Nutall v. Terminals

Decision Date22 December 2015
Docket Number1:14 CV 4738
PartiesIVORY NUTALL, Plaintiff, v. RESERVE MARINE TERMINALS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Judge Marvin E. Aspen

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:

Presently before us is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Reserve Marine Terminals ("Reserve Marine" or "Defendant"), seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Ivory Nutall's ("Nutall" or "Plaintiff") claims against it. Nutall alleges that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of a perceived disability and his age, and retaliated against him for filing a workers' compensation claim, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq,. the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), 775 ILCS 5/1-103(I), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, and Illinois common law. For the reasons set forth below, we grant Defendant's summary judgment motion in part and deny it in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We begin with the pertinent facts. Unless otherwise noted, the facts described herein are undisputed and culled from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact and exhibits. (See Def. Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, Dkt. No. 40 [hereinafter Def. SOF]; Pl. Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, Dkt. No. 46 [hereinafter Pl. SOF].) To the extent that either party objected to certain statements of fact or exhibits, we shall rely on admissible evidence only for the purposes of our analysis. See e.g., Hemsworth v. Quotesmith Com., Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The evidence relied upon in defending a motion for summary judgment must be competent evidence of a type otherwise admissible at trial."). Accordingly, we decline to address objections specifically unless warranted.

A. Facts

a. General Background

In October 1998, Plaintiff was hired by Reserve Marine as a Heavy Equipment Maintenance Mechanic. (Def. SOF ¶¶ 7-8.) As a Heavy Equipment Maintenance Mechanic, Plaintiff was responsible for maintaining and repairing equipment used at Reserve Marine to separate and process scrap. (Id. ¶ 8.) In order to maintain and repair this equipment, Plaintiff climbed ladders, twisted, bended and kneeled, swung sledgehammers, removed faulty engines, changed oil and filters, lifted the hoods of various vehicles, changed six-foot tires and performed a variety of other tasks.1 (Id.)

b. Plaintiff's Injury and Subsequent Treatment

Plaintiff was severely injured on December 3, 2011 when his back gave out after lifting the hood to a large crane. (Id.) Plaintiff was helped off of the crane and immediately went to the emergency room. (Id. ¶ 12.) Following this accident, Plaintiff was unable to work and filed a workers' compensation claim on December 8, 2011. (Id.; Pl. SOF ¶ 65.) Plaintiff has notworked at Reserve Marine since his injury on December 8, 2011.2 (Def. SOF ¶ 42.) Before his December 2011 injury, Plaintiff had never taken more than a day or two off work for any injury, with any employer.3 (Pl. SOF ¶ 66.) From December 2011 through March 2013, in attempts to remedy his back pain and get back to work, Plaintiff received multiple spinal injections, underwent physical therapy, and wore a neck to waist brace for 23 hours a day. (Pl. SOF ¶ 68.) None of these remedies proved effective, so on March 6, 2013, Plaintiff consulted with Dr. Kern Singh, a spinal surgeon at the Rush University Medical Center, concerning his injury. (Def. SOF ¶ 16, Pl. SOF ¶ 68.) A little over three months later, on June 25, 2013, Dr. Singh performed a lumbar laminectomy on Plaintiff. (Def. SOF ¶ 18.)

c. Plaintiff's Communication with Defendant concerning his Injury

Following his surgery in June 2013, Plaintiff continued to meet with Dr. Singh and Dr. Singh provided status reports to Reserve Marine's workers' compensation office after each appointment with Plaintiff. (Pl. SOF ¶ 69.) Dr. Singh's office provided status reports from March 6, 2013 through November 6, 2013. (Id.) On March 6, 2013, after his initial examination, Dr. Singh reported to Defendant's workers' compensation office that Plaintiff was unable to work at that time due to his injury. (Def. SOF ¶ 17.) On July 29, 2013, Dr. Singh informed Defendant's workers' compensation office that he had imposed a ten pound restriction on Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 19.) Based on this ten pound restriction, Plaintiff was unable to perform his job duties at that time, as well. (Id.) Later, in an August 23, 2013 status report, Dr. Singhinformed the workers' compensation office that Plaintiff had a dull ache in his back and was taking ibuprofen and Flexeril for pain. (Id. ¶ 20.) In this same report, Dr. Singh imposed a fifteen pound restriction on Plaintiff's lifting, pushing and pulling. (Id.) Plaintiff still was unable to work. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Singh informed the workers' compensation office that he instructed Plaintiff to complete two to four weeks of work conditioning with a physical therapist and to submit to a "functional capacity exam" to "determine the safe limits of Plaintiff's physical ability." (Id.)

To complete his work conditioning and functional capacity exam, Plaintiff reported to David Noble at ATI Physical Therapy. (Id. ¶ 23.) After Plaintiff was referred to ATI, ATI also sent updates to Defendant's workers' compensation office beginning in October 2013. (Pl. SOF ¶ 69.) Mr. Noble conducted Plaintiff's physical capacity exam on October 4, 2013. (Def. SOF ¶ 23.) After the examination, Mr. Noble reported to Dr. Singh that as of October 4, Plaintiff's capabilities fell below the medium physical demands level, the demand level for a heavy equipment mechanic4. (Id.) On November 4, 2013, Marine Reserve's workers' compensation office received another report from Dr. Singh's office. (Id. ¶ 24.) This report indicated that Plaintiff was in moderate discomfort and was still taking ibuprofen and Flexeril for pain. (Id. ¶ 21.) As of the November 4 report, Plaintiff was still restricted to fifteen pounds of lifting, pushing and pulling. (Id.) That same day, Mr. Noble completed Plaintiff's last workconditioning note, indicating that Plaintiff could lift 60 pounds from floor to chair over a course of ten repetitions but that Plaintiff was reporting lower back pain with radicular symptoms into the left buttock and that such pain was a four out of ten on the functional pain scale, meaning it was moderate pain. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 52.)

Two days later, on November 6, 2013, Dr. Singh's office sent a final report to Defendant's workers' compensation office. (Id. ¶ 26.) This report released Plaintiff to "full duty without restriction," effective November 13, 2013. (Id.) The release noted that Plaintiff's "job requires for him to lift heavy; however he only met medium demands." (Id.) Dr. Singh was never provided a copy of Plaintiff's job description prior to releasing him without restriction. (Def. SOF ¶ 50.) Plaintiff did inform Dr. Singh that he was a Heavy Equipment Mechanic and that his job required him to lift "heavy" weights, "anywhere from fifty to over a hundred pounds." (Pl. SOF ¶ 75.) Since his November 6 appointment, Plaintiff has not returned to Dr. Singh or any other medical professional with back complaints. (Id. ¶ 73.)

d. Plaintiff's Attempt to Return to Work

On November 12, 2013, in line with Reserve Marine's policy5, Plaintiff came to Reserve Marine with Dr. Singh's unrestricted release and expressed his intention to return as a Heavy Equipment Maintenance Mechanic. (Def. SOF ¶ 29; Pl. SOF ¶ 77.) Plaintiff handed the paperwork to Reserve Marine's Operations Manager, Rob Boswell. (Def. SOF ¶ 29.) Mr. Boswell said he was happy to see Plaintiff back and that he would pass along Plaintiff's paperwork to Dennis Stropko, Defendant's primary point of contact for workers' compensation cases. (Id. ¶¶ 3; 30.) Boswell did pass along Plaintiff's release to Stropko, who then contactedPlaintiff and informed him that Plaintiff's return to work was "out of the blue," and, in accordance with company policy, Stropko would reach out to Dr. Singh and Reserve Marine's insurance carrier and get back to Plaintiff with next steps.6 (Id.) After speaking with Stropko, Plaintiff contacted his union representative, Mike Corrigan, to inform him of his attempt to return to work.7 (Pl. SOF ¶ 79.) To this date, Defendant has not contacted Plaintiff concerning a physical examination, an independent medical examination or a functional capacity exam. (Id. ¶¶86-88.) Prior to this litigation, Defendant never informed Plaintiff what additional paperwork he needed to provide to Defendant to return to work.8 (Id. ¶ 85.)

e. Dr. Singh's Release

Despite receiving Dr. Singh's November 6 release, Stropko was concerned that Plaintiff was not physically qualified to perform the job of Heavy Equipment Maintenance Mechanic given his significant physical restrictions two days earlier in Dr. Singh's November 4 report. (Def. SOF ¶ 40.) Stropko was also concerned that Plaintiff could not perform "100% of the essential functions" of his job as required by Reserve Marine policy. (Id.) Stropko was "extremely hesitant to just allow [Plaintiff] to return to work without any real follow up from an occupational health professional that is aware of the type of work [Plaintiff] would be performing." (Id. ¶ 34.) After receiving the release from Dr. Singh, Stropko considered Plaintiff "not yet released." (Pl. SOF ¶ 82.)

Stropko contacted Defendant's workers' compensation claims representative to clarify Dr. Singh's release. (Def. SOF ¶ 36.) The claim representative informed Stropko that "the date on which a worker is released to work is not under our control, it is under the doctor's." (Pl. SOF ¶ 83.) Stropko asked the claims representative to send the physical demands of Plaintiff's job to Dr. Singh to clarify whether Plaintiff's full duty release would allow him to perform his job. (Def. SOF ¶ 36.) At this time, the claims representative told Stropko that...

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