Novis v. Tipton

• Decision Date: 19 December 1963
• Docket Number: No. 36637,36637
• Citation: 387 P.2d 737,63 Wn.2d 473
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Emil H. NOVIS and Johanna Novis, husband and wife, Respondents, v. John D. TIPTON, and John H. Tipton and Jane Doe Tipton, husband and wife, Appellants.

Page 473

63 Wn.2d 473

387 P.2d 737

Emil H. NOVIS and Johanna Novis, husband and wife, Respondents, v. John D. TIPTON, and John H. Tipton and Jane Doe Tipton husband and wife, Appellants.

No. 36637.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

Dec. 19, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1964.

Tollefson & Tollefson, H. M. Tollefson, Tacoma, Weyer, Sandelin & Sterne, D. Scott Sandelin, Seattle, for appellants.

Gordon, Goodwin, Sager & Thomas, Tacoma, for respondents.

HAMILTON, Judge.

The primary issue involved in this appeal is whether the driver of plaintiffs' automobile (the disfavored vehicle) was contributorilally negligent in failing to yield the right of way at an arterial intersection. The trial court deemed the issue to be one of fact and submitted the question to the jury. From an adverse verdict defendants appeal, contending contributory negligence was established as a matter of law.

The automobile accident giving rise to this action occurred at about 3:30 p. m. on a clear, dry, December day, at the intersection of Proctor and North 13th Streets, in Tacoma, Washington.

Proctor Street, in the vicinity of the accident, is a level, north-south, two-lane, 30-mile-per-hour, paved arterial, approximately 30 feet in width, bordered on each side by a curb, parking strip, and sidewalk. It is intersected at 300-foot intervals by nonarterial, east-west, numerically designated cross streets, each about 30 feet in width. North 13th Street is one such cross street. The surrounding area is residential in nature.

Defendants' vehicle, a 'red, shiny' 1955 Chevrolet, entered Proctor Street at North 26th Street, and was traveling south at a speed estimated to be from 40 to 'at least' 60 miles an hour. Plaintiffs' vehicle, a 1951 Mercury, equipped with an automatic gear shift, was traveling east on North 13th Street, the driver intending to turn north on Proctor.

Upon arrival at the intersection, plaintiff driver stopped his vehicle abreat of the sidewalk in obedience to and 5 feet east of the posted stop sign. Both he and his wife then looked for approaching traffic on Proctor. Their view of Proctor Street, for four or five blocks both north and south, was clear and unobstructed. Both testified they saw no vehicle within three blocks north of the intersection, a distance of at least 900 feet. Plaintiffs' vehicle then entered the intersection, accelerated to between 10 and 15 miles an hour, traveled approximately 20 feet, commenced turning to the north, and was struck by defendants' southbound vehicle.

Defendant driver testified he first observed plaintiffs' vehicle entering the intersection when he was 100 to 150 feet distant, whereupon he applied his brakes and swerved to the left in a futile attempt to avoid collision. Other witnesses observed defendants' vehicle within three blocks of the intersection just prior to the collision. Defendants' vehicle laid down 105 feet of skid marks before impact.

Impact occurred within the northeast quadrant of the intersection. Major damage was inflicted upon the front of plaintiffs' vehicle and the right side of defendants' vehicle. Both vehicles were practically demolished.

Upon the factual situation presented the duties of plaintiff husband, as driver of the vehicle entering upon an arterial, are dictated by RCW 46.60.170, ¹ as interpreted and applied in the light of the familiar rules first enunciated in Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563, 289 P. 533. ² We have set out the statute and rules by footnote. ³

The trial court did not instruct upon the doctrine of deception, and plaintiffs do not here argue or claim they were deceived by the excessive speed of defendants' vehicle or by a clear stretch of highway, within the contemplation of rule 4 of Hadenfeldt. Instead, it is plaintiffs' argument that, at the time and place plaintiff driver looked to the north, defendants' vehicle was either not in sight or was, at best, three to four blocks away (900 to 1200 feet), albeit approaching rapidly, ergo, a question of fact was presented as to whether plaintiffs had a reasonable margin of safety within the contemplation of rule 2 of Hadenfeldt.

Defendants, on the other hand, assert that time, distance, and visibility factors, coupled with the fact of collision, indisputably and as a matter of law establish plaintiff driver's negligence in failing to maintain a proper lookout and to yield the right of way.

Upon the issue as so framed by the parties, and bearing in mind that plaintiff driver's view to the north on Proctor was clear and unobstructed, we are constrained to agree with defendants.

The difficulty with plaintiffs' thesis is that it either (1) compels the deduction that defendants' vehicle traveled some 900 feet during the time plaintiffs' vehicle traveled 20 feet, or (2) compels an admission that defendants' vehicle was visibly within striking range and plaintiff driver did not see that which was there to be seen. In short, plaintiffs' theory, if followed in this case, would isolate the fair margin of safety rule from its context, insulate it against the application of physical facts and laws, and substitute the reasonably prudent-man test for the standard of care imposed by the statute. The line of cases relied upon by plaintiffs ⁴ are distinguishable upon their facts, e. g., time, distance, speed, and visibility. In any event, they are of limited and doubtful efficacy in the light of our decisions in Chavers v. Ohad, 59 Wash.2d 646, 369 P.2d 831, and Mondor v. Rhoades, 63 Wash.Dec.2d 158, 385 P.2d 722. ⁵

We are satisfied, upon the issue and facts as presented, the following language from Wilkinson v. Martin, 56 Wash.2d 921, 925, 349 P.2d 608, 611 is dispositive of this appeal:

'* * * It appears that respondent had an unostructed view to his left, * * * of approximately one fourth of a mile, and that appellant was within this range at the time in question. Thus, we must view the situation as though respondent had seen appellant when respondent first pulled out into the intersection. A disfavored driver cannot escape the...