Nystedt v. Nigro

• Decision Date: 20 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 12–1245.,12–1245.
• Citation: 700 F.3d 25
• Parties: Douglas O. NYSTEDT, Jr., individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Evan T. Nystedt, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Eugene A. NIGRO et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

700 F.3d 25

Douglas O. NYSTEDT, Jr., individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Evan T. Nystedt, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.Eugene A. NIGRO et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 12–1245.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Nov. 6, 2012.

Decided Nov. 20, 2012.

William P. Corbett, Jr., with whom The Corbett Law Firm was on brief, for appellant.

Christopher R. Conroy, with whom Elizabeth A. Houlding and Peabody & Arnold LLP were on brief, for appellees.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, SELYA and STAHL, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

This case requires us to explore the parameters of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The underlying litigation is a will contest turned conspiracy case. The plaintiff prevailed in probate court, but only after two and a half years of pretrial discovery and legal wrangling. All the while, the estate's assets waned and the legal fees waxed.

In the end, the plaintiff, although found to be the sole lawful heir of the decedent, had little to show for his victory. Seeking retribution, he sued a bevy of persons involved in the will contest. The central theme of his suit was the allegation of a wide-ranging conspiracy.

In a preliminary ruling, the district court found two of the defendants (a lawyer who had served as a court-appointed discovery master and the lawyer's firm) immune from suit by reason of quasi-judicial immunity. The court certified this ruling as a partial final judgment. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). After careful consideration, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

“Because this case was decided below on a motion to dismiss, we rehearse the facts as revealed by the complaint and the documents annexed thereto.” Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir.2012).

This imbroglio began with the death of Evan Nystedt in May of 2004. Soon thereafter, the decedent's attorney and friend, Earl Munroe, offered a purported will for probate. The probate court provisionally appointed Munroe as executor. SeeMass. Gen. Laws ch. 192, §§ 13–14 (repealed 2008). Munroe neglected to provide the statutorily required notice to heirs, see id. § 13, and used his position as temporary executor to squander estate resources.

The decedent's closest living relative was plaintiff-appellant Douglas Nystedt, who eventually learned of the probate proceedings. He asserted his rights as heir at law and, in August of 2004, initiated a will contest.

On December 17, 2004, the probate court appointed Eugene Nigro, a practicing lawyer, as a special master “to monitor the discovery process” and ensure “full [ ] compl[iance] with [ ] reasonable [discovery] requests” “on a timely basis.” The court authorized the special master to charge the parties, equally, his usual and customary hourly rates. SeeMass. R. Civ. P. 53(c); Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 26(j).

The plaintiff alleges that the special master's performance left much to be desired. He asserts that the special master failed to respond to several letters imploring him to schedule a discovery conference and compel Munroe to honor discovery requests. He also asserts that the special master engaged in ex parte communications with Munroe's counsel, George Lordan. He laments that, after eighteen months of service, the special master had only two depositions and one hundred pages of “generally irrelevant” documents to show for his efforts.

In May of 2006, the plaintiff sought to oust the special master. The probate court rejected this entreaty. Discovery continued until February of 2007, when trial commenced. Following the trial, the probate court, noting that Munroe was both the preparer of the will and the person who stood to inherit from it, disallowed the will. The rejection of the will left the plaintiff as the decedent's administrator and the sole beneficiary of the estate. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190, §§ 2–3 (repealed 2008). On appeal, the probate court's decision was affirmed. See Munroe v. Nystedt, No. 07–P–944, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1103, 2008 WL 4778297 (Mass.App.Ct. Nov. 4, 2008).

The plaintiff's success was bittersweet. By the time that he prevailed and took control of the assets, the value of the estate had been greatly diminished. To make matters worse, he had spent over $200,000 in waging the will contest.

Having been left holding a nearly empty bag, the plaintiff, individually and in his capacity as administrator of the decedent's estate, sued a phalanx of will-contest participants. These defendants included the special master and the law firm in which he was a partner, Nigro, Pettepit & Lucas, LLP (the Firm). For ease in exposition, we refer to these two defendants, collectively, as the Nigro defendants.

After his suit was docketed in the federal district court, the plaintiff twice amended his complaint. The operative pleading for present purposes—the second amended complaint—contains twenty-three counts against nine defendants.

The claims against the Nigro defendants are narrowly focused. The complaint posits that the special master's delinquent performance of his duties prolonged the will contest and, thus, caused the value of the estate to plummet. The plaintiff frames this plaint as both a racketeering conspiracy charge under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, and a civil conspiracy charge under common law. In essence, he avers that the special master's misdeeds furthered a conspiracy crafted by Munroe and others. Viewed from that coign of vantage, the dispatch of each of the fifty-five invoices sent by the Nigro defendants was intended to “reap illicit[ ] benefits” from the conspiracy. These mailings ostensibly amounted to instances of mail fraud, which served as predicate acts for the racketeering charge. See18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1962. The invoices and ex parte communications also allegedly abetted Munroe's unlawful conversion of estate assets.

The Nigro defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted this motion by means of a docket entry because, in its view, all of the Nigro defendants' actions “relate[d] to [Nigro's] quasi-judicial work as a discovery master.” The district court then certified its order of dismissal as a final judgment. See Nystedt v. Munroe, No. 10–10754, 2012 WL 244939 (D.Mass. Jan. 26, 2012) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)). This timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Before us, the plaintiff challenges both the certification order and the order of dismissal. Without the certification, we would lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. See28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 39–40 (1st Cir.1991). Accordingly, we begin with the certification order and then mull the dismissal order.

A. The Certification Order.

“When an action presents more than one claim for relief ... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). This procedure, though sometimes useful, is in obvious tension with the “long-settled and prudential policy against the scattershot disposition of litigation.” Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir.1988). “It follows, then, that entry of judgment under the rule should not be indulged as a matter of routine or as a magnanimous accommodation to lawyers or litigants.” Id. Rather, Rule 54(b) should be applied sparingly and “only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

When contemplating Rule 54(b) certification, a trial court first must ensure that the ruling underlying the proposed judgment is final. Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 42. Such a determination embodies a judgment about a matter of law and, thus, engenders de novo review. González Figueroa v. J.C. Penney P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 317 (1st Cir.2009). To qualify as final, a ruling must “dispose[ ] completely either of all claims against a given defendant or of some discrete substantive claim or set of claims against the defendants generally.” Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 580 (1st Cir.1994). This requirement is plainly satisfied here: the order granting the Nigro defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss terminated all of the plaintiff's claims against them.

The plaintiff attempts to parry this thrust. He argues that the dismissed claims against the Nigro defendants were part of counts in which other defendants were also named. With this in mind, he insists that the district court's order could not be “final” as the counts at issue remained in the case.

This argument exalts form over substance. A single count in a complaint may contain multiple claims and implicate multiple defendants. By its terms, Rule 54(b) permits the entry of a final judgment as to “one or more ... parties,” without reference to the fact that the pleader may have organized such claim or claims within counts containing claims against other parties. See Feinstein, 942 F.2d at 39–40(upholding Rule 54(b) certification of an order dismissing claims against some, but not all, defendants named in a single RICO count).

In addition to finality, Rule 54(b) requires the trial court to make an express determination that there is “no just reason for delay.” We examine the district court's evaluation of the equities inherent in this determination with a deferential eye. See Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 43–44.

In the case at hand, the district court focused on the importance of protecting the Nigro defendants' reputation in the legal community. Nystedt, 2012 WL 244939, at *1. The court noted that pending RICO and conspiracy charges might well dissuade potential clients from using their services. Id. To cinch matters, the court found nothing to suggest that the immediate entry of a partial final judgment would prejudice the rights of any party. Id.

We discern no error. We think that the district court's assessment...