Nunnery v. Barber, 73-2502
Citation | 503 F.2d 1349 |
Decision Date | 18 September 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 73-2502,73-2502 |
Parties | Janice C. NUNNERY, an Individual, Appellant, v. J. Richard BARBER, as an Individual, and in his official capacity as the WestVirginia Alcohol Beverage Control Commissioner, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
John Boettner, Jr., Charleston, W.Va., for appellant.
William R. Wooton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., of West Virginia, on brief), for appellee.
Before BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and RUSSELL, circuit judges.
Plaintiff is a discharged manager of a state-operated liquor store in West Virginia. Contending her discharge was for patronage purposes and thereby violated her First Amendment rights, and was without due process, she sued the West Virginia Alcohol Beverage Control Commissioner both individually and officially for affirmative injunctive relief restoring her to her former position and for actual and punitive damages. She based federal jurisdiction on 1983, 42 U.S.C., and 1343, 28 U.S.C. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment and for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court granted the motion on the second ground without considering the application of the Eleventh Amendment. Nunnery v. Barber (D.C.W.Va.1973), 365 F.Supp. 691. 1 The plaintiff has appealed. We affirm.
The plaintiff's action represents a challenge to the 'patronage' or 'spoils' system of public employment. 2 Such an attack is not novel. For more than a century, the system has been under attack. 3 Generally the attack has been directed toward legislative action as the proper source of relief. And both federal and state governments have responded with civil service laws providing a merit system for public employment and giving public employees in certain classifications protection against discharge for patronage reasons. 4 West Virginia has enacted such a law. 5 When, however, resort has been had by public employees to the courts for relief independently of the legislated civil service laws or regulations, (i.e., by employees not within 'the classified service') the claim has received scant consideration; and this has been true whether the claim was premised on the constitutional right of free speech, equal protection or due process. 6 As the District Court in its opinion observed, the reason generally assigned for this denial of judicial relief is that the proper forum for relief is considered to be the legislature and not the courts. A recent case, expressive of this viewpoint and representing what until that time had been the uniform answer to this claim, is Alomar v. Dwyer, supra. In dismissing a claim of invalidity of a discharge of a non-policy-making public employee 7 for patronage reasons on constitutional grounds, the Court said (pp. 483-484 of 447 F.2d):
8
A little over a year after the decision in Alomar, the Seventh Circuit, in a decision 'without direct precedent', as several commentators have remarked, 9 departed from the accepted rule as stated in that case and for the first time granted constitutional protection of political association to patronage employees. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34, etc. v. Lewis (7th Cir. 1972), 473 F.2d 561, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 and 943,93 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 35 L.Ed.2d 590, 609. 10 While the Court in this case accepted the premise that only the legislature may impose on the state a civil service system assuring impartiality in either the employment or retention of public employees, it held that such principle did not inhibit a court from prohibiting on constitutional grounds the dismissal of a patronage employee having no civil service status for patronage reasons. 11 Taking a realistic, rather than an abstract, view of the matter however, the Court made it clear that this was not an absolute rule applicable in all cases; it was a rule which the Court expressly held did not extend protection to all public employees. 12 On the contrary, the constitutional principle was declared to establish a flexible rule that varied in its application with the classification of the employee and the nature of his duties. There were, and of necessity had to be, exceptions to the rule; there were, the Court freely conceded, classes of public employees who were not entitled to invoke the constitutional principle it was enunciating. Thus, it emphasized in its opinion that it did not (473 F.2d at p. 574)
The Court stated throughout its opinion that the rule it was expounding related only to the rights of 'maintenance workers, elevator operators, janitors, and comparable employees', or, as it expressed it at another point, of 'janitors, elevator operators or school teachers', (473 F.2d at pp. 574-575) employees who normally cannot in their employment adversely affect the policy-making or implementation functions of government and employees 'performing merely routine functions not requiring the exercise of an informed discretion or the formulation of underlying rationales for government action.' Indiana State Employees Association, Inc. v. Negley, supra (365 F.Supp. at p. 232). In short, Lewis, it seems fair to assume, was intended to extend its mantle of constitutional protection only to those public employees whose duties were 'routine', involving the exercise of no administrative policy or public duties as broadly defined and that is the reach of the decision on this point, as we read it. 13
It is true, the opinion in Lewis may be thought to make a vague distinction between what it describes as 'policy-making' employees and 'non-policy-making' employees and does indicate that its rule extends generally to 'non-policy-making' employees. But the Court attempted no authoritative or precise definition of 'policy-making' and 'non-policy-making'; and these terms as used in the opinion, contribute little to determining with exactness or finality those employees who are or are not entitled to the protection of the rule the Court is promulgating. As the editor in 14 Wm. & Mary L.Rev., 720 at 729-30, commenting on this case, phrased it,
Judge Campbell in his concurring opinion also recognized the 'definitional problem' represented in attempting to fix the application of the rule by the use of such broad, general terms as 'policy-making' and 'non-policy-making'. He stated the problem in these words:
Moreover, the lead opinion was at pains, 14 it would seem, to indicate it was not using the term 'policy-making' as an absolute criterion in the application of its rule. It unquestionably envisaged a broader basis for immunity from...
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Rouse v. Nielson
...the Court cannot agree with his interpretation of the law. Potentially the most persuasive case cited by plaintiff is Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005, 95 S.Ct. 1448, 43 L.Ed.2d 763 (1975), in which the court determined that a patronage discharge ......
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...beneficiaries of a patronage system may not be heard to challenge it when it comes their turn to be replaced. See also Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (CA4 1974). The plurality opinion virtually ignores this issue in an apparent rush to constitutional adjudication. It also may be that the ......
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Sprague v. Fitzpatrick
...the need to ensure obedience to state policy, and the need to prevent impropriety or its appearance." Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1361 (4th Cir. 1974) (Butzner, J., dissenting).20 By far the most instructive pre-Roseman case, however, was Meehan v. Macy, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 392 F.2d......
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Marino v. Bowers
...cases which had rejected constitutional challenges to the dismissal of "at will" employees for patronage purposes. Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005, 95 S.Ct. 1448, 43 L.Ed.2d 763 (1975); Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), ......