Nowski v. Siedlecki

• Decision Date: 03 February 1910
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NOWSKI v. SIEDLECKI et ux.

75 A. 135

83 Conn. 109

NOWSKI

v. SIEDLECKI et ux.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 3, 1910.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Action by Stanley A. Nowski against Andrew Joseph Siedlecki and wife. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

The complaint stated this case: The defendant, Andrew J. Siedlecki, on July 6, 1906, secured a loan of $800 from the plaintiff by false representations. In October, 1906, the plaintiff sued him for such false representations, and in May, 1907, recovered a judgment for $918.59 damages, which remains wholly unsatisfied. Meanwhile, on July 23, 1900, said defendant bought, in part at least with the $800 borrowed, a certain parcel of land, taking title in his own name, but soon caused it to be transferred to Franciszka Siedlecki, his wife, a codefendant, who still holds it. Such transfer was without consideration, and for the sole purpose of defrauding the plaintiff. Andrew J. Siedlecki belongs, and always has belonged, out of the state, and at all times mentioned in the complaint has been and is insolvent. The claims for relief were for (1) a judgment that the deeds under which Mrs. Siedlecki derived title be set aside and declared void; and (2) $1,000 damages. The charges of fraud, insolvency, and want of consideration for the transfer to Mrs. Siedlecki were denied by the answers. The plaintiff duly claimed the case for the jury trial list, and it was placed thereon, and specially assigneel for trial on a certain day. On that day the defendants moved that it be struck from the list on the ground that the issues were strictly equitable, and not triable to a jury. This motion was denied.

Benjamin Slade, for appellants.

Arthur H. Wadick, George e. Beers, and Carl A. Mears, for appellee.

BALDWIN, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). A judgment creditor, who complains that his debtor has transferred all his property, when insolvent, to his wife, by a voluntary and fraudulent conveyance, and that she participated in the fraud, has, among other remedies, one at law for compensation in damages against both the wrongdoers, and one in equity to have the fraudulent conveyance set aside. The plaintiff sought both these remedies, and had a right to seek both in a single action. Gen. St. 1902, §§ 532, 721, He had accordingly a right to claim that the case should be entered on the docket as a jury case. Gen. St. 1902. § 720. The answer denied several paragraphs of the complaint, in each of which a material fact was alleged. A separate issue of fact was therefore raised as respects each. Practice Book 1908, p. 252, f 108; Hatch v. Thompson, 67 Conn. 74, 76, 34 Atl. 770. It thus became the plaintiff's duty, within three weeks after such issues were joined, to file a notice stating whether he desired all of them to be tried to the jury, and, if not all, which. This he did not do, and it was therefore for the court to direst how any or all of the issues should be tried. Gen. St. 1902, § 722 (Pub. Acts 1905, p. 284, c. 56, § 3). The court ordered "the issues of fact to be tried by the jury." This order comprehended all the issues, and it was within the discretion of the court to make it. The parties then went forward, and produced their evidence on both sides upon the whole case, but, when it was all in, agreed to frame certain issues to be submitted to the jury, and accordingly framed four questions, each to be answered "Yes" or "No," which the court accepted.

On the argument before us, the plaintiff claimed that their submission to the jury could be justified on either of two theories. The first of these was that they came under the statute providing that, "upon the application of either party, the court may order any issue or issues of fact which may have been or may hereafter be joined in any action demanding equitable relief to be tried by a jury." Pub. Acts 1905, p. 441, c. 236. The second theory was that they were special interrogatories, submitted in the discretion of the court as an appropriate means of ascertaining particular conclusions of fact to which the jury might come, in view of the evidence before them. It is a long-established and well-recognized power of courts of equity to submit, in their discretion, an issue of fact to a jury. Meriden Savings Bank v. McCormack, 79 Conn. 260, 262, 64 Atl. 338. Whether the act of 1905 is simply an affirmance of that power, or was designed to change the ancient practice so far as to make the verdict on an issue, so submitted, conclusive upon the court, we need not now inquire; for, in whatever light the course taken in the present instance be regarded, the judgment, as a judgment of a court administering equity, cannot stand.

The material part of the judgment file reads as follows:

"The parties appeared and were at issue to the jury, as on file, and on the application of the plaintiff, to which the defendants objected, the court ordered the issues of fact to be tried by the jury.

"Said cause having been heard and committed to the jury and certain issues to be determined by them having been framed and submitted to them, counsel on either side agreeing upon the form of said interrogatories (the defendants, however, expressly reserving their objections to a jury trial), the jury returned their verdict and their answers to such interrogatories as follows:

"Issues to be determined by the jury:

"(1) Was the conveyance from Andrew J. Siedlecki to his wife, through Charles Novitsky, a fraudulent conveyance? Yes.

"(2) Was the plaintiff at date of conveyance and date of bringing suit, a creditor of defendant Andrew J. Siedlecki? Yes.

"(3) Was the defendant Andrew J. Siedlecki insolvent at date of conveyance? Yes.

"(4) Was he insolvent at date of bringing this suit? Yes.

"The court accepted said answers to said interrogatories and said verdict.

"Thereupon the defendants filed their motion to set aside the finding or answers of the jury to said interrogatories as on file; thence to the present day, when the court having fully heard the parties, denied said motion.

"Whereupon it is adjudged that the conveyance from Andrew J. Siedlecki to Charles J. Novitsky, referred to in the complaint, being dated September 4, 1906, recorded in volume 81, p. 595, of the Derby Land Records, and from Charles J. Novitsky to Franciszka Siedlecki, dated September 4, 1906, and recorded in volume 81, p. 597, of the Derby Land Records, be and they are hereby declared to be fraudulent and void as against this plaintiff, so far as is necessary to secure the plaintiff's judgment.

"And it is further adjudged that of the original purchase money of said land the sum of $450 was furnished by the defendant Franciszka Siedlecki, and $800 from the money secured by the defendant Andrew J. Siedlecki from the plaintiff, as stated in the complaint.

"And it is further adjudged that the plaintiff is entitled to, and there is hereby declared to exist in his favor, two liens upon said land to secure the amount of the judgment mentioned in paragraph 6 of the substituted complaint, the same amounting, with costs and interest, to $1,000, the costs of this suit being taxed at $101.06; one of said liens to be in the sum of $800, and to be of equal priority with a lien of $450 in favor of the defendant Franciszka Siedlecki, being the amount contributed by her towards the purchase money, as hereinbefore stated, and the other of said liens to be in the sum of $301.06, being the balance of said judgment, with the costs of this suit, which lien shall be subsequent to said liens of $800 and $450, respectively, hereinbefore described, and said liens of the plaintiff to be prior to and superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendants, or either of them, in or to said land, except the lien of the...