Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC

• Decision Date: 02 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 38146.,38146.
• Citation: Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 272 P.3d 512 (Idaho 2012)
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: David F. OAKES, M.D., Plaintiff–Counterdefendant–Appellant, v. BOISE HEART CLINIC PHYSICIANS, PLLC, Defendant–Counterclaimant–Respondent.

152 Idaho 540

272 P.3d 512

David F. OAKES, M.D., Plaintiff–Counterdefendant–Appellant,

v.BOISE HEART CLINIC PHYSICIANS, PLLC, Defendant–Counterclaimant–Respondent.

No. 38146.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2012 Term.

March 2, 2012.

Banducci, Woodward, Schwartzman, PLLC, Boise, for appellant. Thomas A. Banducci argued.

Duke, Scanlan & Hall, Boise, for respondent. Keely E. Duke argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

This case arises out of a determination by the district court that David Oakes (Oakes) was not the prevailing party in his claim against his former employer, Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC (BHC). Oakes brought a claim against BHC alleging that the company owed him $25,171.69 pursuant to an employment contract. BHC filed a counterclaim alleging that Oakes had been overcompensated for his work, and that Oakes owed BHC $32,794.10 for the overpayment. The jury sided with Oakes and awarded him $2,043.92, a fraction of the amount he sought. The district court entered a judgment conferring to Oakes the amount awarded by the jury, but found that neither party was the prevailing party for purposes of costs or attorney fees. Oakes appeals that determination to this Court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Oakes was employed as a cardiologist by BHC from January 2000 until the end of July 2008, when he left to pursue other employment opportunities. While employed by BHC, Oakes had an employment agreement that entitled him to "an annual salary in an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of the adjusted gross charges generated by the Physician." The charges generated by Oakes were from several different employment activities. Aside from his work for BHC, Oakes interpreted electrocardiograms for St. Luke's Regional Medical Center (St. Luke's) and participated on the Heart and Vascular Board. The employment agreement also governed Oakes's compensation for this work. Finally, Oakes was involved in a program through BHC called "Gainshare" that gave physicians a share of any reductions in costs or waste in patient care. Because of these complicated arrangements, Oakes's final payment would not be calculated until after his departure. The dispute over this final payment amount eventually led to the commencement of this action.

After his employment ended, Oakes engaged in correspondence with BHC for the purpose of receiving his final payment. Oakes never received any payment, instead receiving a series of letters that detailed the evolving computation of his final payment. The letters from BHC show a gradual increase in the amount of money BHC claims that it overpaid Oakes, finally reaching a total of $29,310.08. The May 11, 2009 letter from BHC included a demand for repayment.

On August 11, 2009, Oakes filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, claiming that BHC still owed him money under the employment agreement. At trial, Oakes detailed the alleged amounts owed to him, which totaled $25,171.69.¹ BHC brought a counterclaim and alleged at trial that Oakes was overpaid by $32,794.10.

In rendering its verdict, the jury was given a choice between three special verdict forms that corresponded with the three possible verdicts: one finding that neither party is entitled to recover from the other; one that finding that BHC owed money to Oakes; and one finding that Oakes owed money to BHC. The jury returned with a verdict in favor of Oakes, and against BHC, that awarded Oakes $2,043.92. After the verdict, Oakes submitted a proposed judgment and supporting memorandum that contained, among other things, a request for treble damages under the Wage Claims Act. BHC filed a motion in opposition to the proposed judgment, taking particular issue with the request for treble damages. On October 4, 2010, the district court entered a final judgment that awarded Oakes $2,043.92 and declared that neither party was the prevailing party for purposes of costs and attorney fees. Oakes timely filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The determination of prevailing party status is committed to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010) (citing Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009) ). When examining whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. Only in the rarest of circumstances will this Court reverse the district court's determination of which party prevailed. Shore, 146 Idaho at 914, 204 P.3d at 1125.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The district court erred in finding that Oakes was not the prevailing party in this matter.

Oakes argues that the jury chose the verdict form that represented a victory on his claim and a defensive victory over BHC's counterclaim. Oakes claims that in so choosing, the jury declined to use either a verdict form that would entitle neither party to any award, or a form that would entitle BHC to an award. In response, BHC puts forward several arguments regarding waiver and contends that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

1. Whether this claim is waived on appeal.

In its brief, BHC argues that Oakes waived the issue of attorney fees in several different ways. First, since Oakes argued that the Idaho Wage Claim Act applied in this case—an argument that the district court rejected—it would preclude attorney fees under any other statute. Secondly, that Oakes waived the issue by not timely filing a memorandum for costs and fees. And finally, that Oakes is asking for fees under I.C. § 12–120(3) for the first time on appeal.

a. Whether the wage claim act was the exclusive avenue for attorney fees.

In his proposed judgment, Oakes asked the district court for treble damages under I.C. § 45–615, a section of the Idaho Wage Claims Act. Idaho Code section 45–615 allows attorney fees and treble damages in a suit filed to recover wages as they are defined by I.C. § 45–601(7). BHC argues that, since the district court declined to treble the damages, the court implicitly ruled that Oakes did not prevail on his wage claim and thus was not entitled to attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 45–615. BHC also argues that since Oakes characterized his lawsuit as a wage claim, I.C. § 45–615 should be his only avenue for attorney fees and costs. On appeal, Oakes has waived the issue of whether the district erred by not trebling damages under I.C. § 45–615.²

In support of its position, BHC cites Bilow v. Preco, Inc., where an employee received summary judgment in his favor on a wage claim under I.C. § 45–615 but was not awarded attorney fees. 132 Idaho 23, 966 P.2d 23 (1998). On appeal, this Court found that:

[A]n award of attorney fees in addition to treble damages would constitute an unreasonable windfall to the employee and would punish the employer too harshly. Therefore, we hold that I.C. § 45–615 is the exclusive code section under which an employee can recover attorney fees when the employee properly brings a claim for wages and treble damages under I.C. §§ 45–61[5], –617.

Id. at 32, 966 P.2d at 32 (internal citations omitted).

Here, the district court implicitly determined that Oakes's claim did not fall under I.C. § 45–615, so any case law stating I.C. § 45–615 as the exclusive avenue for attorney fees would be inapplicable. In addition, as discussed below, the claim is fundamentally a breach of contract claim. Therefore, Oakes's attempt to invoke the Idaho Wage Claim Act would not preclude his receipt of attorney fees under any other statute.

b. Whether Oakes waived the issue of attorney fees by not timely submitting a memorandum of costs and fees.

BHC argues that Oakes waived the issue of attorney fees by not submitting to the district court a memorandum of costs nor timely moving for time extension for filing the same, and that the issue is now moot. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) states, inter alia, that:

At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, itemizing each claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment.

Oakes argues that submission of a memorandum of costs and fees would have been futile, since the district court ruled only thirteen days after the jury verdict that neither party prevailed. On this point, Oakes cites the holding in Western World, Inc. v. Prater , where the Court of Appeals found that the prevailing party did not waive the right to recover fees by failing to timely file a memorandum of costs when the initial judgment indicated that the prevailing party was not entitled to attorney fees. 121 Idaho 870, 828 P.2d 899 (Ct.App.1992).

Until the judgment was amended with respect to the attorney fees determination, a claim for that item would be subject to objection, and likely stricken on the ground that the question of entitlement already had been adjudicated. It was not until the court granted the motion to amend the judgment that Prater became entitled to an award for fees.

Id. at 873, 828 P.2d at 902.

BHC argues that Prater should be applied narrowly, since Prater was excused from submitting a timely memorandum of costs because he moved to amend the judgment, which tolled the period for filing such a memorandum. Id. at 872–73, 828 P.2d at 901–02. BHC argues that this is distinguishable from the present case since in Prater the district court amended the judgment to show a prevailing party. Here, like in Prater , the trial court had ruled there was no prevailing party and therefore filing of a memorandum of fees and costs would have been futile. Therefore, there was no waiver of claims for...