Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 2-75

Citation133 Vt. 225,335 A.2d 321
Decision Date28 February 1975
Docket NumberNo. 2-75,2-75
PartiesStephen N. NZUVE v. CASTLETON STATE COLLEGE et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont

Stephen L. Klein, Rutland, for plaintiff.

Peter H. Banse, Bishop & Crowley, Rutland, for defendants.

Before BARNEY, C. J., and SMITH, KEYSER, DALEY and LARROW, JJ.

LARROW, Justice.

In a case of first impression in this state, the plaintiff-appellant, Stephen Nzuve, seeks to enjoin Castleton State College, its College Court, and its Dean for Student Affairs, from holding a hearing before the College Court on charges preferred against him by the Dean. He seeks to enjoin such hearing permanently on the ground that the procedures outlined by the applicable college rules fail to meet the requirements of due process. He also seeks temporary relief on the further ground that such hearing would unduly prejudice the disposition of criminal charges against him pending in the Rutland Superior Court if held before such disposition.

Admittedly, the charges before the College Court and those before the Rutland Superior Court are substantially the same. In substance, they encompass burglary of a sleeping apartment in the nighttime, attempted rape, and simple assault. College involvement in the charges springs from the fact that they allegedly occurred in a college dormitory at a time when the building was closed to males.

The complaint was dismissed by the Rutland Superior Court, which stayed the dismissal order and enjoined student trial until disposition of the appeal from its order. On motion, we granted speedy hearing, and have elected to dispose of the case by opinion and entry made prior to the customary time, opening of the succeeding term.

We hereinafter consider the issues, ably presented by counsel, in what seems to us their logical order. It is both undisputed and certain that the rights of plaintiff here threatened are neither insubstantial nor de minimis. With prior investment in his pursuit of a degree, he stands threatened with expulsion and loss of good name and reputation. This is 'loss of liberty' within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and due process of law is required if plaintiff is to sustain such loss. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930, 82 S.Ct. 368, 7 L.Ed.2d 193 (1961). 'Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.' Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). We have, therefore, examined at length the stipulated procedures of the College Court, which plaintiff voluntarily elected in preference to an alternative hearing before Dean Jennings, to determine whether the protections appropriate to the situation are afforded him. In light of the importance of this question, we elect not to consider the effect of his election as a possible waiver. If due process is not indeed afforded by these procedures, plaintiff would be entitled to both the permanent and the temporary relief which he seeks.

We have also, in light of the importance of this case and the desirability of fair and speedy disposition, elected to relax somewhat the stringency of our rules regarding adequate briefing. Practically all of plaintiff's claims with respect to the inadequacy of the procedures afforded are contained in a lengthy affidavit which was attached to his application for temporary relief. These claims are, in his brief, simply incorporated by reference, a course we would ordinarily consider inadequate briefing. We imposed, however, short limitations on briefing preparation for argument, and consider the presentation by both counsel, under existing circumstances, to be impressive. We have therefore considered the merits of these claims, insofar as they are consistent with the unchallenged findings of the trial court.

The first general objection raised by appellant below was that the College Court hearing would be a criminal action, denying him due process. He points to the power to impose a fine, without limitation as to amount. We are cited to no authority holding this makes the action criminal in nature, but in any event, failure to pay an imposed fine results only in 'further disciplinary action.' The most severe disciplinary action set forth in the procedures is expulsion; it follows that the most severe fine would only be tantamount to expulsion. The procedures are not, in our view, rendered 'criminal' by this provision. An alleged lack of right of confrontation and examination is contrary to the findings of the trial court, and we do not, therefore, consider it. The same is true with respect to an alleged deprivation of counsel. Unanmity among the members of the court is not required, but we are pointed to no authority holding this to be a requisite of due process. Trial by court before the three members of our county (now superior) courts have never been held to require such unanimity. The issue of lack of time to prepare a defense was decided adversely to appellant by the trial court, and this finding stands unchallenged, largely because of events transpiring between the original affidavit and hearing on the merits. Absence of 'random selection' of court members may well be applicable to jury trial, but certainly has no application to trial without jury. Failure to replace disqualified members after challenge deserves the same comment. The argument of 'selective enforcement', based upon the infrequency of preferred charges and failure to pursue the drug convictions of two other students we regard as frivolous, particularly when made without citation of authority.

Also asserted in the submitted affidavit was impairment of plaintiff's privilege against self-incrimination. We treat this claim infra, in dealing with plaintiff's claim for temporary relief.

In Goss v. Lopez, supra, the majority opinion makes reference to the Fifth Circuit decision in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, supra, as a 'landmark decision', which indeed it is. Without extensive quotation, Dixon enumerates the criteria of due process prior to expulsion from a state college. They are a statement of specific charges and grounds for expulsion under appropriate regulations; a hearing approaching more than as informal interview with administrative authority; an opportunity for both sides to be heard in considerable detail at a hearing best suited to protect the rights of all involved, not necessarily public; the 'rudiments' of an adversary proceeding. A full-dress judicial hearing, with right of cross-examination, is not required, but a right to present a defense, by oral testimony or affidavits, is. The 'rudimentary elements of fair play' meet general requirements of due process.

All of these elements are contained in the stipulated procedures of the Castleton College Court, found by the trial court. Appellees urge that we not 'escalate the formality and adversary nature of the disciplinary process to that akin to criminal prosecution', and in line with what we regard as the current overwhelming weight of authority, we are not inclined so to do. Goss v. Lopez, supra; Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).

In addition to the Dixon requirements enumerated above, we would point out that the trial court found numerous laudable, if not mandated, provisions in the Castleton College Court procedures. At plaintiff's election, he could be tried before the Dean of Academic Affairs or the College Court. From either forum, he could appeal to the Disciplinary Committee and, further, to the College President. On trial, he was entitled to an advisor, who could be legal counsel. He was consulted as to whether he preferred a closed hearing or one open to the college community. He had the right to present evidence and examine witnesses, to remain silent without prejudice, to hear all testimony, and to challenge all judges except the Chief Judge. The burden of proof rested on the prosecution. Although they were not enumerated, he was advised that his constitutional rights would be respected.

We concur fully with the conclusions of the trial court that the procedures sought to be permanently enjoined by the plaintiff did not violate due process. The permanent injunction was rightly denied.

In affirming the lower court's holding that the requirements of due process are met by the Castleton procedures, we note a unique feature of this case. The plaintiff is not a Vermont citizen or permanet resident, but a national of the Republic of Kenya. He is, therefore, not within the protective ambit of due process for all of the reasons stated in Goss. He lacks the 'protected interest in property' which...

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6 cases
  • Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Committee
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 27 Enero 1983
    ...facts, and that " 'the rudimentary elements of fair play' meet general requirements of due process." Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 Vt. 225, 229, 335 A.2d 321, 324 (1975). Turning to the lower federal courts, decisions have examined both administrative noncompliance with established ......
  • Gabrilowitz v. Newman
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 21 Junio 1978
    ...declined to grant students the right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings. But, with the exception of Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 Vt. 225, 232, 335 A.2d 321, 326 (1975), and Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D.Cal.1969), these cases did not involve the specter of a pend......
  • University of Utah v. Shurtleff
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 8 Septiembre 2006
    ...had a "contractual duty" to maintain such an atmosphere in its student dormitories (emphasis added)); Nzuve v. Castleton State Coll., 133 Vt. 225, 335 A.2d 321, 325 (1975) ("Educational institutions have both a need and a right to formulate their own standards [for academic discipline] and ......
  • Com. v. Watkins
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 3 Septiembre 1992
    ...1163, 1164-1165 (N.D.Cal.1969); Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F.Supp. 1379, 1385 (W.D.Mich.1983); Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 Vt. 225, 232-233, 335 A.2d 321 (1975). In the present case, the defendant, at the time he made his statements to the university investigator, was a mat......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Campuses or Courtrooms? Government Involvement in U.s. and U.k. University Sexual Misconduct Response
    • United States
    • University of Georgia School of Law Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law No. 51-1, 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...(1975) (referring to "the landmark decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dixon") and Nzuve v. Castleton State Coll., 335 A.2d 321, 324 (1975) ("In [Goss], the majority opinion makes reference to . . . [Dixon] as a 'landmark decision', which indeed it is.").84. Dixon, 294......

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