Oakes v. Lake
| Decision Date | 06 November 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 5,5 |
| Parties | OAKES v. LAKE, Sheriff |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. George B. Guthrie, James G. Wilson, and John F. Reilly, all of Portland, Or., for petitioner.
Mr. William Healy, of Boise, Idaho, for respondent.
This is an action under the Idaho 'claim and delivery' statute brought by petitioner in the Federal District Court for the District of Idaho. The complaint alleges that petitioner is a resident and inhabitant of the state of Oregon, and is the duly qualified receiver of the property which is the subject matter of the action, having been so appointed by an Oregon state circuit court; that follow- ing his appointment and qualification, and prior to March, 1931, as such receiver he took into his possession certain designated cattle, and has ever since been entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession thereof; that about the 1st day of July, 1931, the respondent took possession of the cattle in the state of Idaho by virtue of a writ of attachment; that respondent has refused to return said cattle to petitioner, although demand therefor was made prior to the commencement of the action. Judgment was prayed to the effect that petitioner is the owner and entitled to the immediate possession of the cattle, and in lieu thereof that he recover from respondent the sum of $5,000.
The answer, among other things, denies that petitioner took possession of the cattle as alleged, or any of them, and avers affirmatively that respondent in his official capacity seized the cattle upon a writ of execution duly issued by an Idaho state district court.
The case was tried before the Federal District Court and a jury. Petitioner offered evidence tending to show that he had taken actual possession of the cattle in the state of Oregon, and that the cattle thereafter were found in Idaho and there seized by respondent. At the conclusion of petitioner's case, respondent moved for nonsuit and dismissal, upon the grounds: (1) That the proof shows that plaintiff had no capacity to sue in the courts of Idaho, since he had neither title to the property under the Oregon law or the order of the court appointing him, nor actual possession thereof, either in the state of Oregon or in the state of Idaho; (2) that an action of replevin will not lie in a United States court against a sheriff to take property from the possession of a state court. A third ground was urged, which we do not consider. It is without merit and is not pressed here. The court granted the motion, saying 'that the proof is insufficient to initiate the liability on this hearing.'
1. Upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, that court, without considering other assignments of error, affirmed the judgment upon the ground that a receiver appointed in a state court is not entitled to sue in a foreign jurisdiction to repossess cattle, which, after being put in charge of his agent, cross over the boundary line into a foreign jurisdiction. Although respondent contends otherwise, the court below reached that conclusion in the face of an assumption that actual possession of the cattle had been taken by petitioner in Oregon. The language of the court follows: 'Granting the soundness of the contention that the receiver was entitled to the undisturbed possession of the property and assuming that he actually had such possession (italics supplied), and granting or assuming that he had the power to sue locally in replevin for an unlawful interference with his right of possession, nevertheless such right of possession did not vest him with the title necessary to sue in the court below without an ancillary appointment therein; and he was not entitled to bring the suit as a matter of comity.' 62 F.(2d) 728, 730.
Upon the same assumption, namely, that the receiver had reduced the property to his actual possession in the state of Oregon, we reach a different conclusion.
The general rule undoubtedly is that an ordinary chancery receiver, having no other authority that that arising from his appointment as such, cannot as of right maintain an action in a state other than that in which he was appointed. The decision in Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 15 L.Ed. 164, to that effect has been uniformly followed by this court. See, for example, Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, 198 U.S. 561, 25 S.Ct. 770, 49 L.Ed. 1163; Sterrett v. Second National Bank, 248 U.S. 73, 39 S.Ct. 27, 63 L.Ed. 135. The very terms in which the rule is expressed, however, clearly recognize that where the receiver has 'other authority than that arising from his appointment as such,' he may under some circumstances maintain an action outside the state of his appointment. And so it definitely has been held.
The foreign receiver may maintain such a suit, so far at least as the federal courts are concerned, where title to the property in question has been vested in him by conveyance or statute. In Bernheimer v. converse, 206 U.S. 516, 27 S.Ct. 755, 51 L.Ed. 1163, it was held that a receiver might sue in a foreign jurisdiction to collect upon the statutory liability of stockholders of a corporation, where the statute of the state conferred the right upon the receiver as quasi assignee. Following that decision, this court, in Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 256 et seq., 32 S.Ct. 415, 56 L.Ed. 749, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1292, while reiterating the rule laid down in Booth v. Clark, supra, pointed out that the receiver suing in the Hamilton Case was not merely an ordinary chancery receiver, but much more; that under the laws of the state of his appointment he became a quasi assignee, vested with the rights of the creditors against the stockholders, and charged with the enforcement of those rights in the courts of the state and elsewhere; that his right to maintain an action in another state properly could not be denied as presenting a question only of comity unaffected by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. The case involved the right of a receiver of an insolvent Minnesota corporation to maintain a suit in Wisconsin against two stockholders to enforce an asserted double liability imposed by the Minnesota statute. The Wisconsin court refused to entertain the suit, holding it to be a matter of comity; but this court, denying that view, reversed on the ground that thereby the laws of Minnesota and the judicial proceedings of that state had not been accorded the faith and credit to which they were entitled under the Federal Constitution.
In the case just dealt with, and in other cases where the receivership property has been assigned to the receiver by its owner, the suit is brought not strictly in his capacity as receiver, by virtue of his appointment in another state, but in his capacity as assignee. High, Receivers (4th Ed.) § 244. His designation as receiver, etc., in the title of the cause may be regarded as descriptio personae merely.
Coming immediately to the present case, the authorities, federal and state, are in practical accord to the effect that where the receiver appointed in one state has taken possession of property which thereafter is found and seized upon process in another state, the receiver may maintain an action in the latter state to recover possession or for other appropriate relief. The Willamette Valley (C.C.A.) 66 F. 565, 567; Hopkins v. Lancaster (D.C.) 254 F. 190—192; Wilkinson v. Culver (C.C.) 25 F. 639; Jenkins v. Purcell, 29 App.D.C. 209, 215, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1074; Lyon v. Russell, 41 App.D.C. 554, 559; Pond v. Cooke, 45 Conn. 126, 132, 29 Am.Rep. 668; Robertson v. Staed, 135 Mo. 135, 137, 36 S.W. 610, 33 L.R.A. 203, 58 Am.St.Rep. 569; Woodhull v. Trust Co., 11 N.D. 157, 163, 164, 90 N.W. 795, 95 Am.St.Rep. 712; Cagill v. Wooldridge, 67 Tenn. (8 580, 582, 583, 35 Am.Rep. 716. Other cases might be cited to the same effect. The only decision which we have found definitely to the contrary is Humphreys v. Hopkins, 81 Cal. 551, 22 P. 892, 6 L.R.A. 792, 15...
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