NYCAL Offshore Dev. Corp. v. Haaland
| Decision Date | 21 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-966 (RBW) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | NYCAL OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. DEBRA HAALAND, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of the Interior, [1] Defendant. |
The plaintiff, Nycal Offshore Development Corporation, brings this civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, against the defendant, Debra Haaland, Secretary (the “Secretary”) of the Department of the Interior (the “Department”). See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Currently pending before the Court is the Secretary's motion to dismiss. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 12. Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions, [2] the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the Secretary's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The following allegations are taken from the plaintiff's Complaint unless stated otherwise. In 1982, the Secretary sold oil and gas exploration leases for lands offshore the California coast, see Compl. ¶ 12, including “a pair of leases for oil and gas exploration in Federal submerged lands offshore of Santa Barbara, California [(the ‘Leases'), ]” id. ¶ 1. The Leases were issued with a primary term of five years. Id. ¶ 12. The plaintiff purchased a fractional interest in the Leases from a successor lessee in 1990 Id. ¶ 13.
Prior to and after the plaintiff's purchase, the Secretary suspended the leases to allow for completion of an oil and gas development study. Id. ¶ 14. These suspensions essentially “continued the [L]eases in effect.” Id. On November 12, 1999, the Secretary, based on “a study [ ] carried out concerning the status and future of oil and gas development offshore of California[, ]” granted an additional suspension (the “1999 suspension”). Id. ¶ 14-15. On November 15, 1999, the State of California filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to invalidate the 1999 suspension claiming that the Secretary lacked “authority to grant the November 1999 suspensions without first determining that those suspensions would be consistent with California's coastal management program[, ]” in violation of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1). Id. ¶ 16. On June 20, 2001, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California agreed with the State of California and ordered the Secretary “to set aside its approval of the requested suspensions” and “direct suspensions of the [Leases] . . . for a time sufficient” to complete its Coastal Zone Management Act compliance obligations. Id. ¶¶ 16-17; Pl.'s Opp'n at 3 (citing California ex rel. Cal. Coastal Comm'n v Norton, 150 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1057-58 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd, 311 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002)). As ordered, the Secretary “issu[ed] the directed suspension.” Pl.'s Opp'n at 4.
“In 2002, many of the lessees, including other factional interest holders in the [L]eases, commenced an action in the [United States] Court of Federal Claims.” Compl. ¶ 21. Those lessees, who did not include the plaintiff, prevailed and were awarded restitution, “which required the return of these lessees' leases to the United States.” Id. ¶ 22. On April 10, 2009, those lessees assigned their leasehold interests to the United States. Id. (citing Amber Res. Co. v. United States, 68 Fed.Cl. 535 (2005), aff'd, 538 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The plaintiff was not a party in the Court of Federal Claims litigation brought by the other lessees, was not a recipient of the resulting restitution award, and, therefore, did not assign its interests to the United States. See id. The plaintiff filed a separate suit in the Court of Federal Claims in 2005. See Compl. ¶ 21. The plaintiff ultimately did not prevail in that case and its claim for lost profits was dismissed. Id. ¶ 23.
In 2013, “the Regional Director of the [ ] Department's Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Pacific Region, sent a letter [(the ‘Ming Letter')] to [the plaintiff] at its London headquarters[.]” Id. ¶ 24. The letter stated “that the [L]eases ‘[had] not been relinquished nor ha[d] they expired due to the continued court-ordered directed suspensions on those lease[s].'” Id.; see also Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 4 (Ming Letter). The letter further stated “that the Department ‘[would] request permission to lift the court-ordered directed suspensions[.]” Compl. ¶ 24. The letter “not[ed] that ‘[the plaintiff's] leases [were] not in the primary term, no production or operations ha[d] occurred on [the plaintiff's] leases for more than 180 days, and there [was] not a suspension request for these leases upon which [the Department] may act.'” Id. (alteration in original). Although the plaintiff “received this letter[, ]” it continued “to pursue its damage[s] action, which was then awaiting briefing in the [United States] Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” Id.
“[O]n or about June 17, 2013, the United States moved to have the directed suspensions [lifted], but it never served the motion papers on [the plaintiff].” Id. ¶ 25. On July 13, 2013, the Northern District of California “granted what it denominated as the ‘Federal Defendants' Amended Unopposed Motion,' ordering that ‘[t]he lease suspensions ordered by th[at] Court in its order of June 20, 2001, 150 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1057-58 (N.D. Cal. 2001) are hereby LIFTED.'” Id. ¶ 33 (quoting Order at 1-2, California ex rel. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. 4:99-cv-04964-CW, ECF No. 180 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2013) () (“the Northern District of California's July 2013 order”) (capitalization in original).
On August 12, 2013, the Department sent another letter to the plaintiff . . . stating that, “[a]s a consequence of the [Northern District of California's July 13, 2013] order, [the plaintiff's] lease has expired, effective July 23, 2013.” Compl., Exhibit (“Ex.”) A (Letter from Joan Barminski, Regional Supervisor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to William G. Horn, Nycal Offshore Dev. Corp. (the “Barminski Letter”)) at 1-2.[3] According to the plaintiff, it was not aware of the 2013 proceedings in the Northern District of California, did not receive this letter, and did not learn about either until 2017. Id. ¶¶ 35-37.
Once the plaintiff learned of these events, it filed a motion to intervene and void the Northern District of California's July 2013 order due to the “failure of the [United States] to serve[ ]its motion paper []” on the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 37. The Northern District of California denied the plaintiff's motion to intervene, concluding that the plaintiff “should have intervened years ago in order to protect its inchoate interest” in the Leases. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. The plaintiff appealed that ruling. Id. at ¶ 42.[4]
On April 5, 2019, the plaintiff filed its Complaint in this Court, “seeking a judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, declaring that [the plaintiff] is[, ] and has been since 1990[, ] the owner of a fractional interest in [the Leases].” See id. ¶ 1. On September 27, 2019, the Secretary filed her motion to dismiss based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See generally Def.'s Mot.
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and therefore, “[a] motion for dismissal under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) ‘presents a threshold challenge to the [C]ourt's jurisdiction[, ]'” Morrow v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Walton, J.) (quoting Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Thus, the Court is obligated to dismiss a claim if it “lack[s] [ ] subject[-]matter jurisdiction[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). And, because “it is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [ ] [the Court's] limited jurisdiction, ” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, “the plaintiff bears the burden of pro[ving]” that the Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
In deciding a motion to dismiss based upon a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court “need not limit itself to the allegations of the complaint.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2001). Rather, the “[C]ourt may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Additionally, the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged[.]'” Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). However, “the [p]laintiffs factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge, 185 F.Supp.2d at 13-14 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim...
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