Novak v. Com., Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1990
• Citation: 133 Pa.Cmwlth. 220,575 A.2d 661
• Parties: Victor F. NOVAK and Thelma Novak, his wife, Petitioners, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 661

575 A.2d 661

133 Pa.Cmwlth. 220

Victor F. NOVAK and Thelma Novak, his wife, Petitioners, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Feb. 5, 1990.

Decided May 18, 1990.

Shirley Novak, with her, Alvin E. Dillman, Jr., Zoffer, Dillman, Hacknery, Friedman & Wiedner, Pittsburgh, for petitioners.

Jeffrey L. Giltenboth, Sr. Asst. Counsel, with him, William J. Cressler, Asst. Chief Counsel, and John L. Heaton, Chief Counsel, for respondent.

Before McGINLEY and PELLEGRINI, JJ., and BARRY, Senior Judge.

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

Victor and Thelma Novak (Novaks) petition for review of a decision of the Board of Property (Board) denying a request requiring the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) to convey a certain parcel of property to the Novaks by granting an order for specific performance.

To accomplish the construction of Interstate 279 (I-279), PennDOT condemned certain residential and commercial properties owned by the Novaks. To settle these condemnation cases, PennDOT and the Novaks entered into an agreement on October 31, 1981, where, in addition to monetary compensation, the Novaks were to receive two parcels of land to be conveyed in two phases.

Pursuant to the agreement, the first parcel was conveyed to the Novaks on February 1, 1982. The second parcel under the agreement was to be conveyed as follows:

The second parcel of ground is described as follows: Portions of Lots 151, 152 and Lots 166 through 175 and Lot 187 of the aforesaid Lapsely Plan which the Commonwealth deems unnecessary for highway use. The determination of what portions of the above-mentioned lots deemed unnecessary will be decided by the COMMONWEALTH after the final design of the above-mentioned highway has been approved. Within a reasonable time thereafter, the COMMONWEALTH will convey to the condemnees the remaining portion of the aforementioned lots which will not be used for highway purposes.

The survey which is labeled Exhibit "A" and attached hereto is hereby incorporated in this stipulation.

Reproduced Record 25-A.

In 1988, the Novaks filed an action in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County seeking specific performance alleging that PennDOT was obligated to convey the second parcel because the parcel was no longer necessary for the construction of I-279. PennDOT filed preliminary objections claiming jurisdiction lies with the Board of Property. Pursuant to its authority, ¹ the Board of Property denied relief to the Novaks, since the final design of the highway had not been approved, and PennDOT was not obligated to convey the property until such time. The instant appeal followed.

The issue before this court is whether the Board erred when interpreting the agreement as not requiring the immediate conveyance by PennDOT to the Novaks of the second parcel of land when the final design of the entire highway project was not yet completed.

Our scope of review of a Board of Property determination is limited to whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Ulrich, 129 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 376, 565 A.2d 859 (1989). The function of contract interpretation and construction is a question of law peculiarly within the province of this court. Department of Transportation v. Mosites Construction Company, 90 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 33, 494 A.2d 41 (1985).

The Novaks contend that the Board erred in interpreting the language "final design of the above mentioned highway" contained in the agreement to mean completion of the I-279 highway project. They argue that "final design of the above mentioned highway" does not mean I-279, but describes the realignment of several local streets which has already been accomplished. The basis of this contention is that the term highway was never defined, and in the agreement should refer only to streets that affect the ability of PennDOT to convey its property. More specifically, because neither "highway", "East Street Valley Expressway", or "I-279" was expressly defined in the agreement, the Novaks contend the completed realignment of Boyer and Hazlett Streets is the highway referenced in the agreement.

Because those streets have been realigned and constructed, the Novaks contend the completed work obviates PennDOT's need for the second parcel of land for highway construction. The Novaks then argue that PennDOT is in breach of contract since the agreement required PennDOT to convey the property within a reasonable time after approval of the highway's final design. The Novaks maintain the omission is an ambiguity and should be interpreted most strongly against its drafter, PennDOT.

As this court stated in Department of Transportation v. L.C. Anderson & Sons, Inc., 69 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 601, 603, 452 A.2d 105, 106 (1982):

Whether an ambiguity exists is to be determined by the Court as a question of law.... A contract is not ambiguous if the court can determine its meaning without any guide other than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature of...