Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. United States Army Corp.S Of Eng'rs
| Decision Date | 20 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civ.No.lO-1129-AC |
| Parties | NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS et al., Defendants, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Introduction
Plaintiff Northwest Environmental Defense Center ("NEDC") brought an action against the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") and the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") (collectively, "Defendants"), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against certain meeting and planning activities of the Defendants that occurred in Oregon. The action was filed inthe Portland Division of the District of Oregon. Presently before the court is Defendants' motion to reassign the case to the Medford Division. For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Defendants' motion to reassign.
NEDC's complaint makes two general allegations: that the Corps held planning meetings in violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"), 5 U.S.C. App 2 (1997), and that one outcome of those meetings was a mining plan that, among other things, violates the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2008). NEDC's complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the meetings violated FACA and an injunction against any future meetings in violation of FACA. Plaintiff also requests that the court issue a permanent injunction to prevent the Corps from implementing the mining plan that resulted from the challenged meetings.
FACA was established to "eliminate useless advisory committees, strengthen independence of remaining advisory committees, and prevent advisory groups from becoming self-serving." Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Dep't V of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 409 F. Supp. 473, 474 (D.D.C. 1976), affirmed 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Advisory committees should be convened only when "determined to be essential," and should be "kept to the minimum necessary." 5 U.S.C. App 2 § 2(b)(2). Legislation that establishes advisory committees must ensure that the committees are "balanced in terms of points of view represented " and that recommendations of the committee are not induly influenced by any "special interest." 5 U.S.C. App 2 § 5(b)(2~3). Advisory committees should operate under uniform procedures, and the public should be kept informed as to their "number, purpose, membership, activities and cost." 5 U.S.C. App 2 §§ 4-5. Committees operating under FACA must file a charter with the head of the agency they advise, give advance notice in theFederal Register of any meeting, and make transcripts of their proceedings available to the public. 5 U.S.C. App 2 §§ 9(c), 10(b), 11(a). Advisory committee meetings must be open to the public. 5 U.S.C. App 2 §§ 10(a)(1).
NEDC's core assertion regarding FACA is that Defendants organized and held private meetings to develop a plan for gravel mining in Oregon's rivers, that these meetings should have been organized under FACA, and that in any event the meetings were carried out in violation of FACA policies. ,) These meetings included representatives of federal and state agencies, and representatives of the mining industry. Id. NEDC alleges that these groups, which came to be known as the Executive Team and the Technical Team, were "clearly subject to FACA's requirements." Id. ¶ 47. NEDC recites a number of specific dates on which the teams met, and Defendants do not dispute that these meetings took place. NEDC alleges that a substantial portion of these meetings took place at Corps headquarters in Portland, and offers documents supporting that allegation. (Pl's Resp. in Opp'n ("Response") (Docket #6) Ex. B Attach, 3-18.)
NEDC further alleges that, as a result of the challenged meetings, a plan was developed to mine the Chetco River and other rivers in Oregon. (Complaint ¶¶56-62.) NEDC alleges that the plan for mining the Chetco River is meant to "serve as a model for evaluating other river systems." Id. ¶54. NEDC alleges that the method for arriving at the Chetco plan, and the plan itself, give rise to numerous violations of the ESA, Id. ¶¶83-106. NEDC asks the court to declare that these activities violated, and continue to violate, the ESA, and asks that the court set aside the plan that resulted from the challenged meetings.
Defendants timely filed a motion to reassign venue to the Medford division. Defendantsmaintain that the heart of NEDC's complaint concerns plans for gravel mining on the Chetco River, and that the acts or omissions alleged to have taken place in Portland are tangential to the matter. (Fed. Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. to Reassign ("Motion to Reassign") 1, 4.) Defendants urge the court to focus on the portion of the local rule that designates the location of the "property... that is the subject of the action" as determinative of venue. (Motion to Reassign 2.) Pointing out that the Chetco River is located entirely in the Medford division, Defendants ask the court to reassign the case to Medford on that basis.
This court's jurisdiction over the matter is uncontested. Federal jurisdiction is proper here because the actions alleged arise under the laws of the United States, and because the defendants are federal agencies. 28 U.S.C, § 1331; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.
Venue is proper in the District of Oregon under the federal rules that govern assignment of venue among the federal judicial districts. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2002). Where the federal court has jurisdiction, a plaintiff may assert venue in "any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, [or] a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated." Id, Because all the events are alleged to have taken place in the state of Oregon, venue in the District of Oregon is proper. The parties contest, however, the divisional venue in which this case should be filed and heard.
Divisional venue, the issue disputed here, is analyzed under three distinct but related authorities: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of the District of Oregon, and the statutes governing federal judicial procedure, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391,1404 and 1406. While Defendants rely primarily on precedent under this district's Local Rules in their argument for change of venue, the court evaluates all three authorities to determine the proper location for advancement of the case.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), ("Federal Rule") while the plaintiff makes the initial choice of where to file a suit, the defendant may challenge the plaintiff's choice of venue as an affirmative defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). A venue defense must be asserted in a responsive pleading, and is waived if the defendant fails to make the motion under the rule. Id. 12(h). In adjudicating a 12(b)(3) motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and resolves all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party. See Murphy v. Schneider Natl, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004).
The District of Oregon's Local Rules ("Local Rules") also govern assignment of venue. A judicial district is empowered by federal statute and Federal Rule 83 to make local rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 137 () and Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1) (). The Ninth Circuit accords broad deference to the district court's interpretation of local rules. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 105 F.3d 1288, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997) () (citing U.S. v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 695 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Local Rule 3-2 divides the District of Oregon into four divisions to "distribute the judicial work and to align counties for juror management purposes." LR 3-2(a). These divisions, which encompass all Oregon counties, are Portland, Pendleton, Eugene, and Medford. Parties are instructed that their pleading must identify the division where venue lies; i.e., "the division in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial partof the property that is the subject of the action is situated." LR 3-2(b). This "substantial part" language follows exactly the analogous portion of the federal venue statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Parties are further instructed that and that "[c]ases where divisional venue lies within the Medford Division must be filed in Medford." LR 3-3(a). Should a party initially file a case in the wrong division, the Court may reassign the case "on its own motion or that of any party." LR 3-3(c).
The court additionally looks for guidance in two federal judicial procedure statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1404,28 U.S.C. § 1406(b). The first statute governs motions for "convenience" transfers, which arise when venue is proper in either of two forums, but one party prefers a given forum for reasons of convenience. 28 U.S.C. § 1404. The statute places discretion in the district court to evaluate convenience transfers on an "individualized, case-by-case" basis for convenience and fairness, in the interests of justice. Stewart-Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 23 (1988). The court considers multiple factors, such as:
(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (4) the respective parties' contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff's cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7)...
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