O.A.O. v. R.S.O., 14-20-00870-CV

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
Writing for the CourtFrances Bourliot, Justice
PartiesO.A.O., Appellant v. R.S.O., Appellee
Docket Number14-20-00870-CV
Decision Date22 November 2022

O.A.O., Appellant
v.

R.S.O., Appellee

No. 14-20-00870-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District

November 22, 2022


On Appeal from the 280th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2019-76763

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Wilson.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Frances Bourliot, Justice

This is a pro se appeal from the trial court's final protective order under Title 4 of the Texas Family Code restricting appellant O.A.O.'s contact with appellee R.S.O., among others. On appeal, appellant primarily challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's factual findings underlying the protective order. Because appellant requested only a partial reporter's record but did not follow the procedures that would require we presume the partial record contains all of the relevant evidence and filings, we affirm the trial court's final protective

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order.

Discussion

The trial court initially granted appellee's request for an ex parte temporary restraining order and subsequently signed the final protective order. Appellant has filed several documents with this court challenging the trial court's orders, including two petitions for writ of mandamus that we denied in prior orders. See In re O.A.O., No. 14-21-00215-CV, 2021 WL 1917844, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 13, 2021, orig. proceeding); In re O.A.O., No. 14-21-00099-CV, 2021 WL 925055, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 11, 2021, orig. proceeding). Although the present case is an appeal, appellant appears to have filed substantially the same document or brief that he filed in the two mandamus actions.[1] Among his arguments, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the final protective order and threatening him with the loss of assets (presumably from being ordered to pay appellee's attorney's fees) in the absence of evidence proving the allegations against him; there was no proof either that appellee was in danger or that appellant had abused appellee in the past; the evidence is factually insufficient; and the trial court erred in excluding evidence. Except for the evidence-exclusion issue, each of these complaints turns on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings underlying the order.[2] In regards to the evidence-exclusion issue, appellant does not identify the evidence he contends the trial court erred in excluding or where in the record he

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requested its admission. That issue is therefore inadequately briefed. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring that appellate briefs "must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record"); see also Nguyen v. Pham, 640 S.W.3d 266, 275 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). We therefore turn to the issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence.

As appellant acknowledges, the trial court heard evidence and argument in this case on four separate days. Appellant, however, only requested that the court reporter file hearing transcripts from two of those dates, one being a partial "excerpt" of proceedings and the other being a full transcript of the final day. Appellant asserts in his briefing that this...

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