Nyquist, Matter of, 93-129

Citation870 P.2d 360
Decision Date14 March 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-129,93-129
PartiesIn the Matter of the Workers' Compensation Claim of Tim J. NYQUIST. OLSTEN TEMPORARY SERVICES, Appellant (Petitioner/Employer) v. STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent Objector-Defendant).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

George Santini, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Kenneth E. Spurrier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

This appeal arises from an administrative agency decision affirmed by the district court. Olsten Services (Olsten) asserted that it was not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before worker compensation benefits were paid to an injured employee. Believing that the error of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (Division) left Olsten only one appropriate remedy, Olsten did not contest the benefit payments and instead sought to avoid charges to its experience rating for benefit payments made to the employee. Olsten contended that WYO.STAT. § 27-14-603(e) permits nonchargeability in this situation. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) determined that the statute did not authorize its agency to order nonchargeability.

We affirm.

Appellant presents these issues:

I. Should an employer which loses its opportunity to defend claims made against its experience rating due to the mistake of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division also be forced to bear the cost of that mistake?

II. Is there a remedy for employers who are denied the right to a hearing due to the mistakes of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division?

III. Where an employer has been materially prejudiced in its defense of claims due to its detrimental reliance upon a determination entered by the Division, does estoppel bar the Division from objecting to a stipulated settlement and award of benefits which does not charge the employer's experience rating?

Appellee states the issues as:

A. Whether the hearing officer has authority, pursuant to W.S. § 27-14-603(e), to order the Division to charge benefits to an industrial class as a whole rather than a single employer?

B. Whether the employer waived any claim for relief based upon W.S. § 27-14-603(e)?

C. Whether the hearing officer properly concluded that no statutory basis afforded Appellant relief from an agency error resulting in denial of procedural due process?

D. Whether there is an adequate remedy for employers who allege mistakes by the Division in its rate setting functions?

The OAH's decision was based upon statutory interpretation, and it is that conclusion of law which is considered by this court. The germane issue is:

Whether WYO.STAT. § 27-14-603(e) (1991) authorizes the Office of Administrative Hearings to order the Worker's Compensation Division not to charge the benefits paid to an injured employee against the employer's experience rating.

Olsten employed Timothy J. Nyquist as a temporary construction worker. While assigned to a project at the Buttrey Food Store in Laramie, Wyoming, Nyquist contended he was injured on September 17, 1991. He reported a lower back injury to the Division on September 20, 1991. Olsten disputed Nyquist's claim on September 23, 1991, the claim was denied by the Division on November 8, 1991, and Olsten received notification of this denial. Four days later, on November 12, 1991, the Division reversed itself and granted benefits to Nyquist after receiving a letter from Nyquist's doctor that the injury was not due to any preexisting condition. It is disputed whether the Division failed to notify Olsten of its reconsideration and subsequent reversal.

Olsten learned in February, 1992, that benefits were being paid to Nyquist. On February 26, 1992, Olsten contacted the Division, objected to the payments, requested its experience rating not be charged and inquired why a hearing had not been granted. The Division notified Olsten on March 30, 1992, that all charges against its experience rating would be nonchargeable until resolution of the matter. Finding Olsten's objection was timely, the Division ordered Olsten's requested hearing.

Before the hearing, Nyquist and Olsten agreed by stipulation and settlement agreement "that Nyquist was injured in a series of compensable injuries, but no single employer can be determined to be chargeable for the injuries." The settlement agreement also stated: "The parties further stipulate that benefits charges as a result of claims made for the September 17, 1991 injury should be distributed in accordance with the provision of § 27-14-603(e), W.S.1977 (1991 Replacement), within the general industrial classification and not chargeable to Olsten's experience rating." The agreement was not signed by the Division.

The agreement was presented to OAH along with a proposed Order Approving Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. In a letter dated June 2, 1992, OAH notified counsel for the Division that the proposed settlement involved application of WYO.STAT. § 27-14-603(e), and entitled the Division to an opportunity to request a hearing on that issue. When no objection or request for a hearing was received by the June 9, 1992 deadline, the order was entered on June 10, 1992. The following day, the Division moved to vacate the order approving the stipulation agreement. This motion was granted on June 15, 1992, and a hearing was set for August 4, 1992.

On August 3, 1992, Nyquist and Olsten entered into another settlement agreement. It stipulated that Nyquist "was injured in a work-related accident at the Buttrey Store * * * while working for Olsten on September 17, 1991 * * * sustained a compensable injury * * * and may receive benefits * * *." The agreement retained the issue of the employer's experience rating and was signed by the Division's attorney.

OAH entered an order approving the stipulation to pay Nyquist's claims and ordered that all proceedings before OAH specifically pertaining to the issue of Nyquist's entitlement to benefits were terminated. OAH retained jurisdiction of the remaining contest between Olsten and the Division and, on August 4, 1992, heard the case for determining the chargeability of the employer's experience rating for compensation paid to the employee. OAH determined there was not any statutory basis that provided for it to order that an employer's experience rating not be assessed for payments to an injured employee. OAH concluded the Division was entitled to a judgment on the pleadings as a matter of law and granted its motion. The district court affirmed OAH's decision, and this appeal followed.

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4 cases
  • Campbell v. Department of Family Services
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • September 14, 1994
    ...court's decision; instead, our judicial review of agency decisions is as a reviewing court of the first instance. Matter of Nyquist, 870 P.2d 360, 362 (Wyo.1994). DFS denied Campbell a hearing upon finding that under the relevant federal regulation a hearing was not mandated. Our review of ......
  • Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1995
    ... ... In the Matter of Nyquist, 870 P.2d 360, 362 (Wyo.1994). The scope of review of administrative actions is defined ... ...
  • Wagoner v. State, Dept. of Admin. and Information, 96-34
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • September 19, 1996
    ... ... of the first instance and we accord no deference to the district court's decision." In the Matter of Nyquist, 870 P.2d 360, 362 (Wyo.1994) (citing Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, ... ...
  • Olheiser v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • December 7, 1994
    ...review is as a reviewing court of the first instance and we accord no deference to the district court's decision. Matter of Nyquist, 870 P.2d 360, 362 (Wyo.1994). As a reviewing court, our standard of review is set out by [T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, int......

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