Nowak v. Thoroughbred Servs., Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-2540

• Decision Date: 18 March 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-2540
• Parties: OLGA NOWAK, Plaintiff, v. THOROUGHBRED SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

OLGA NOWAK, Plaintiff, v. THOROUGHBRED SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-2540

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 18, 2021

Anita B. Brody, J.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Olga Nowak brings suit against Defendant Thoroughbred Services, Inc. ("Thoroughbred"), alleging gender and/or sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq. In addition, Nowak brings a claim for wrongful discharge under Pennsylvania common law. I exercise federal question jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Currently pending is Thoroughbred's motion to dismiss. For the below reasons, I will deny Thoroughbred's motion to dismiss Nowak's Title VII and PHRA claims, and I will grant Thoroughbred's motion to dismiss Nowak's Pennsylvania wrongful discharge claim.

I. BACKGROUND¹

In January 2016, Nowak began working for Thoroughbred as a Safety Coordinator. Nowak was a licensed racing official who had extensive experience as a jockey, exercise rider, and thoroughbred trainer. As the Safety Coordinator, Nowak's duties included "identifying risks and enforcing safety practices during daily horse exercise hours and live racing; checkingequipment utilized by horses and riders; . . . preparing incident and accident reports; . . . [and] reporting safety violations to licensed security personnel, stewards and the racing secretary." Am. Compl. ¶ 8.

In October 2018, Nowak began reporting to David Osojnak. In November 2018, Nowak informed Osojnak of her intention to obtain a Safety Steward accreditation. Osojnak supported Nowak's plan to get a Safety Steward accreditation and told her that he would try to get Thoroughbred to pay for the course Nowak needed to obtain the accreditation.

In November 2018, Osojnak also spoke to Nowak about her reporting of outriders for safety violations. "Examples of reported outrider safety violations include, but are not limited to, refusing to assist with an unruly horse; and leaving the track without permission, thereby leaving horses unsupervised and/or being unable to assist in emergency situations and/or unable to activate the emergency track warning system." Am. Compl. ¶ 14. Specifically, Osojnak instructed Nowak "to stop reporting certain outriders for safety violations due to the fact that the reports could be used as evidence that [Thoroughbred] had knowledge of unsafe conditions in any subsequent injury claim." Am. Compl. ¶ 13.

Despite Osojnak's instruction, Nowak continued to report the outriders for safety violations on a weekly, or more frequent, basis throughout her employment because she was the Safety Coordinator and was required by Pennsylvania law to report the violations. See Am. Compl ¶¶ 34-35 (citing 58 Pa. Code § 163.291, 163.6).

On February 7, 2019, Osojnak told Nowak that she was being discharged because she did not have the skills to perform the Safety Coordinator position. Nowak, a female, was replaced by Donnie Smith, a male, who had been working in the office and not in a safety role. Nowak"had as much, or more, experience than Smith as a thoroughbred jockey, exercise rider and/or trainer; and was as, or more, qualified than Smith for the position." Am. Compl. ¶ 20.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not be detailed." Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 265 (3d Cir. 2021). But a complaint must allege facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In order to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must engage in the following analysis:

First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011)). "Plausible does not mean possible. The facts must be more than 'merely consistent with a defendant's liability.' But plausible does not mean probable either. The court need only be able to draw a 'reasonable inference' that the defendant has broken the law." Martinez, 986 F.3d at 265 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

"As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings. However, an exception to the general rule is that a 'document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint' may be considered . . . ." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)). Thus, a court may consider "the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

Thoroughbred moves to dismiss Nowak's Title VII and PHRA claims on the grounds that Nowak has failed to allege a prima facie case of sex or gender discrimination. Additionally, Thoroughbred moves to dismiss Nowak's wrongful termination claim because it contends that Nowak cannot establish the claim.

A. Title VII and PHRA Claims

Nowak alleges that Thoroughbred terminated her employment due to her sex/gender in violation of Title VII and the PHRA. Under Title VII, an employer may not "discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). "The proper analysis under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is identical, as Pennsylvania courts have construed the protections of the two acts interchangeably." Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prod. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (overruled on other grounds)). In order to state a prima facie case of sex and/or gender discrimination under Title VII and the PHRA, a plaintiff must "show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for herposition; (3) the particular disciplinary measure was an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances of the disciplinary measure give rise to an inference of discrimination." Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); see also Fortes v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 12-6063, 2014 WL 3573104, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2014) ("The prima facie case for employment discrimination . . . under the PHRA is the same as under Title VII . . . ."). Thoroughbred argues that Nowak's Title VII and PHRA discrimination claims must be dismissed because she has failed to plead the second and fourth elements of a prima facie case—that she was qualified for her position and that the circumstances of her termination give rise to an inference of discrimination. Nowak counters that she is not required to allege a prima facie case of discrimination at the motion to dismiss stage and that she has plausibly pleaded her Title VII and PHRA claims.

"[F]or purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 2016). "The complaint need only allege enough facts to 'raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element.'" Martinez, 986 F.3d at 266 (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009)).

Nowak has alleged enough facts for her discrimination claims to survive a motion to dismiss. Nowak alleges that she was a licensed racing official with extensive experience as a jockey, exercise rider, and thoroughbred trainer—skills that align with her duties and responsibilities as Safety Coordinator. She performed the position of Safety Coordinator for three years prior to her termination. Moreover, in November 2018, Nowak's supervisor supported her desire to obtain a Safety Steward accreditation and even told Nowak that he would try to get Thoroughbred to pay for the course that she needed to obtain the accreditation. Theallegations that Nowak performed her position for three-years, had extensive experience in areas that aligned with her job duties and responsibilities, and her supervisor supported her intention to receive a Safety Steward accreditation raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that Nowak was qualified for her position.

Nowak also alleges that when she was terminated, she was replaced by a male who had not been working in a safety role, who was no more qualified than Nowak, and who possessed the same or less experience than Nowak as a jockey, exercise rider, and trainer. These facts also raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that Nowak's...