NY State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey
| Decision Date | 15 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 72 C 356/357.,72 C 356/357. |
| Citation | 544 F. Supp. 330 |
| Parties | NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHILDREN, INC., et al., and Patricia Parisi, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Hugh L. CAREY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
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Christopher A. Hansen, New York Civil Liberties Union, Bruce J. Ennis, American Civil Liberties Union, Archibald R. Murray, Executive Director and Attorney-in-Chief, The Legal Aid Soc., Kalman Finkel, Attorney-in-Charge, The Legal Aid Soc., Civ. Div., New York City, John E. Kirklin, Director of Litigation, The Legal Aid Soc., Civil Appeals & Law Reform Unit, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of N. Y., New York City , for defendants.
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled class action, except for New York State Association of Retarded Children ("NYSARC"), seek attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for services rendered from the inception of the suit through April 1, 1980.1 The facts of the case have been fully set forth in numerous opinions of this court, both published and unpublished,2 familiarity with which is assumed. Briefly, the suit was brought in March, 1972 against New York State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of retarded children and adults residing at Willowbrook Developmental Center, now known as Staten Island Developmental Center ("Willowbrook"). Plaintiffs alleged that conditions at Willowbrook, including, among other things, severe overcrowding and understaffing, violated their constitutional rights, and sought preliminary injunctive relief restricting certain abuses and requiring improved care. In April, 1973 Judge Judd granted a preliminary injunction according much of the relief requested. NYSARC v. Rockefeller, 357 F.Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y.1973). Trial of the case began on October 1, 1974 and ended on January 6, 1975 after attempts at settlement failed. However, renewed settlement negotiations after trial culminated in the signing of a consent decree by all parties in April, 1975. NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F.Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.1975). The Consent Judgment mandated that Willowbrook residents "be provided with the least restrictive and most normal living conditions possible," establishing detailed standards of care for class members and setting a timetable for "de-institutionalization" of the facility. The decree also provided for the creation of a Review Panel to monitor compliance with its terms and make recommendations to defendants "of steps deemed necessary to achieve or maintain compliance with the provisions of the judgment." Consent Judgment, Steps, Standards and Procedures ¶ 8(b).
It is fair to say that since April, 1975 all litigation concerning Willowbrook has revolved around questions of interpretation, implementation or enforcement of the terms of the Consent Judgment.3 Plaintiffs' counsel's vigorous and effective representation of their clients has played a crucial role in the effort to turn the promises of the Consent Judgment into reality for the Willowbrook class members.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in relevant part that:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section ... 1983 ... of this title ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
This court decided on March 21, 1978 that plaintiffs, as the prevailing parties within the meaning of the statute, were entitled to attorney's fees for services rendered in the case up to that time. NYSARC v. Carey, No. 72-C-356/357, slip op. at 7 (E.D.N.Y. March 21, 1978). The present application is for 16,409.7 hours logged by eight attorneys and two law students, valued by plaintiffs at $1,312,642.10, and costs and expenses valued at $21,035.48. With the application of the 100% bonus sought by counsel, the total amount sought is $2,542,430.63.4
In passing upon counsel's request, we follow the two-step procedure mandated in this circuit for the calculation of fee awards. First, it is necessary to establish a "lodestar" figure obtained by multiplying the hours properly expended in litigating the case by the hourly rate "normally charged for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area." Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Com'rs, 638 F.2d 496, 497, 505 (2d Cir. 1980); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974). Second, the court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward in light of "subjective" factors like the complexity of the case, counsel's skill, novelty of questions presented or nature of results achieved. Cohen, 638 F.2d at 505.5
Defendants do not deny liability for fees in this case, but vigorously contest the amount sought by plaintiffs, claiming that counsel seek compensation for excessive hours at inflated hourly rates. They also contend that no bonus or multiplier is warranted. Before turning to our discussion of those points, however, we must mention briefly defendants' contentions that plaintiffs are entitled to no fees for services rendered prior to October 19, 1976, the effective date of § 1988.
It is by now well settled that § 1988 is applicable to cases pending when it became effective. Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). Defendants argue, however, that at the time of the signing of the Consent Judgment the parties contemplated that the then pending decision of the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), would govern plaintiffs' request for an award of fees. Alyeska strictly limited the availability of fees. If it were applicable to the present application, the award of compensation would be problematic. Defendants also contend that even if Alyeska is not deemed to be applicable to plaintiffs' application, compensation for services rendered before October 19, 1976 must be denied because the first phase of the case was no longer pending when § 1988 became effective and attorney's fees under § 1988 can only be granted in cases pending at the statute's inception. Both of these arguments were rejected by the court in its decision of March 21, 1978, and defendants have not shown why the court should reverse its ruling.6
The starting point for determining counsel fees is the calculation of a "lodestar" representing the number of hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. For the purposes of this application counsel have divided the litigation into four stages, as follows:
Stage I: Inception of suit through December 31, 1973 Stage II: January 1, 1974 through December 31, 1975 Stage III: January 1, 1976 through December 31, 1977 Stage IV: January 1, 1978 to April 1, 1980 (and hours spent on fee application itself).
Plaintiffs seek compensation at a different rate for each attorney at each stage, depending on the attorney's years of experience at the time services were rendered.7 Defendants object to compensation at the hourly rates sought on the grounds that: the rates reflect a market value standard which is inappropriate for non-profit law organizations; the award to the Legal Aid Society should in any event be reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage of its budget that is federally funded; the same rate is sought for all work, regardless of the type of service rendered; the rates sought are current rather than those prevailing at the time the services were rendered; the rates sought are higher than those charged by attorneys of like skill in the community for similar work.
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