Nunez Nunez v. Vazquez Irizarry, CIV. 04-2275JP.
| Decision Date | 05 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 04-2275JP.,CIV. 04-2275JP. |
| Citation | 367 F.Supp.2d 201 |
| Parties | Antonio V. NUÑEZ NUÑEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. William VAZQUEZ IRIZARRY, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Antonio Núñez-Núñez, San Juan, PR, Pro Se.
José Enrico Valenzuela-Alvarado, Esq., Department of Justice, Ineabelle Santiago-Camacho, Esq., Reichard & Escalera, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
Before the Court is co-Defendant William Vázquez Irizarry and co-Defendants Jack Allison and the Puerto Rico Highway Authority's unopposed motions to dismiss (docket Nos. 15 and 16). Although the Complaint is no model of clarity, the Court understands Plaintiffs to be bringing this case before the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging damages as a result of the construction of Puerto Rico Highway Route 66. Without any supporting case law or any sort of developed argument, Plaintiffs generally allege they suffered damages in the amount of Eight Million Dollars ($8,000,000.00).
Defendants in this case are William Vázquez Irizarry, former Secretary of Justice for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Engineer Jack Allison, Executive Director of the Highway Authority, the Puerto Rico Highway Authority, the Transportation and Public Works Department, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and several unknown insurance companies and Defendants. Defendants Vázquez Irizarry, Allison, and the Puerto Rico Highway Authority now pray this Court to dismiss the complaint on a variety of grounds. Finding it can dismiss this case solely on the basis of res judicata, and for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss.
On September 28, 1998, the Puerto Rico Highway Authority (hereinafter the "PRHA") commenced the process of expropriating Plaintiffs' property before the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, San Juan Part. On October 28, 1999, Núñez filed a Complaint in tort against the PRHA, alleging damages as a result of the allegedly illegal condemnation procedure carried out by the PRHA. On October 18, 2001, during a Status Conference, and with Plaintiff's consent the Court of First Instance consolidated the tort action with the expropriation case. Through a Judgment dated April 23, 2003, the Court of First Instance found that the eminent domain proceeding had been effected according to the law, and that no due process violations were evident, and dismissed the case.
On June 5, 2003, Plaintiff Antonio Núñez Núñez filed an appeal before the Puerto Rico Circuit Court of Appeals, which was dismissed through a Resolution dated July 22, 2003. On August 15, 2003, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration before the Puerto Rico Circuit Court of Appeals, which was denied through a Resolution dated August 21, 2003. On September 29, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was also denied. Finally, on December 2, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration from said Order, which was also denied on January 9, 2004. On November 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed the instant case.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may, in response to an initial pleading, file a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is well-settled, however, that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir.1991). The Court must accept as true "all well-pleaded factual averments and indulg[e] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted); see also Berrios v. Bristol Myers Squibb Caribbean Corp., 51 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.Puerto Rico 1999) (Pieras, J.). A complaint must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28 n. 2 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988)). The Court, however, need not accept a complaint's "`bald assertions' or legal conclusions" when assessing a motion to dismiss. Abbott, III v. United States, 144 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st Cir.1996)). It is with this framework in mind that this Court will assess the motion before it.
The doctrine of res judicata — meaning, literally, that the thing has been decided — binds parties from litigating or re-litigating any issue or claim that was adjudicated in a prior case. Res judicata issues arise because of the commonly accepted practice in both federal and state judicial courts of concurrent jurisdiction; that is, when similar claims based on a similar set of facts and involving the same parties are allowed to proceed simultaneously in different courts. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d, 483 (1976). When jurisdiction is proper in the federal district court, it is only in exceptional circumstances that the court can abstain or dismiss the action in deference to an identical or similar state court proceeding. Id. at 1244. Dismissal by the court of cases properly before it is justified only in those situations where an "important countervailing interest" would be served. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959).
Under res judicata, when identical causes of action are filed, the first judgment entered generally bars adjudication of claims in the second action without regard to the order in which the actions were filed, and regardless of which forum it was filed in. 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction, § 4404 (1981). The doctrine of res judicata, now called claim preclusion, forecloses litigation of all matters which have been litigated or might have been litigated in an earlier case. Id. The rule of collateral estoppel, now termed issue preclusion, precludes re-litigation of issues actually adjudicated. Id. at § 4402.
The landmark case of Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) served to bolster the constitutional principle that all federal courts must give preclusive effect to a state court judgment when the courts of the state from which the judgment was rendered would do so. It is a well established principle that judicial judgments shall be given the "same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (2001).
It is also settled law that the applicable rules regarding collateral estoppel are not "federally created, but are those of the state from which the judgment is taken". Baez Cruz v. Municipality of Comerio, 140 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897-98, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982)); see also Montalvo-Huertas v. Rivera-Cruz, 885 F.2d 971, 974 (1st Cir.1989); and Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000). Therefore, if Puerto Rico courts would give preclusive effect to the judgment of a state court, then this Court must also give preclusive effect to said judgment. Futura Development Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir.1985). In Puerto Rico, judgments can be given preclusive effect if they are final and on the merits. See Millan v. Caribe Motors Corp., 1961 WL 13796, 83 D.P.R. 494 (P.R.1961); Manrigue v. Aguayo, 37 P.R. Dec. 314, 320 (P.R.1927); Stitzer v. University of Puerto Rico, 617 F.Supp. 1246, 1254 (D.Puerto Rico 1985).
As previously stated, on October 28, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, San Juan Part, alleging unlawful expropriation practices on behalf of the Highway Authority and damages resulting therefrom. On January 9, 2004, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico rendered a Resolution where it denied Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration in said case.
In most states, the judgment of any lower court is considered final immediately and thus, immediately appealable. See 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Id. at § 4433. However, because the federal court is bound by state law when the judgment in question was rendered by a state court, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, in some jurisdictions, the federal court sitting in that jurisdiction will honor the state rule that no preclusive effect will be given to the judgment until it becomes final on appeal. See Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir.1985). This applies squarely to Puerto Rico.
The idea that a judgment is not final until fully resolved on appeal is reinforced by the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure. Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which presume the finality of a trial court judgment unless a party files a motion to stay the effect of the judgment, See Fed.R.Civ.P. 62, Puerto Rico Rule of Civil Procedure 53.9 states that a judgment of a lower court is automatically stayed once it is appealed. "Once an appeal or petition for review is filed, all further proceedings in the lower court regarding the judgment appealed from ... shall be stayed." 32 P.R. Laws Ann. Ap. III R. 53.9 (2000). Therefore, a judgment is final during the pendency and until the resolution (and reconsideration) of an appeal has been dealt with by the court.
As applied to the case at bar, the...
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