Nutter v. Dougherty

• Decision Date: 28 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. 6 EAP 2007.,No. 7 EAP 2007.,No. 9 EAP 2007.,No. 8 EAP 2007.,No. 5 EAP 2007.,5 EAP 2007.,6 EAP 2007.,7 EAP 2007.,8 EAP 2007.,9 EAP 2007.
• Citation: 938 A.2d 401
• Parties: Michael A. NUTTER v. John DOUGHERTY, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah, Jonathan Saidel, and City of Philadelphia Appeal of Chaka Fattah. Michael A. Nutter v. John Dougherty, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah, Jonathan Saidel, and City of Philadelphia Appeal of Chaka Fattah. Michael A. Nutter v. John Dougherty, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah, Jonathan Saidel, and City of Philadelphia Appeal of John Dougherty. Michael A. Nutter v. John Dougherty, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah and Jonathan Saidel Appeal of John Dougherty. Michael A. Nutter v. John Dougherty, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah and City of Philadelphia Appeal of John Dougherty.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

938 A.2d 401

Michael A. NUTTER v. John DOUGHERTY, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah, Jonathan Saidel, and City of Philadelphia

Appeal of Chaka Fattah.

Michael A. Nutter v. John Dougherty, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah, Jonathan Saidel, and City of Philadelphia

Appeal of Chaka Fattah.

Michael A. Nutter v. John Dougherty, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah, Jonathan Saidel, and City of Philadelphia

Appeal of John Dougherty.

Michael A. Nutter v. John Dougherty, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah and Jonathan Saidel

Appeal of John Dougherty.

Michael A. Nutter v. John Dougherty, Dwight Evans, Chaka Fattah and City of Philadelphia

Appeal of John Dougherty.

No. 5 EAP 2007.

No. 6 EAP 2007.

No. 7 EAP 2007.

No. 8 EAP 2007.

No. 9 EAP 2007.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued October 15, 2007.

Decided December 28, 2007.

Jonathan F. Bloom, Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, L.L.P., Philadelphia, for Campaign Legal Center, amicus curiae.

Gregory M. Harvey, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, L.L.P., Philadelphia, for Chaka Fattah, appellant.

Richard Gerson Feder, Lewis Rosman, City of Philadelphia Law Dept., for City of Philadelphia, appellee.

Susan Laura Burke, Burke O'Neil, L.L.C., for Michael A. Nutter, appellee.

George Bochetto, Bochetto & Lentz, P.C., Philadelphia, for John Dougherty, appellee.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, BALDWIN and FITZGERALD, JJ.

OPINION

Justice BAER.

We are called upon to consider whether the General Assembly, in enacting and later amending the Election Code,¹ intended to preempt municipalities from legislating their own regulations limiting campaign contributions to candidates for municipal office.² The General Assembly has enacted modest limitations on the manner in which interested individuals, political action committees (PAC), and corporations may contribute to the campaign coffers of candidates for state or local office, and no material limits on the sums that may permissibly be given to candidates. In an effort to stem what has been characterized as a "pay to play" political culture, the Philadelphia City Council enacted an Ordinance in 2003 limiting campaign contributions to candidates for municipal office, and refined it by amendment in the years immediately thereafter. When Appellant Michael Nutter, now Mayor-Elect, filed a complaint in the trial court seeking to enforce the Ordinance against other putative mayoral candidates, those candidates challenged the validity of the Ordinance under state law. The trial court upheld these challenges, ruling that the Pennsylvania Election Code manifests the General Assembly's intent to preempt all local campaign regulation to ensure the uniform elections provided by Article VII, § 6, of the Pennsylvania Constitution.³ On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed, finding in the Election Code insufficient indicia of the legislature's intent to preempt local regulation in the area of campaign contributions, and ruling that Philadelphia was free as a Home Rule municipality⁴ to enact campaign regulations governing campaign contributions to candidates for municipal office. See Nutter v. Dougherty, 921 A.2d 44 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007). We affirm.

Before relating the background of this case, it is necessary to establish, in broad strokes, the principle of state preemption of local lawmaking authority and its several forms. In Department of Licenses and Inspections, Board of License and Inspection Review v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 147 A.2d 326 (1959), this Court explained two of the three closely related forms of preemption as follows:

Of course, it is obvious that where a statute specifically declares it has planted the flag of preemption in a field, all ordinances on the subject die away as if they did not exist. It is also apparent that, even if the statute is silent on supersession, but proclaims a course of regulation and control which brooks no municipal intervention, all ordinances touching the topic of exclusive control fade away into the limbo of `innocuous desuetude.'

Id. at 327. In addition to those two forms of preemption, respectively "express" and "field preemption," there is also a third, "conflict preemption," which acts to preempt any local law that contradicts or contravenes state law. See Mars Emergency Med. Servs. v. Township of Adams, 559 Pa. 309, 740 A.2d 193, 195 (1999) (citing, inter alia, W. Pennsylvania Rest. Ass'n v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d 616, 619-620 (1951)) (hereinafter Mars EMS). Having established the general import of these principles, we turn to the background of the case.

On December 18, 2003, the Philadelphia City Council passed an ordinance, effective January 1, 2004, establishing a $1000 limit on campaign contributions by "persons" to candidates for Mayor and City Council, and a $5000 limit on contributions by PACs. The Ordinance was amended on June 9, 2005, extending contribution limits to candidates for all other Philadelphia elective offices, and increasing the relevant limits to $2500 for individuals under § 20-1002(1) and $10,000 for non-individuals and PACs.⁵ Finally, on November 16, 2006, the Ordinance was once again amended— first, to define "candidate" as "(a) [a]n individual who files nomination papers or petitions for City elective office; [or] (b) [a]n individual who publicly announces his or her candidacy for City elective office;" and second, to provide that, should a candidate contribute $250,000 or more of his own money to his campaign, all limits under the Ordinance would double for all other candidates.⁶

Under these provisions, Appellee Nutter filed a complaint on April 12, 2006, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against John Dougherty and Chaka Fattah; Dwight Evans; and Jonathan Saidel⁷ —all politicians Nutter maintained were exploring mayoral candidacies.⁸ Appellee Nutter sought, in Count I, relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531, et seq., directing these putative mayoral candidates to abide by the Ordinance's campaign finance limits. In Count II, Appellant Nutter sought an injunction directing the other candidates not to accept illegal contributions and to return any contributions already accepted that failed to pass muster under the Ordinance. Appellant Dougherty, in turned, filed a counterclaim. Therein, Dougherty challenged the constitutionality of the Ordinance, arguing that it was preempted by the Election Code.

After disposing of the preliminary matters addressed supra n. 8, the trial court invited the parties to file motions for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the validity of the Ordinance. The parties complied, and on December 13, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the named defendants, those mayoral candidates who challenged the Ordinance, based on its determination that the Ordinance contravened the General Assembly's intention to preempt all local ordinances affecting elections except as expressly provided. Because the Election Code contained no express authorization pursuant to which municipalities might impose local campaign finance limitations, Philadelphia lacked authority to enact the Ordinance. Thus, the court ruled the Ordinance invalid.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed. The court began by reviewing Philadelphia's authority as a First Class City under the Home Rule Act. See 53 P.S. §§ 13101, et seq. (granting, and detailing, the self-government authority of cities of the first class); PA. CONST. ART. IX, § 2.⁹ The court cited this Court's decision in City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75 (2004), for the proposition that "the Home Rule Act granted Philadelphia general authority of local self-government that includes complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal functions as set forth in" 53 P.S. § 13131. Nutter, 921 A.2d at 54. The court also reviewed § 13133 of the Home Rule Act, which provides that, "[n]otwithstanding the grant of powers contained in this act, no city shall exercise powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly" in pertinence to, inter alia, "the personal registration of electors." 53 P.S. § 13133(a)(7). Pursuant to the Home Rule Act, the court continued, Philadelphia, on April 17, 1951, adopted its Home Rule Charter granting the city, in terms that echo Article IX, § 2, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, "all powers and authority of local self-government" and "complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal functions," as well as "the power to enact ordinances and to make rules and regulations necessary and proper for carrying into execution its powers." Nutter, 921 A.2d at 55 (quoting Philadelphia Home Rule Charter § 1-100).

Notwithstanding the Home Rule Act's grant of authority, the court noted, any enactment pursuant to that act's authority is subject to the doctrine of preemption, which provides, generally, "that when the legislature has preempted a field the state has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and therefore prohibits local legislation in that area." Id. at 56. Preemption, the court emphasized, is the exception and not the rule. Id. (citing Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311, 315 (1987)). The Court observed that preemption does not result simply because the General Assembly legislates in the field; rather, the legislature must manifest its intent entirely to preempt that field. Id. (citing Council of Middletown, 523 A.2d at 315). In light of these principles, the court determined that the Election Code manifests no express preemptive mandate, nor any implicit mandate sufficiently clear to satisfy the stringent standard articulated in Pennsylvania precedent. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's ruling and, in effect, upheld Philadelphia's Ordinance. This appeal followed.

Appellant Dougherty contends that...