Nype v. Las Vegas Land Partners, LLC
| Decision Date | 26 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 59940,59940 |
| Parties | RUSSELL L. NYPE AND REVENUE PLUS, LLC, Appellants, v. LAS VEGAS LAND PARTNERS, LLC; LIVEWORK, LLC; AND ZOE PROPERTIES, LLC, Respondents. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
An unpublished order shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority. SCR 123.
ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND
Appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Ronald J. Israel, Judge.
Russell Nype worked on behalf of Las Vegas Land Partners (LVLP) to secure a partner, Forest City, that could provide equity for a development project. The transaction between LVLP and Forest City eventually changed from a partnership to a land sale contract. LVLP refused to pay Nype his commission, claiming payment was statutorily barred by NRS 645.270 because Nype is not licensed as a Nevada realtor. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of LVLP because Nype was not a licensed realtor, and his work resulted in the sale of real property. Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and NRS 645.270 applies only to those whose actions fall within NRS 645.030's definition of real estate broker. Because there remain questions of material fact regarding whether Nype meets that definition and has a legitimate claim to compensation, summary judgment was inappropriate.
As the parties are well aware of the facts, we merely summarize them here. LVLP owned five blocks of land in downtown Las Vegas that it wished to develop. It hired Nype to help find an investor that would fund the project. Through one of Nype's contacts, LVLP was introduced to Forest City. LVLP appears to have worked with Nype in brokering a deal with Forest City, and may have promised him compensation for this work although it does not appear they formally contracted with him concerning the Forest City deal.
LVLP and Forest City negotiated a partnership, but Forest City initially backed out. Nype worked with Forest City to get them to reconsider, and Forest City entered into a letter of intent to form a limited-liability company (LLC) with LVLP. However, Forest City let that agreement lapse, and the partnership fell through. A few months later, however, Forest City contacted LVLP and indicated it would be interested in restructuring the transaction as a land sale contract. The parties thereafter contracted to sell a tenancy-in-common interest in the land to Forest City. Nype may not have been aware of the sale contract, as it appears LVLP began excluding Nype from its correspondences with Forest City during this time.
LVLP, Nype, and other interested parties litigated the case in New York and Nevada. When discovery in the Nevada case moved forward, LVLP petitioned for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion because the final agreement was a land sale contract, and it found NRS 642.270 bars unlicensed person from collecting compensation for work done in the capacity of a real estate broker. The order relied on Islandia, Inc. v. Marechek, 82 Nev. 424, 427-28, 420 P.2d 5, 6 (1966), and Loomis v. Lange Financial Corp., 109 Nev. 1121, 1127-28,865 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1993), in finding that Nype acted as a broker by bringing the parties together and later claiming a commission on the resulting land sale. The district court did not explain which of Nype's acts met the statutory definition of real estate broker, assuming that Nype was necessarily covered by the statute because the ultimate transaction was a land sale contract.
This court reviews questions of statutory construction and the district court's legal conclusions de novo. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008); California Commercial v. Amedeo Vegas I, 119 Nev. 143, 145, 67 P.3d 328, 330 (2003). In interpreting any statute, this court looks first to the plain language of the statute and construes the statute so as not to produce unreasonable results. Harris Assocs. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 641-42, 81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003). Likewise, this court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence reflects no genuine issue of material fact and, as a matter of law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. Id.
On appeal, LVLP makes the same argument it did before the district court: if a party's efforts culminate in the sale of an interest in land, and that party does not hold a Nevada realtor license, that party is precluded from collecting any fee pursuant to NRS 645.270, regardless of the party's intent in undertaking or furthering the transaction.
NRS 645.030(1)(a). This definition focuses on the nature of the action, not the nature of the ultimate outcome. Moreover, the statute later exempts certain persons who do "not perform any tasks related to the sale or other transfer of an interest in real estate," further supporting that if the action was not intended to effect the transfer of real property, the actor may not fall within the definition of a real estate broker. NRS 645.030(3). Thus, only persons who act for the purpose of furthering a sale, lease, or rent contract for real property fall within the definition of real estate broker and are subject to NRS 645.270.
This comports with established Nevada law. And contrary to the district court's analysis, Islandia compels this conclusion.1 There, we held that the licensing requirement will not preclude payment of a commission unless the services rendered fall within acts outlined in NRS 645.030, and that this determination rests on the individualcircumstances of the services. 82 Nev. at 427-28, 420 P.2d at 7. That case makes clear that a person who is not a licensed real estate broker may recover a commission where the work was not done to further or...
To continue reading
Request your trial