same business sector of computer software and emergency management services."

In addition, plaintiff seeks damages against the United States for alleged wrongdoing by WCM and the State of California Plaintiff claims that in order to promote his business, in 2013, he entered into a joint venture agreement with WCM, "who promised an initial capital contribution of $50,000." According to Mr. Norton, in June 2013, after the agreement was signed, WCM "register[ed] a C-corp. in California titled Odysseus, Inc.'" but, "the joint venture agreement was abridged, and no subsequent contribution occurred" As a result, Mr Norton claims that WCM stole his business identity. Mr. Norton also claims he reported a "business identity theft" to the Secretary of State of California in July 2013, "after which the State reported to the Plaintiff that hisidentity was lost with them and denied him Unemployment Insurance benefits awarded the previously [sic] month." (emphasis in original).

Finally, plaintiff also seeks redress because he claims that from June 2013-14, as a result of the above, his Individual credit score plummeted 200 points from near-700 to 495, while all other mentioned parties profited from Plaintiff's work, [he suffered] an unusual 'tax allowance' burden."⁴

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $398,306.00: (1) $40,270,00 for TeamNEO hiring Atlas Advertising to partially implement plaintiff's App; (2) $300,000.00 for "HBO, Inc. partially implementing] Plaintiff's Copyrighted work;"⁵ (3) $50,000,00 for WCM steal[ing] Plaintiff's business identity:" (4) $8,036.00 for the amount of undistributed Unemployment Insurance because the State of California lost plaintiff's identity; and (5) an "undetermined" amount due to "[f]ragmented jurisdictional entities allowing this to happen." (emphasis in original).

According to Mr. Norton, the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over his complaint because '[t]he work of the Plaintiff has protections recorded in the U.S. Copyright Office and Patent & Trademark Office, and the nature of the work has many crossovers with regard to state and international jurisdictions. However, the majority of such remains in the United States"

Defendant responded to plaintiff's complaint by fling a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (2014) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), Specifically, defendant argues that 'Norton's claim of copyright infringement should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because this Court's jurisdiction is limited to claims of direct infringement by or for the United States, and not by private parties." Defendant also argues that "Norton's claim of patent infringement should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Norton abandoned his application before the PTO and was thus never issued a patent" Further defendant states, "Norton's claim of trademark infringement should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Lanham Act places jurisdiction for trademark claims against the United States in the federal district and territorial courts" Defendant also argues that '[t]o the extent that Norton seeks relief from the United States for the actions of the State of California or any other State or foreign country, this Court lacks jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to address such claims" Therefore, the government requests the "[c]omplaint be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."⁶

Plaintiff did not respond to the arguments raised in the defendant's motion to dismiss, instead he filed a one page document titled, "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings," in which he urges an early trial and for judgment on the pleadings He also "represents 'the factual contentions have evidentiary support' and have been specifically, so identified' and 'have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity.'" Plaintiff states:

Per RCFC 91 [sic], Plaintiff has "describe[d] the patent . . . alleged to be infringed". The application for patent presented in the Complaint is just that: a patent example of economy, ingenuity, communications, and novelty. The Court has sufficient interconnectedness among the Rule of Law and existing agencies to determine, via record of the United States Patent & Trademark Office from 2006, Plaintiffs pre- examination and examination phase attempts at communication with Central Intelligence Agency on the patentable art (which in marriage or merger qualifies this Court as good as any with regard to jurisdiction over the unprecedented art), via record of the United States Copyright Office from 1998 with regard to willfully infringed Copyrighted work in the Complaint via record of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 2013 and Secretary of State of California from 2012 with regard to the business of Odysseus, Odysseus being the commercial activity represented by the Plaintiff and application for patent.

DISCUSSION

When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthews v. United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Diamond v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 516, 524, aff'd, 2015 WL 527500 (Fed. Cir Feb. 10, 2015). "However, "[t]here is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his [or her] pleading ""' Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F 2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir 1975))); see also Bussie v United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aff'd, 443 F. App'x 542(Fed. Cir. 2011); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). 'While a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9 and Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence"), reh'g and ...