Nottingham v. Wrigley

• Decision Date: 07 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 22980,22980
• Citation: Nottingham v. Wrigley, 221 Ga. 386, 144 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. 1965)
• Parties: W. M. NOTTINGHAM v. Normal J. WRIGLEY, Jr., et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 749

144 S.E.2d 749

221 Ga. 386

W. M. NOTTINGHAM v. Normal J. WRIGLEY, Jr., et al.

No. 22980.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 7, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

The motion of the defendant Cox for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, rendering him liable with another defendant for malicious injury to the plaintiff's property rights, was properly denied. The judgment of the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary is reversed.

Grant, Spears & Duckworth, William H. Duckworth, Jr., Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.

Claude Hambrick, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

GRICE, Justice.

Whether there was evidence for submission to the jury as to liability of one of the defendants in a tort action is the issue now before us.

This issue comes from a suit, filed in the Civil Court of Fulton County by W. M. Nottingham against Norman J. Wrigley, Jr., Mrs. Madeline Wrigley and James S. Cox, for damages allegedly resulting from the defendants' maliciously procuring a breach of the plaintiff's employment contract and interfering with his property rights. Upon the trial, after direction of a verdict in favor of Mrs. Madeline Wrigley, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff as against both Norman J. Wrigley, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as Wrigley) and Cox. The trial court denied the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made by both Wrigley and Cox. Upon review the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Wrigley's motion, but reversed as to that of Cox. Wrigley v. Nottingham, 111 Ga.App. 404, 141 S.E.2d 859. We granted Nottingham's application for certioraril. He assigns error upon the portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment which reversed the trial court's denial of Cox's motion for judgment notwithstanding such verdict.

The plaintiff Nottingham predicated his claim upon a contract, first oral and later allegedly reduced to writing, employing him as manager and bookkeeper of a corporation, Wrigley Sales, Inc., and promising to compensate him by a salary payable in both money and voting stock. While so employed, he was to make loans to the corporation at a specified rate, and to secure them by assignments to himself of accounts due the corporation. The three defendants comprised the board of directors of the corporation and Wrigley owned all of its voting stock.

After the plaintiff had worked for about two months and had made a number of loans to the corporation he was discharged by action of the three defendants at a directors' meeting. The plaintiff contended that they conspired to maliciously procure the breach of his contract with the corporation and interfere with his property rights. He sued for lost earnings in cash and voting stock, amounts due him on loans, punitive damages, expenses of litigation, and attorney's fees.

Upon the trial the evidence was in sharp conflict. The defendants denied that the plaintiff's discharge was malicious, testifying that it was occasioned only by his mismanagement of the business, and stated that the subsequent shifting of the assets of the corporation was done to repay loans and to keep the business in operation. However, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff's contentions against both Wrigley and Cox.

Upon review the Court of Appeals referred to certain portions of the evidence which it deemed significant and held that it, together with the evidence as a whole, authorized the jury's finding that the plaintiff's discharge and the subsequent shifting of the corporate assets were done by Wrigley, with knowledge of the plaintiff's rights, and with intent to interfere with them, and thus were actionable. It cited Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353, 69 L.R.A. 90.

But it held that, 111 Ga.App. p. 408, 141 S.E.2d p. 862, 'There is nothing in the evidence showing or tending to prove that * * * [Cox] did anything maliciously to procure the breach of the plaintiff's contract with the corporation or to interfere with the performance of the agreement,' and that proof of a conspiracy was lacking.

In so holding the Court of Appeals erred, as we view the evidence and the legal principles which control it.

Our Code provides that 'The right of enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every citizen, every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such enjoyment is a tort for which an action shall lie.' Code § 105-1401.

Also, Code § 105-1207 provides that 'In all cases he who maliciously procures an injury to be done to another, whether it is an actionable wrong or a breach of contract, is a joint wrongdoer, and may be sued either alone or jointly with the actor.'

Thus, those Code sections contemplate that acts such as those charged here may be committed individually, either by one person doing the prohibited acts or by his procuring another person to do them. Violation also may occur by means of a conspiracy.

As to conspiracy, there are several well established rules that are applicable here.

Insofar as proof of a conspiracy is concerned, "The law recognizes the intrinsic difficulty of proving a conspiracy. * * * The conspiracy may sometimes be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances. * * * 'To show conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove an express compact or agreement to the parties thereto. The essential element of the charge is the common design; but it need not appear that the parties met together either formally or informally, or entered into any explicit or formal agreement; nor is it essential that it should appear that either by words or by writings they formulated their unlawful objects. It is sufficient that two or more persons in any manner either positively or tacitly come to a mutual understanding that they will accomplish the unlawful design. * * *"' Cook v. Robinson, 216 Ga. 328, 329-330, 116 S.E.2d 742, 745. Also, 'Where transactions between relatives are under review, slight circumstances are often sufficient to induce belief on the part of a jury that there was fraud or collusion' for a conspiracy, quoted approvingly in Horton v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 338, 346, 15 S.E.2d 605, 613, (one special concurrence).

Then, as to the consequences of a conspiracy, the rule is well established that the act of one is the act of all. Consp...