Novak v. Com.

• Citation: 20 Va.App. 373,457 S.E.2d 402
• Decision Date: 23 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1416-92-1,1416-92-1
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals
• Parties: Shawn Paul NOVAK v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. Record

Page 402

457 S.E.2d 402

20 Va.App. 373

Shawn Paul NOVAK v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 1416-92-1.

Court of Appeals of Virginia,

Norfolk.

May 23, 1995.

Richard G. Brydges, Stephen C. Mahan (Brydges, Brydges and Mahan, on briefs), Virginia Beach, for appellant.

Richard B. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen. (James S. Gilmore, III, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Youth Advocacy Clinic and Mental Disabilities Clinic, University of Richmond Law School (Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Kathe Klare, Robin Hegner, on brief), amicus curiae, for appellant.

Present: BENTON, WILLIS and BRAY, JJ.

BRAY, Judge.

Shawn Paul Novak (defendant), a juvenile, age sixteen, was convicted by a jury on an indictment charging capital murder. On appeal, defendant complains that he was improperly transferred from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (J & D court) to the trial court for prosecution as an adult, and that the trial court failed to conduct a de novo review of such transfer. Defendant further contends that the trial court erroneously (1) declined to suppress his confession and certain psychiatric evidence, (2) refused to order the Commonwealth to "open" its "files" to his inspection, (3) overruled his motion for additional pretrial psychiatric evaluation, (4) permitted cameras in the courtroom, (5) denied a continuance to permit his investigation of exculpatory evidence first disclosed during trial, and (6) overruled his motion for a mistrial. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988).

On the evening of March 4, 1991, Christopher Weaver, age seven, and Daniel Geier, age nine, did not return to their respective homes from play. Earlier that day, both children had briefly visited with a neighbor, Benet Stead, and were last seen by him at "about quarter after five to 5:30," in the company of defendant, at the edge of nearby "woods." The following morning, a "search party" combed this wooded area, and the children's bodies were discovered by James McKinsey hidden beneath "stacks of pine tree limbs." According to the medical examiner, Weaver died from "three stab wounds which would have been a quick three thrusts resulting in incapacitation and ... repeated cutting and slashing of the neck until it was almost decapitated...." Geier had been killed by a "blunt force injury" and "multiple slashes" on his neck.

Although McKinsey did not recall seeing defendant during the search, shortly after the discovery defendant claimed to a friend, Donald Williams, that he had personally located the bodies. The following day, March 6, 1991, defendant related a similar story to schoolmates and others. Later that same day, defendant commented to Williams's mother that he had seen the children at approximately 5:00 p.m. on the afternoon of their disappearance. She immediately telephoned a police "hotline" in defendant's presence, and he then spoke to a "gentleman on the phone," willingly providing his name and address.

During the ensuing investigation, defendant, accompanied by his mother, was interviewed by detectives at police headquarters on three separate occasions. At the final meeting between Detective Hoffman and defendant, Hoffman told defendant that a police officer had observed conduct by defendant at the crime scene inconsistent with his earlier statements, and that police had obtained defendant's fingerprints from the clothing of a victim, all of which was untrue. Nevertheless, Hoffman testified that he did not regard defendant as a "suspect until ... [he] asked, 'Did you kill them?' " and defendant answered, "yes." This response prompted Hoffman to immediately advise defendant of his Miranda rights, followed by defendant's execution of a related waiver and detailed confession to the crimes.

During a subsequent search of defendant's residence, police discovered a knife, a book entitled "Serial Killers," and several newspaper clippings of articles related to other violent crimes in the region, all from defendant's bedroom. Experts testified that the knife, or "another object having exactly the same features," had impressed a blood stain on the trousers of one victim and was the "tool" used to cut tree limbs that had covered the bodies.

Prosecution of defendant was commenced in the Virginia Beach J & D court. However, following an ore tenus hearing pursuant to Code § 16.1-269, ¹ jurisdiction was transferred to the trial court for treatment of defendant as an adult. In ordering transfer, the J & D court expressly "found probable cause to believe that [defendant] had committed" the offenses and noted that all "the statutory requirements for transfer had been met." See Code § 16.1-269(A), (C). Due to the "gravity of the charges," the J & D court did not consider defendant "amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile." See Code § 16.1-269(A)(3)(b).

Defendant appealed the transfer decision to the trial court, challenging the failure of the J & D court to properly consider his "amenability ... to treatment within the juvenile court." He argued that the trial court, while it need not review probable cause, must "make its own determination" of the several statutory factors requisite to transfer. See Code § 16.1-269. However, "after having examined all such papers, reports and orders pertaining hereto" and "carefully listen[ing] to arguments of counsel," the trial court concluded that the J & D court had "complied with [Code s] 16.1-269," and permitted the Commonwealth to "seek an indictment against the defendant."

Incidental to the proceedings both in the J & D court and trial courts, defendant was the subject of several psychiatric examinations. Dr. Robert Showalter testified in behalf of defendant that he exhibited a "schizotypal personality disorder." Drs. Lee Mingione and Paul Mansheim, Commonwealth witnesses, disagreed and opined that defendant knew right from wrong when he murdered the victims. Dr. Mingione further noted that defendant was "very bright," "interactive," and "evinced no unusual personality traits for a sixteen-year-old."

I. Transfer Hearing

Defendant first contends that his transfer from the J & D court to the circuit court for trial as an adult was unconstitutional because the attendant proceedings lacked the "individualized and particularized" consideration mandated by the Eighth Amendment in death penalty cases. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375-76, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 2978-79, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989). However, because defendant was not sentenced to death, we find this argument moot. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977) (When "life term was substituted ... for a ... sentence of death, the conclusion is inescapable that the question of the constitutionality of [the procedures leading to] the death penalty has been rendered moot."); see also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1789-90, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968) (complaint that jury was unconstitutionally "death qualified" rendered moot when defendant received life sentence).

Defendant further argues that the Virginia juvenile transfer statute unconstitutionally permits a juvenile, age fifteen or older and charged with armed robbery, rape, or murder, to be "certified" to the circuit court for trial as an adult without a preliminary finding that the accused is unamenable to treatment as a juvenile. ² Defendant contends that such "automatic certification" denies both equal protection and due process. We disagree.

In Hutcherson v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 534, 536-37, 375 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1989), this Court approved a "finding of nonamenability based solely on the nature of the offense," provided the related inquiry included consideration of "circumstances surrounding the offense," the "extent of the juvenile's involvement[,] and the interests of society and of the child." We also expressly recognized that a "determination of nonamenability based solely on the face of the charge is ... permissible when the offense is one of those enumerated in the statute [i.e., armed robbery, rape, and murder]." Id. at 537, 375 S.E.2d at 404 (emphasis added). Contrary to defendant's argument, this provision does not result in "automatic certification." The statute simply dispenses with the finding that the juvenile is unamenable "to treatment or rehabilitation" as a prerequisite to transfer in such instances. Code § 16.1-269(A)(3)(b). The remaining "conditions" of Code § 16.1-269(A) must be satisfied before "[a]ny such transfer" is ordered. Code § 16.1-269(A).

The legislature had a rational basis for treating a juvenile charged with murder, rape, or armed robbery differently from one prosecuted for a less violent offense. Hutcherson, 7 Va.App. at 537, 375 S.E.2d at 404; see Ballard v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 213, 217, 321 S.E.2d 284, 286 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085, 105 S.Ct. 1848, 85 L.Ed.2d 146 (1985). Code § 16.1-269(A)(3)(b) identifies certain violent crimes against the person as acts inconsistent with the conduct of an offender amenable to treatment as a juvenile, a distinction both logical and constitutional. The resulting "classification" is, therefore, reasonably related to a "legitimate" governmental objective, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), juvenile rehabilitation consonant with protection of the public. Hutcherson, 7 Va.App. at 536-37, 375 S.E.2d at 404; see Code § 16.1-227. "[C]ourts will not overturn a statutory classification on equal protection grounds unless it is so unrelated to the achievement of a legitimate purpose that it appears irrational." Ballard...