Norwich Union Indem. Co. v. Willis
| Decision Date | 11 April 1936 |
| Citation | 127 Fla. 238,168 So. 418 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | NORWICH UNION INDEMNITY CO. v. WILLIS. |
Rehearing Denied May 28, 1936.
Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; Worth W. Trammell, Judge.
Garnishment proceeding by Millard F. Willis, at the instance of the Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, assignee of a judgment for plaintiff, against the Norwich Union Indemnity Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
On Motion for Rehearing.
McKay, Dixon & DeJarnette, of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
Patterson, Blackwell & Knight and A. Y. Clement all of Miami, for defendant in error.
On January 7, 1927, Millard F. Willis secured a judgment in the circuit court of Dade county against George Jahn for $4,000. On January 11, 1927, within the time allowed by law, Jahn filed his motion for new trial. On January 20, 1927, while the motion for new trial was still pending, Willis, for a valuable consideration, assigned his judgment to Aetna Casualty & Surety Company. The judgment and the assignment were duly recorded. On December 19, 1932, more than five years after it was rendered, the motion for new trial was denied and execution on the judgment was entered in favor of Aetna Casualty & Surety Company. When the motion for new trial was entered, no supersedeas bond was obtained, no order was entered staying execution of the judgment, and no appeal was taken. The judgment, therefore, became final when the motion for new trial was denied. McClellan v. Wood, 78 Fla. 407, 83 So. 295.
On December 20, 1932, this cause was instituted by filing an affidavit and the issuance of a writ of garnishment at the instance of Aetna Casualty & Surety Company directed to Norwich Union Indemnity Company, it appearing that the defendant George Janh, held a liability insurance policy in Norwich Union Indemnity Company at the time Willis secured his judgment as heretofore referred to. Jahn's contract of insurance provided that no action should lie to recover against the company for any loss until the amount of the damages for which the assured was liable is determined either by final judgment or agreement between the assured and the plaintiff with the written consent of the company, and unless such action is brought within two years after the rendition of the final judgment.
In its answer to the writ of garnishment the garnishee admitted that Jahn was the holder of a liability policy covering the injury for which Willis secured his judgment. It resisted payment of the judgment on the ground that Jahn did not forward to it a copy of the summons served on him (Jahn) in the Willis action as required by the policy. The garnishee also invoked the statute of limitations as a bar to the payment of the Willis judgment.
As to the defense that Jahn did not forward copy of the summons served on him to the garnishee, it is not shown that the garnishee was in anywise prejudiced thereby. It is shown that the garnishee was permitted to offer evidence at the trial of the garnishment proceeding to the effect that it did not receive copy of the summons at its home office, but the testimony of the plaintiff in the garnishment proceeding conclusively shows that the summons served on Jahn was forwarded promptly to the general agent of the Norwich Union Indemnity Company at Miami, which undertook to defend the action in behalf of George Jahn. Under such a state of facts this defense can avail the garnishee nothing.
To like effect is the garnishee's attempt to invoke the statute of limitations. That effort is predicated on the fact that the judgment against Jahn was rendered January 7, 1927, a motion for new trial was filed January 11, 1927, but was not disposed of until December 19, 1932, more than five years later. It cannot be denied that this was loose practice, but the law did not in terms require a sooner disposition neither party was affected by the delay, and the judgment did not become final until the motion for new trial was disposed of and the writ of garnishment was filed the following day. McClellan v. Wood, supra; Adams v. Wolf, 103 Fla. 547, 137 So. 705; West Florida Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209, L.R.A.1918B, 968.
It follows from the facts and cases cited that the writ of garnishment could not be filed until the judgment became final and the debt due which took place when the motion for new trial was disposed of, but, absent this, the five-year statute of limitations was not available as a defense to the garnishee, because under the law of this state judgments are enforceable within twenty years. Section 2939, Revised General Statutes of 1920, section 4663, Compiled General Laws of 1927. Under the lastnamed statute the garnishee was bound to like effect as Jahn which was for twenty years. The provision of the policy requiring that any action brought against the company be instituted within two years was vitiated by section 4651, Compiled General Laws of 1927.
The contention that the statute of limitations should have been specially pleaded is without merit. It was not available as a defense in this case, but if it had been it was not necessary to plead it specially. The garnishee entered a general answer to the writ, that is a general denial of any indebtedness to the defendant or possession of any goods belonging to him. Under such an answer, any evidence with reference to the indebtedness due by the garnishee should have been admitted. Howe v. Hyer, 36 Fla. 12, 17 So. 925; Fulton v. Gesterding, 47 Fla. 150, 36 So. 56.
It is contended that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence tending to show that Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, the assignee of the Willis judgment, was the insurer of Willis, a subcontractor, who committed the tort for which the judgment against Jahn was secured and that the money alleged to have been paid for the assignment of the judgment by Willis was paid by his (subcontractor's) insurer in settlement of other actions then pending by him (Willis) against Jahn and other parties for the same tort.
The rejected evidence consisted of the court files in certain cases pending in the circuit court of Dade county brought by Willis, the assignor of the judgment to Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, and the entry of appearance for Aetna Casualty & Surety Company...
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...some circumstances, particularly where the facts are admitted, it be a question of law. Id. at 75 (citing Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Willis, 124 Fla. 137, 168 So. 418 (1936); Vliet, 4 So.2d at 863; Collura, 163 So.2d at 788). As a result, “[i]f ... the insured cooperates to some degree ......
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