Noyes v. Noyes, 14508

Citation679 P.2d 152,106 Idaho 352
Decision Date30 March 1984
Docket NumberNo. 14508,14508
PartiesWilliam P. NOYES, personal representative of the Estate of Albert E. Noyes, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Velma I. NOYES, an unmarried woman, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Idaho

Mark L. Clark of Kibler, Hamilton & Clark, Nampa, for plaintiff-appellant.

Henry F. McQuade and R.H. Young of Adamson, Young & McQuade, Nampa, for defendant-respondent.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an award of the proceeds of a group life insurance policy to the respondent, Velma Noyes, in a declaratory judgment action. We affirm.

The following facts are not in dispute. The appellant, William Noyes, is the duly appointed personal representative of the estate of Albert E. Noyes, deceased. He is also the sole heir and legatee of the decedent. From 1968 until his death in 1981, Albert Noyes was employed by DuBois Chemicals, a division of Chemed Corporation, Inc. The employer (hereinafter DuBois) Adamson provided a number of benefit programs for its employees, one of which was a group life insurance policy. It was a term policy, with no cash surrender value, funded entirely by DuBois and its benefits were payable only if the insured employee died while still in the employment of DuBois.

Albert and Velma Noyes were divorced in 1979. The divorce decree set over to Albert, as his sole and separate property, the "Retirement plan with DuBois Chemical." The decree made no mention, or award to either Albert or Velma, of the group life insurance policy. Nor did the decree contain a provision otherwise awarding to either of them any unspecified or residual property belonging to the parties.

A few months before the divorce decree was entered, Albert made a beneficiary change in his "Employees' Pension Plan" with DuBois. He designated his son William, the appellant herein, as the sole beneficiary of that plan. Earlier, in 1968, Albert had designated his wife Velma as the beneficiary of the group life insurance policy. Thereafter, no specific change of beneficiary of the insurance policy was ever recorded or filed by Albert with his employer.

After Albert's death Velma claimed the insurance proceeds. William also claimed the proceeds for himself or the estate, contending that the divorce and a change of beneficiary in the "Employees' Pension Plan" had terminated Velma's status as a beneficiary of the life insurance policy. Because both William and Velma claimed the insurance benefits, the insurer would not release the proceeds to either party. To resolve the dispute, William filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to determine the rights of the parties in the group life insurance benefits.

Neither party requested a jury. Instead they concurred in setting the case for trial before the court. Following a pre-trial conference, an order was entered reciting that the parties agreed "the only factual issue remaining is whether the proceeds of the life insurance policy involved in the action are part of the 'Retirement plan with DuBois Chemical' awarded to the deceased, Albert E. Noyes, under the judgment of divorce entered into in the action between him and the defendant Velma I. Noyes." It was further agreed the parties would attempt to resolve the issue in the case by a summary judgment proceeding. Subsequently, Velma moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Velma was entitled to the insurance proceeds and granted judgment to her. William appeals. Both parties seek an award of attorney fees on appeal.

William attacks the judgment of the district court on three grounds. First, he contends the court erred in determining that the group life insurance policy was not a part of Albert's "Retirement Plan." Second, he urges that the award to Albert of the "Retirement plan with DuBois Chemical," as separate property in the divorce decree, also implicitly included the group life insurance policy. Third, William asserts that, because the group life insurance policy was the community property of Albert and Velma and if it was not disposed of by the divorce decree, then it became an asset held as tenancy in common, one-half of which would belong to Albert's estate.

I

William's arguments concerning the interrelationship between the group life insurance policy and the other employee benefits raise mixed issues of law and fact. The threshold factual issue is whether the insurance policy was part of what William characterizes as Albert's "Retirement Plan". Upon this determination two subsidiary questions depend--whether the change of beneficiary of the "Employees' Pension Plan" served also as a change of the beneficiary of the life insurance program and whether the disposition of the "Retirement plan with DuBois Chemical," in the divorce decree, effected a change in the expectancy interest of Velma, as beneficiary, in the life insurance policy.

We address first the factual determination made by the court below that the group life insurance policy was not a part of any pension or retirement plan. That determination was made by drawing an inference from the undisputed facts presented at the summary judgment proceeding. Ordinarily, on summary judgment, the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434, 660 P.2d 46 (1982). Where, however, the evidentiary facts are not disputed, and those evidentiary facts could yield conflicting inferences as to the ultimate factual issue of the case (e.g., whether the insurance policy was part of a "retirement plan") and where the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate--despite the possibility of conflicting inferences--because the court alone is responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982).

Once the parties agreed there were no genuine issues of material fact, the ultimate question--whether the insurance policy was part of a retirement plan--was properly the subject of summary judgment. Consequently, our review of this issue extends only to determining whether the record is sufficient to justify the district court's finding that the insurance policy was not part of any retirement plan.

In the summary judgment proceeding, the parties submitted documentary evidence obtained from DuBois concerning its employment benefit programs provided to Albert Noyes. This information explains that DuBois provides eight different plans and programs for its employees. As disclosed by the DuBois' benefits brochure, more than one type of retirement plan was provided by the employer, as well as a number of insurance and investment programs. The programs described in the brochure are: Chemed/DuBois Savings and Investment Plan; Hospitalization and Medical Services Insurance; Disability...

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5 cases
  • Locey By and Through Locey v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • October 18, 1988
    ...by the parties, the trial court's task is to determine which party should prevail as a matter of law. See, e.g., Noyes v. Noyes, 106 Idaho 352, 679 P.2d 152 (Ct.App.1984). When reviewing such a determination, we exercise free review. Standards of Appellate Review, IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK §......
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    ...vested in the surviving spouse upon the insured's death because the premiums were paid with community assets); Noyes v. Noyes, 106 Idaho 352, 356, 679 P.2d 152, 156 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that the community did not have an interest in proceeds from a term life insurance policy because the i......
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    • Idaho Supreme Court
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    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • August 31, 1989
    ...owners, subject to partition upon demand of one of the parties. Harrell v. Harrell, 692 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.1985); see Noyes v. Noyes, 106 Idaho 352, 679 P.2d 152 (Ct.App.1984). In this case, Elizabeth is entitled to receive her portion of the equity value as determined by the magistrate in his......
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