Nw. Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles
| Decision Date | 27 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | AC 42899 |
| Citation | 241 A.3d 733,201 Conn.App. 128 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | NORTHWEST HILLS CHRYSLER JEEP, LLC, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES et al. |
Jason T. Allen, pro hac vice, with whom were James J. Healy, Hartford, and, on the brief, Richard N. Sox, pro hac vice, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Eileen Meskill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
George W. Mykulak, pro hac vice, with whom were Charles D. Ray and, on the brief, Shawn S. Smith, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant FCA US, LLC).
Lavine, Alvord and Cradle, Js.
In this administrative appeal, the plaintiffs, Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC, Gengras Chrysler Dodge Jeep, LLC, Crowley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., doing business as Crowley Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, and Papa's Dodge, Inc., challenge the judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal. The plaintiffs had appealed from the decision of a hearing officer for the defendants Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the Department of Motor Vehicles (collectively, department), which found that good cause existed to allow the defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA), to establish a new Jeep dealership at the defendant Mitchell Dodge, Inc. (Mitchell), in Canton. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals that the four plaintiffs operate Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep and Ram dealerships in Connecticut, where they engage in the sale of new motor vehicles and hold valid franchises from FCA for such activities. Mitchell operates a Chrysler, Dodge and Ram dealership. FCA manufactures, assembles, imports and/or distributes new motor vehicles to each of the plaintiffs and to Mitchell.
In May, 2016, FCA provided notice to the department and to the plaintiffs, pursuant to General Statutes § 42-133dd (a),1 that it intended to establish a new Jeep dealership at Mitchell, which would be located within the relevant market area2 of each plaintiff. The plaintiffs timely protested FCA's proposal to establish the new Jeep dealership, and a hearing was held by the department to determine whether good cause existed to establish the proposed dealership pursuant to § 42-133dd (c).3
Following an evidentiary hearing and the submission of posthearing briefs, the department issued its decision, dated January 19, 2018, concluding that, "[b]ased upon the evidence presented, and taking into consideration [the] criteria set forth in ... § 42-133dd, good cause exists for permitting the establishment of a new Jeep dealer ... in Canton ...."
The plaintiffs appealed from the department's decision to the trial court, alleging that the department (1) failed to comply with its statutory mandate to consider the existing circumstances of two of the dealers, (2) made findings that are not supported by substantial evidence with respect to three statutory factors, and (3) made irreconcilable findings with respect to two of the statutory factors. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, concluding that the department's decision "is neither incomplete nor inconsistent and is supported by substantial evidence," and, accordingly, dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal.
The plaintiffs now challenge the trial court's dismissal of their appeal from the department's decision, essentially reiterating the claims that they raised during trial. We carefully have examined the record of the proceedings before the trial court, in addition to the parties’ appellate briefs and oral arguments. Applying the well established principles that govern our review of a court's decision to dismiss an administrative appeal; see, e.g., Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 191 Conn. App. 648, 654, 216 A.3d 847, cert. granted on other grounds, 333 Conn. 926, 217 A.3d 994 (2019) ; we conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. We adopt the court's thorough and well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues. See Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles , Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-18-6042924-S, 2019 WL 2137320 (April 15, 2019) (reprinted at 201 Conn. App. 132, ––– A.3d ––––). It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See, e.g., Tzovolos v. Wiseman , 300 Conn. 247, 253–54, 12 A.3d 563 (2011) ; Freeman v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc ., 191 Conn. App. 110, 112, 213 A.3d 542 (2019).
The judgment is affirmed.
APPENDIX
NORTHWEST HILLS CHRYSLER JEEP, LLC, ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES ET AL.*
Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain
Memorandum filed April 15, 2019
Proceedings
Memorandum of decision on plaintiffs’ appeal from decision by named defendant. Appeal dismissed .
James J. Healy , Jason T. Allen , pro hac vice, and Richard N. Sox , pro hac vice, for the plaintiffs.
Eileen Meskill , assistant attorney general, and George Jepsen , former attorney general, for the named defendant et al.
Charles D. Ray , Shawn S. Smith , George W. Mykulak , pro hac vice, and Caitlin W. Monahan , pro hac vice, for the defendant FCA US, LLC.
Jay B. Weintraub , John L. Bonee and Eric H. Rothauser , for the defendant Mitchell Dodge, Inc.
In this administrative appeal, four automobile dealers assert that the defendants Department of Motor Vehicles and its commissioner, Michael R. Bzdyra (collectively, department), improperly denied their protest to the decision of the defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA), to establish a new Jeep dealership in Canton. They assert that the department (1) failed to comply with its statutory mandate to consider the existing circumstances of two of the dealers, (2) made findings that are not supported by substantial evidence with respect to three statutory factors, and (3) made irreconcilable findings with respect to two of the factors. FCA and the department, in separate briefs, disagree. After considering all the arguments of the parties, and reviewing the entire administrative record, the court concludes that the department's decision is neither incomplete nor inconsistent and is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the appeal is dismissed.
In Connecticut, the relationships between manufacturers and dealers of motor vehicles are governed by General Statutes §§ 42-133r through 42-133ee. These provisions recognize the "need for intrabrand competition."
McLaughlin Ford, Inc . v. Ford Motor Co ., 192 Conn. 558, 569 n.14, 473 A.2d 1185 (1984). Section 42-133r (14) defines " ‘[r]elevant market area’ " as "the area within a radius of fourteen miles around an existing dealer or the area of responsibility defined in a franchise, whichever is greater." The law "does not guarantee an exclusive right to operate a dealership within a fourteen mile radius, but rather requires the [C]ommissioner of [M]otor [V]ehicles to demonstrate good cause, as defined in the statute, for denying the addition or relocation of a dealer in the objecting dealer's relevant market area." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McLaughlin Ford, Inc . v. Ford Motor Co ., supra, at 569 n.14, 473 A.2d 1185.
If a manufacturer wants to add a new dealer or to relocate an existing dealer within the relevant market area of an existing dealer, General Statutes § 42-133dd (a)1 requires the manufacturer to notify the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and each existing dealer of its intention. If an existing dealer files a protest with the commissioner, the manufacturer cannot proceed until the commissioner has held a hearing and has determined whether there is good cause for denying the manufacturer's plan. The manufacturer bears the burden of proving that good cause exists for permitting the proposed establishment or relocation. Section 42-133dd (c) sets out eleven nonexclusive "circumstances" or factors to be considered in determining whether good cause exists.2
Mitchell Dodge, Inc., doing business as Mitchell Chrysler Dodge (Mitchell), operates a Chrysler, Dodge, Ram (CDR) dealership presently located at 416 Hopmeadow Street in Simsbury. There are thirty CDR dealerships in Connecticut; all but four of them also sell the Jeep line. Mitchell is one of the four dealers currently without the Jeep line.
The four plaintiffs operate Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Ram (CDJR) dealerships in Connecticut. Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC (Northwest), operates a CDJR dealership in Torrington. Gengras Chrysler Dodge Jeep, LLC (Gengras), operates a CDJR dealership in East Hartford. Crowley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., doing business as Crowley Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram (Crowley), operates a CDJR dealership in Bristol. Papa's Dodge, Inc. (Papa's), operates a CDJR dealership in New Britain. Each of their dealerships is within fourteen miles of Mitchell's present location.
In 2007, FCA's predecessor, DaimlerChrysler Motors Company, LLC, looked to add the Jeep line to Mitchell's franchise at its present location. It gave the statutorily required notice to the dealers in the relevant market area. Northwest, Gengras, Crowley, and Papa's filed a protest pursuant to § 42-133dd (a), and the proposal to establish the Jeep line at Mitchell's present location was withdrawn on March 5, 2007.
On May 5, 2016, FCA gave notice to the department and to affected existing Jeep dealers that Mitchell intended to construct a facility at 71 Albany Turnpike in Canton, where it would relocate its existing CDR dealership, and requested to add the Jeep line. On May 23, 2016, Northwest, Gengras, Crowley, and Papa's protested the establishment of the Jeep line. They did not protest the relocation of Mitchell's CDR dealership.4
In FCA's dealer agreements, a "sales locality" is a geographic area of responsibility defined by specific census tracts. These are nonexclusive...
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